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ABSTRACT
This thesis outlines the history of the Volta River Project
indicating the origin of the initiatives behind the project and
the method of implementing it in the face of opposition. A
discussion of the variety of aims and expectations of those
involved by the scheme indicates widely divergent interests at
\
work. The effects of the scheme are described at length; both
the main effects desired by the participants and the so—called
side-effects. The extent to which each interest group managed to
achieve its aims is described as an aid to assessment of the
project. As a result the value of the project to Ghana is
called into question, and an indication is given of fundamental
criticisms of such projects in general.
DECLARATION
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A NOTE ON CONVENTIONS
The title 'Ghana' has been -used throughout this work.
The country's former name, the Gold Coast, has only been used
in quotations or in titles of publications.
Metric units have been used except in quotations where
the metric equivalent if necessary has been added.
The Ghanaian new cedi (Nj2), the U.S. dollar (/) and the
pound sterling (£) have all been used as units of currency, but
to try and acquaint the reader with an unfamiliar unit, new
cedis have been used consistently throughout Chapter One.
Exchange rates were as follows
Equivalent of one
Period Ghanaian Currency unit of Ghanaian currency
* £
1958/July 1965 £G 2.8 1.0
July 1965/Feb 1967 1.17 0.42
Feb 1967/July 1967 N0 1.4 0.5
July 1967/Nov 1967 N0 ■ 0.98 0.35
Nov 1967/Dec 1971 N0 0.98 0.40
Feb 1972/Dec 1972 N/ 0.78 0.32
Dec 1972/Dec 1973 N0 0.78 0.33
Dec 1973/May 1975 N0 0.86 0.35
XV
A GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS
A I D Agency for International Development
A L C A N Aluminium Limited of Canada
A L C 0 A Aluminum Company of America
B A C 0 British Aluminium Company Limited
C P P Convention People's Party
E C G Electricity Corporation of Ghana
F A 0 Food and Agriculture Organisation
I B R D International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (The World Bank)
I D A International Development Association
(part of the World Bank Group)
0 P I C Overseas Private Investment Corporation
U G C C United Gold Coast Convention
u N D P United Nations Development Programme
V A L c 0 Volta Aluminium Company Limited
V L II D P Volta Lake Research and Development Project
V L T C Volta Lake Transport Company
V II A Volta River Authority
V R P Volta River Project
w A F A L West African Aluminium Limited
w F P World Food Programme
w II 0 World Health Organisation
INTRODUCTION
This thesis is a historical, economic and political study of
an industrialisation scheme in Ghana» This scheme, called the Volta
River Project (VRP), involved the building of a large hydroelectric
dam and an aluminium smelter. The questions that the thesis seeks
to answer include the following
(a) Who initiated the scheme and with what motives?
(b) How in terms of political processes was the scheme
brought to reality?
(c) Who benefited from the scheme?
(d) What can we learn of more general interest which
might help us to understand other schemes which
involve rich countries, multinational corporations
and poor countries?
The VRP is generally described as a "development scheme" but
the end result of this study has been a questioning of this
description. The VRP seems not to have assisted Ghana's development.
Even if the definition of development is restricted to a purely
technical criterion such as whether industrialisation has occurred,
the VRP remains open to severe criticism. If development is
defined in terms of economic criteria (in terms of monetary gain or
loss), the success of the VRP is even more in doubt. And when
development is defined in terms of the achievement of political
autonomy, the VRP looks as much a backward as a forward step.
Since the meaning of the word "development" is often left
loosely-defined, it ought to be made clear what definition of
development is being used here.
The process of development does not simply involve a cultural
change from a traditional to a modern society, or a materialistic
change from a poor to a rich society. Neither does it involve
simply a combination of cultural and materialistic change. To
assume that the process is simply one of transmutation from one form
(or cluster of characteristics) to another is uxrwise. For this
assumption involves two further, hidden assumptions pertaining to
the problem:
1) That today's "developed1" nations" offer some kind of
ideal archetype at which to aim,
2) That the present structure of the world economy is
basically acceptable; all it needs is minor modification
to absorb poor countries into its system.
On the contrary, a key assumption of this thesis is that the
"developed nations" could not exist as they are today if we did
not have the "underdeveloped nations". So to assume that the change
from underdeveloped to developed can occur without changing the
present picture of the world economy, is to ignore the structural
nature of underdevelopment.
The problem then, of defining development may he approached
by first defining underdevelopment. Typically the main characteristics
of a Third World country are that it is:
A) Disarticulated:- that is, it is less of a homogeneous unit
from the economic and social points of view than are the rich nations.
It exhibits large differences in affluence between its regions and
amongst its population.
B) Dominated:- by the rich countries, primarily economically
but also culturally and technologically.
C) Incapable of providing an adequate standard of living for
the majority of its population, / Sagasti, 1973_7
So on this basis, the process of development does not merely
consist of achieving economic growth as measured by increasing GNP
or GNP per capita or similar yardsticks. Economic growth alone will
not necessarily result in an end to disarticulation or to domination
or to poverty for a very large section of a country's population.
Neither will the improvement of the productivity of agriculture or
the encouragement of industry provide a simple one-dimensional
solution to the problem. The problem is multidimensional and in
consequence must be attacked on many fronts. But if a poor country
is to develop it probably should obtain three things
1) A large degree of self-reliance and of self-determination
(but not necessarily self-sufficiency).
2) A fairer distribution of income and wealth among its
population.
3) A larger slice of the "world cake" through a fairer
international distribution of wealthy
Thus development is not purely an economic or technical process,
for development is more than just economic growth and it is more
than just changes in the structure of on economy and it is more
than just changes in the teclmiques of production. Development
involves social and political and institutional changes. Above all,
development is a subject for political analysis in terms of power
structures, autonomy and control. This work is therefore a case
study of how political influences have affected what might appear
to be a straightforward, technical, development project.
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Originality of the thesis
This thesis is original for the following three reasons:-
i) It is one of very few works which discuss the
interactions between the fields of politics and technology with some
depth of empirical detail / See Williams, 1971, for a general
j
account of the field_7, Two crucial political questions facing any
society are:-
a) What goals is the society to aim for?
b) By what means is the society to achieve those goals?
The first question is usually recognised as being an essentially
political decision,, But the second question is sometimes regarded
as being "neutral", a "merely technological" question. This is
too simplistic. For the second question involves both policy
decisions and the use of technology. This is a place where there
is an intimate relationship between politics and technology.
ii) It is the first time that the VHP has been examined
in explicitly socio-political terms, in terms of interest groups,
iii) It is the first time that the value of the VHP to
Ghana's development has been thoroughly examined with a broad
historical and political perspective. There are four other book-
length studies of the VKP / Barnes, 1966; Moxon, 19&9; Chambers,
1970; Ergas, 1972_/.
Barnes deals purely with the economic expectations prior to
the project. Chambers deals purely with the resettlement scheme
necessitated by the formation of the Volta Lake. Ergas's work is
stated to be an interdisciplinary study but its contents are
descriptive rather than analytic. Because of this, it has little
claim to coherence, and is merely a collection of facts about the
VIIP /"Steel, 1972 7. Moxon is probably the best general study of
the VI!P, but it contains chapters which are not about the VHP at
all, it does not go into a great deal of detail, and it makes no
attempt at analysis or assessment.
However, I draw upon these works for information, along with
many other sources. The material for this thesis was obtained in
both the U.K. and Ghana. Preparatory research was done in
Edinburgh for 18 months before doing six months intensive work from
a base in Accra. Information on the history of the project and its
present state in economic and environmental terms, was carefully
sifted, mainly in the Volta Itiver Authority Library. The opinions
of various people connected with or interested in the project were
sought. The areas involved by the project were visited (the dam
site, the aluminium smelter, the resettlement villages, the lake and




A Brief History of Ghana up to I960
f
The area now known as Ghana came under the influence of
Europeans in the fifteenth century when the Portuguese huilt their
castle at Elmina. The Portuguese were mainly interested in Ghana's
gold hut in later years the principal trade was in slaves<, The British
became interested in Ghana in the eighteenth century and their
motivation, as with the other European powers, was gold and slaves.
But the slave trade was abolished in the nineteenth century and
Britain formally colonised the southern part of the country in 187A.
However, the powerful Ashanti tribe, whose capital was Kumasi, was not
suppressed until 1901.
The Gold Coast, as it was then called, remained under British
colonial rule until 1951 > and during this period supplied Britain with
cocoa, gold and manganese. In February 1951 a general election was
held as a result of which Kwame Nkrumah's Convention People's Party
won an overwhelming victory and Nkrumah was appointed Leader of
Government Business by the Governor. The coming into power of this
first African-majority government in Ghana did not, however, lend to
revolutionary changes. For example, just before the February election
the Crown Government had launched a ten-year development, plan called
'Ten-Year Plan for the Economic and Social Development of the Gold
Coast, 1951'. Nkrumah's government decided that they would adopt the
colonial plan, with several additions, only they would implement it in
five years instead of ten. Thus the "new" plan was entitled 'The First
Five-Year Development Plan, 1951'. / Ewusi, 1973 7
Formal independence for Ghana came in 1957, but it was not until
the declaration of the republican constitution in I960 that the office
of Governor-General was abolished thus ending a subtle form of dual
control through which the British influence was still maintained.
After 1961 Ghana was avowedly a socialist state following a policy of
non-alignmento
Nkrumah was a key figure in Ghana's history and also in the
history of the Volta River Project (VRP), so a short account follows
of his background and views, Nkrumah originally started on a career
as a schoolteacher but left Ghana to study in the United States for
ten years (at Lincoln University and the University of Pennsylvania)
and in the United Kingdom for two years (at the London School of
Economics). Explaining why he went to the U,S. for his higher
education, Nkrumah states "... America came to appeal to me as a
Western country which stood refreshingly untainted by territorial
colonialism in Africa" / Nkrumah, 1964, 1 7* bhe U.S. he studied
economics, sociology, theology and philosophy, and in the U.K. he
studied economics, law and philosophy. This kind of education
automatically made him a member of the Ghanaian intellectual elite and
put him under the influence of Western intellectual models. lie had
Christian beliefs and a nodding acquaintance with Marxist ideas. His
views on the importance of African unity (pan-Africanism) may well have
been the fruit of his stay in the U.S. where being black tended to
override the racial and regional differences amongst Africans
/ Davidson, 1973 7» This is not to say that he was totally "Westernised"
for he was a proponent of an African philosophy and of African socialism
/ Nkrumah, 1964^7. But Nkrumah did tend to overlook internal divisions
of class and creed within Ghana and Africa due to his belief in the
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necessity of Pan-Africanism for the achievement of real independence
from colonial ties. He regarded traditional African society as
essentially egalitarian / Nkrumah, 1964, 68-9 7* as having
been transformed into a class society by the colonial administration.
So Nkrumah's emphasis was on political independence first, economic
independence second and egalitaria.ni.sm third. Or, more explicitly,
formal administrative decolonisation first, financial and technological
self-reliance second and domestic reforms third.
In the period up to I960 Nkramah took steps to attract foreign
investment into Ghana. Why? Because:-
(1) lie believed that Ghana was short of capital, and
foreign capital was easiest to obtain.
(2) He believed Ghana to be short of energy supplies
(Ghana has no coal or oil to speak of) and foreign
investment seemed to be the obvious way of obtaining
an oil refinery and a hydro-electric scheme. / Esseks, 1967 7
Paradoxically, it was only after the declaration of the Republic
in I960, when attitudes to foreign investment were becoming cooler,
that significant amounts of foreign capital entered Ghana. Having
achieved political independence in 1957» it was felt that greater
economic independence should be obtained during the 60's. That this
should coincide with an influx of foreign capital indicates merely
the difficulty of characterising any country's development by
simplistic stages.
Nkrumah's party, the Convention People's Party (CPP), had its
base among Ghana's "yotingmen" / Fitch and Oppenheimer, 1966 7® These
were not necessarily young, any more than the "elders", who counselled
the tribal chief were necessarily old. "The youngmen" is a Ghanaian
I
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expression denoting educated commoners without official status. They
were often clerks, primary school teachers, storekeepers, etc. They
were essentially a petty-bourgeois stratum.
The CPP obtained power in 1951 but had to cooperate with the
colonial government after this date in order to "prove" that the
country was ready for self-government. The CPP was, therefore,
reformist in nature through having to compromise with the colonial
government and through its middle class base of support. It was a
mans party only in the sense that it had a large membership. Its
policies did not originate from Ghana's grass roots: the peasants.
Instead the CPP tried to exert influence from the middle down.
Ghana's Economy in the Early 1960's
Having dealt with the historical context to the VRP, it is
necessary to give some idea of the economic context into which it
was placed. The following section attempts to give a statistical
picture of Ghana before the VRP was implemented.
According to the I960 census Ghana had a population of 6.7
million and an annual population growth rate of 2.5 to 3.0^, thus
making Ghana one of the most densely populated countries in Africa
and one of the most rapidly growing countries (in terms of population)
in the world.
Ghana's GDP in i960 was approximately N0 950 million giving a
figure of approximately N0 140 as the GDP/capita / Birmingham et al.,
1966, 18 7• This compared with a GDP/capita of about N0 2000 in the
U.S. and N0 1000 in the U.K. for the same year. While the U.S. figure
for GDP was N0 360,000 million and for the U.K. N0 50,000 million.










Fuel and electricity 0.7
Services 31.8
100.0 $
/ Bank of Ghana Annual Report, 1962 7
As is typical in developing countries a large proportion, ahout
55$, of household income was spent on food, as compared to 25$ in the
U.K. /"Golding, 1963- J. Nevertheless the Ghanaian diet appears to he
inadequate





Recommended intake 10.5-H.8 65-70
Ghana 9.1 48.6
India 7.6 45.4
/ FA0, The State of Food and Agriculture
1969-70_7
In the poorer areas of Ghana the diet varies with the
agricultural season, so that in June before the crops have been
harvested, average body weight is much below normal:-
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Average Weight of men Average weight of men in
in U.K. Nangodi (Northern Ghana)
Height Weight Height Weight
December June
I65 cm 64 kg I65 cm 57 kg 54 kg
168 65 168 59 55
171 68 171 60 57
173 70 173 61 57
Average weight of women Average weight of women
in U.Ko in Nangodi
Height Weight Height Weight
December June
152 cm 55 kg 152 cm 44.5 kg 43 kg
155 56 155 52 48
158 58 158 52 48.5
160 60 160 52 49
/ Simons, 1972, 9 7
In I960 Ghana produced 35$ of the total world production of
cocoa / Ghana Economic Review, 1972-3 7* Cocoa exports account for
60 ~ 70$, by value, of Ghana's total exports, and duties and taxes
on cocoa make up about 35$ of the government's revenue / Henle, 1968 7*
The price received for exported cocoa tends to vary inversely with
A.
the amount exported so that although production of cocoa may be
increased the resultant proceeds tend to remain more or less the same
(see Table 0ne)o Also, althoiigh the price of cocoa may drop, the price
of chocolate usually continues to rise:-
7
1954 1964 1965
Weight of chocolate entering
U.K. domestic market (gm/head/week) 111 111 114
Chocolate wholesale price index 100 105 109
Average price paid for Ghanaian
cocoa (N0/tonne) 790 357 276
/"Bing, 1968, 376_7
Thus a fall in the price of cocoa is not allowed to he translated
into a bigger demand for chocolate. Neither producer nor consumer
benefits, only the middleman.
Ghana, being the world's largest producer of cocoa is always
in danger of saturating the world market, so there appears to be
little hope of gaining extra resources through increased production
of cocoa. Diversification away from cocoa would seem to offer more
hope, especially since cocoa is in no way related to the industrial,
agricultural or nutritional needs of the country.
Ghana's total exports in I960 were made up by percentage value
as follows











These five main products were all exported in unprocessed form
i.e. most of the cocoa is in the form of cocoa beans rather than cocoa
powder or cocoa butter, most of the timber is in the form of logs
Table One Prices and Proceeds of Cocoa Exports 1950 - 71
Average price received Quantity Proceeds
(N0/tonne) (000's tonnes)(N0 million)
1950 410 267 109
51 524 230 121
52 506 212 105
53 474 237 112
54 790 214 169
55 636 206 131
56 436 234 102
57 390 260 102
58 632 197 125
59 550 250 138
60 00 303 133
61 339 405 139
62 317 421 134
63 335 404 135
64 357 382 136
65 276 495 137
66 264 391 103
67 398 330 131
68 562 330 185
69 721 301 217
70 705 358 252
71 550 339 187
/ Sources : Birmingham et al., 1966, 348
Ghana Economic Review, 1972 -• 3J
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rather than sawn timber, etc. Any attempts to process these products
in Ghana are blocked by the tariff barriers of the industrialised world.
And Ghana's imports look like this:-
Food and beverages 19 $
Other non-durable consumer goods 21
Durable consumer goods , 9





It may seem surprising that a country which produces more than 50$
of its GNP through agriculture and forestry should have to import
such a substantial amount of food. But of course about 40$ of
agricultural production is inedible and destined for export. This
necessitated an annual food imports bill of about N0 50 million in
the early 1960's / Birmingham et al., 1966, 333 7»
The direction of Ghana's trade in I960 was as follows
Imports Exports
Sterling Area 42 $ 36 $
Dollar Area 9 16
EEC 26 36
Russia, East Europe and China 4 7
Others 19 5
/ Sources: Henle, 1968; Birmingham et al.,
1966_7
Ghana displays a clearcut regional structure. The North is
traditionally agricultural, the middle of Ghana accounts for
forestry, cocoa production and mining, and the South concentrates
most of the construction and service industries and the modern part
of the economy. Thus the Northern and Upper Regions together generated
only 9$ of the total value added in i960 while accounting for 41$ of the
country's area and 19$ of its population. And the four southern regions
yielded 75$ of the total value added while accounting for 34$ of the
country's area and 60$ of its population / Ilenle, 1968; Birmingham et al,1966
t
In terms of income the same picture emerges, the regional
distribution of income units in i960 was









/ Sources: Ewusi, 1971; Birmingham et al., 1966 7
Turning now to the subject of employment, care must be exercised
in applying this concept to an underdeveloped country. Unemployment
is usually defined for use in a wage economy, it only strictly applies
to wage labour. Ghana's i960 Population Census gives the following figored:-
T , „ rr 1 j Percentage of labourLabour Force Unemployed —- 1:5 — —s force unemployed
Male 1,682,730 109,093 6.5
Female 1,042,120 54,550 5.2
Total 2,724,850 163,643 6.0
Taking these unemployed persons as a percentage of the country's
total population gives 2.5$ which in itself is a rather high figure.
However when we realise that the problem as defined is that of wage
labour unemployment it looks much worse. The definition of an unemployed
person used in the Population Census was "a person who did not work at
any time during the reference month and had no fixed job....and who was
looking actively for work by visiting employment agencies, writing
applications etc." / I960 Population Census, Advance Report 1962, page
xvi 7. Obviously the concept of unemployment in mind here is lack of
a wage earning job. Looking at the figures again in terms of the
wage labour force only we find:-
Total wage Percentage of
labour force Unemployed wage labour
(employed & force unemployed
unemployed)
Male 567,760 109,093 19.3
Female 89,910 54,550 60.3
Total 657,670 163,643 24.9
This exaggerates the extent of the problem, for some of the
unemployed must have been seeking non-wage work, especially the
women. But it is clear that the problem is very serious. Even more
so when it is realised that to be categorised as employed, according
to the census, it was sufficient that a person had worked one day in
the preceding month. Clearly then these statistics are of limited
use for a discussion of the degree of utilisation of labour in
Ghana's economy. Rather than considering the amount of unemployment
amongst the wage labour force one should consider problems such as
"disguised unemployment" - when workers do jobs with low marginal
productivities - and "underemployment" - when workers voluntarily or
involuntarily engage in work that takes up only a part of their work
potential. One should also remember that there is a high degree of
fluctuation in employment, of job instability and absenteeism. The
reasons appear to be deficiencies in quantity and quality of food
supply, and bad health (particularly recurring illness like malaria).
Turning now to the subject of capital, the growth in Ghana's




































/ Birmingham et al., 1966, 208 ]
Ghana's capital output ratio in 1961 (as measured by the ratio of
total capital assets to the GDP) was high by African standards.
During the period 1955 to 1961 it was increasing, therefore the
economy was not expanding i:a proportion with the capital. This
I
might indicate either that relatively unproductive capital was being
acquired (such as houses, hospitals and schools rather than machinery)
or that the nature of the capital investment was not suitable for the
Ghanaian economy (i.e. that it was not appropriate to the available
resources or labour power).
Ghana's industry in i960 was generally small-scale and was
heavily dependent on imported raw materials and spare parts
/ Birmingham et al., 1966, 274-293 7• There was no iron and steel
industry, no oil refinery and no petrochemical industry,, A cement
factory was being commissioned which was to carry out the final
stage in the production of cement (i.e. the crushing of clinker),
but the clinker was to be imported. Ghana Airways and the Black
Star Line (Ghana's first airline and shipping company respectively)
were also founded in I960.
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Ghana's electrical generating capacity (consisting of diesel
powered generating sets) was about 85 MW which produced about 250
million kW hours/year. Most of this generating capacity (about 60$
of the total) was privately owned by the mining corporations.
/"Guyol, 1969, 192_7
I
Overall consumption of fossil-fuel energy in Ghana as
compared with other nations is indicated in Diagram One. Ghana is
low not only on the income scale but also on the energy consumption
scale.
One of Ghana's most useful resources is bauxite, the mineral
ore from which aluminium is produced. Ghana's estimated reserves
























































BELGIUM AND LUXEMBOURG* . .
.
. -■ •




































o 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2.500 3.000
GROSS"NATIONAL PROOOCT
Diagram One
Commercial energy consumption (thousands of megajoules
per capita per year) versus GNP (dollars per capita)
/ From: Earl Cook, Scientific American; September 1971, p. Ik2 7














French Guinea 70 100
India 70 100




/"From: Voluntary Committee on Overseas Aid and Development,
Commodity Sheet Number 7 : Aluminium, 1968 "J
Table Three : Annual World Bauxite Production



















/ From: Voluntary Committee on Overseas Aid and Development,
Commodity Sheet Number 7 : Aluminium, 1968 J
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CHAPTER TWO
THE HISTORY OF TI3E VOLTA RIVER PROJECT
The VRP was first conceived in 1915 hy Sir Albert Kitson
/ Moxon, 1969, 49 7. Kitson was Director of the Gold Coast Geological
Survey which had a permanent office in London and sent its staff to
Ghana to undertake surveys lasting up to nine months at a time.
Kitson was the man who first discovered bauxite in Ghana, near
Mpraeso in 1914. During the following year Kitson was travelling
down the Volta River and noted that the river flowed through a gorge
in a long range of hills thus making the gorge an ideal site for a
dam.
The two discoveries became interlinked in Kitson's mind, for
he knew that to produce aluminium from alumina (which is aluminium
oxide prepared by beating and purifying bauxite) a lot of electricity
is needed. Therefore a dam could be built on the Volta River to
supply electricity to an aluminium smelter, which would process
local resources of bauxite. This concept was first made public in
London in 1924, at the First World Power Conference, to which Kitson
presented a paper entitled "The possible sources of power for
industrial purposes in the Gold Coast, British West Africa" / Kitson,
1924 7. The idea was subsequently made public in Ghana in a Bulletin
of the Gold Boast Geological Survey / Kitson, 1925_7 However, from
these documents it appears that the development of Ghana's bauxite
and Ghana's hydroelectric resources was not inextricably linked,
for Kitson discusses the possibility of exporting bauxite in a crude
state and also the possibility of using hydroelectricity for mines,
&RA NA
industries and electrification of the railways, independently of
its use for aluminium smelting.
The kind of scheme envisaged by Kitson involved the building
of a dara 15 metres high at Akosombo, which would have formed a
substantial reservoir. This reservoir could then be used to
transport the bauxite from Mpraeso to the dam site, where it could
be processed into aluminium.
But Kitson's plans remained without detailed economic and
engineering studies to back them up, until Duncan Rose, a South
African engineer, read Kitson's Geological Survey Bulletin in a
Johannesburg library in 1938 / Moxon, 1969, 52 J• As a result Rose
formed the African Aluminium Syndicate and proposed a hO metre high
dam at a cost of £&jr million to £3^r million. The following year
C St. John Bird, another South African engineer, carried out
preliminary investigations for Rose and issued a reconnaissance
report in July 1939• This proposed the building of a 75 metre dam
at a cost of £6-^ million. During the war years, Duncan Rose
attempted to arouse interest in the prospects for producing aluminium
in Ghana and in 19^5 he was responsible for the formation of Vest
African Aluminium Ltd. (WAFAL) of which he became the Managing Director.
f~Moxon, 1969, 5^ 7 Later, in March 19^6, Unilever through its
subsidiary the United Africa Company, acquired a financial interest
in WAFAL. Between 19^4 and 1949 C. St. John Bird carried out a
second, exhaustive investigation into the VRP and presented his
report to WAFAL in September 1949 / C. St. John Bird, 1949 7* His
estimate for the cost of the dam and power station was £11 million.
It was also in 1949 that Aluminium Ltd. of Canada (ALCAN) and the
British Aluminium Company Ltd. (BACO) took an interest in the
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scheme, the former taking a 25^ financial interest in VAFAL.
During World War II, due to its sudden increased need for
aluminium, Britain had rapidly expanded its exploitation of Ghana's
hauxite deposits. During 1941-2, 6,300 tonnes of bauxite were
produced, in 1942-3, 55,000 tonnes, and in 1943-4, 147,500 tonnes
/ de Graft Johnson, 1955, 9 7«
It was about 1948-9 that the U.K. and Ghana governments began
to become seriously interested in producing aluminium in Ghana.
First through their involvement in bauxite during World War II,
second through the representations that Rose and St. John Bird had
made to them. Government interest was first publicly indicated in
"The Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Disturbances in the
Gold Coast" published in 1948. This Commission, known as the Watson
Commission, was set up to investigate a boycott (by Ghanaians) of
imported goods in protest at their high' price. However the report
mentioned the VRP and stated:
"To harness the waters of the Volta, for the production of
electrical energy and its utilisation among other things
in the manufacture of aluminium alloy on the spot, we
believe is a scheme which has passed the visionary stage.
The bauxite deposits which .lie at hand for use in the
process of manufacture of aluminium doubtless hastened
practical consideration of the Scheme. Such a scheme,
apart from creating a new industry, capable so far as yet
seen of very great expansion, might well enable large
tracts to become fertile by irrigation. At the same time
the surplus electrical energy set free could be utilised
to great advantage in hundreds of ways not calling for
any great imagination ."
/ Wat son Commission, 1948, paragraph 313 7
In the following year the Secretary of State for the Colonies,
A. Creech Jones, proposed a survey of the Volta Basin to assess the
contribution the projected scheme could make to Ghana's economy.
The Ghana government endorsed this proposal and informed WAFAL that
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their plans would he considered in relation to the development of
the Volta Basin as a whole / de Graft Johnson, 1955, 21 ,/. Shortly
after this, Sir William Ilalcrow & Partners (Consulting Engineers)
accepted an invitation from the Ghana government to undertake the
survey. Its terms of reference were to report on the economic value
to Ghana of the development of the Volta Basin and to recommend the
most suitable schemes for: i) hydroelectric development at Ajena or
Bui, ii) irrigation in Volta Basin, iii) navigation on the river below
Ajena and on the Lake, iv) provision of port facilities / Ilalcrow &
Partners, 1951 7• In October- 19^9, after negotiations between the
Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir William Ilalcrow & Partners,
and WAFAL, the latter agreed to make its findings available to Halcrow
& Partners / de Graft Johnson, 1955, 22 /.
Early in 1950 a British-Canadian Aluminium Mission was set up
(with the encouragement of the U.K. government) consisting of a
number of representatives of BACO and ALCAN / Government of Gold
Coast, 1952, 2 J. The Mission spent some time in Borneo investigating
a project for the manufacture of aluminium by hydroelectric power and
after some time in the U.K. visited Ghana in August and September to
investigate the technical and economic aspects of the Volta Iliver
project. The Mission reported in January 1951 that both sites were
suitable for aluminium production, but that Ghana was preferable
because bauxite was available there and because the VBP had a
greater potential for hydroelectric power / Preparatory Commission,
Vol. 2, 1956, 11_7.
In August 1951 the final report of Balcrow & Partners was
distributed to interested bodies, members of parliament, etc., but
not to the general public / Government of the Gold Coast, 1952, 1 7«
It recommended a dam with a height of 80 metres above sea level and
estimated the combined cost of dam and power house to be about
£40 million.
On the 25th April 1952, the Ghanaian Legislative Assembly
approved a motion for the beginning of negotiations between the
interested parties / Gold Coast Legislative Assembly Debates, 1952_7.
In actual fact the negotiations appear to have begun at least six
months earlier, for on the 29th October 1951, Mr. R.P. Armitage
(Financial Secretary in the Ghanaian Civil Service), Mr. E.A. Ilitchman
(U.K. Ministry of Materials), Mr. Nathaniel V. Davis (President of
ALCAN) and a representative from BACO, met in London to discuss the
arrangements for the project / de Graft Johnson, 1955, 25-4 J,
Subsequent negotiations in Kay and June 1952, and consultations in
London in September 1952, resulted in the U.K. White Paper on 'The
Volta River Aluminium Scheme' / Cmd 8702 of November 1952, U.K.
Government, 1952 /. Meanwhile, in April 1952, the Ghana government
had published 'Development of the Volta River Basin' which outlined
the proposals made by Halcrow & Partners and presumably gave them
a greater public airing / Government of Gold Coast, 1952 7»
On the 23rd February 1953 Nkrumah's government proposed in the
Legislative Assembly:
"That this House in the light of the further stage reached
in the negotiations on the VRP as set out in HMG's White
Paper Cmd 8702, and having regard to the terms of its
resolution on the development of the Volta River Basin made
on the 25th April 1952, approves the continuation of the
negotiations and the establishment of a Preparatory Commission
with a view to arriving at a final agreement which will be in
the best interests of the Gold Coast."
/ Gold Coast Legislative Assembly Debates, 1953, 57C7
However, after criticism of the proposed Preparatory Commission
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on the grounds that it would he a one-man show consisting essentially
of a Special Commissioner who might or might not he representative,
the motion was amended. The added clause was "and that the Gold
Coast Government do take up with the U.K. Government the views
expressed hy the House on the VHP, especially that of enlarging
the Preparatory Commission to include-two other members nominated
hy the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly". This amended motion was
then debated and several members of the House oke against it,
including Dr. J.B. Danquah and Dr. K.A. Busia. Mr. William Ofori-Atta
reminded the House that the U.K. White Paper had never been debated ,in ftccfa,
(Although the Gold Coast government statement of April 1952 had been
debated.) Accusing the Government of failing to justify matters to
the House, he said the House was in a typical situation of not being
asked to approve the negotiations over the VHP, but merely to give
the government the power to continue negotiations.
Several CPP members (i.e. members of the Government) spoke
against the motion but voted with the Government after "a somewhat
harsh application of the Whips" / Davison, 195k ~f. The motion was
carried by 50 votes to 13. But the vote was not reached until the
25th February despite the fact that the debate had been due to end
on the 2kth. On the morning of the 25th February, the 'Gold Coast
Review', a government paper, stated that Commander R.G.A. Jackson,
CMG, OBE, had been appointed Special 0Ommissioner of the Preparatory
Commission. This appointment had been made on the 17th February 1953. **
Since at the time of the appointment and the announcement of the
appointment, the Legislative Assembly had not yet approved the
setting up of a Preparatory Commission, it is clear that the real
decisions were being nude elsewhere. The Legislative Assembly's
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lack of decision-making power was made even more obvious in July 1953
when Nkrumah announced that the proposal that two members of the
Preparatory Commission be appointed by the Legislative Assembly had
turned out to be impractical. He explained to the House that if
there were to be two members from Ghana there would also have to
be two members from the U.K. and two members at least from the
aluminium companies. This, he said, would make a rather unwieldy
seven/nine man Preparatory Commission. Therefore he proposed that
a Gold Coast National Committee on the VHP be set up wTith a brief
to check on the work of the Preparatory Commission. This Gold Coast
National Committee would consist of two government ministers plus
three persons to be nominated by the Assembly.
The first meeting of the Gold Coast National Committee was held
on 25th July 1953. Subsequently, in September/October 1953> it went
on study tours abroad, to ALCAN's Kemano-Kitimat project in Canada,
where hydroelectric power was used for aluminium smelting, and to
some of BACO's installations in the U.K. But it was only in
November 1953 that Nkrumah announced to the Assembly the composition
of this committee. It consisted of:
Nkrumah (as Chairman)
K.C. Tours (Minister of Pinance)
K.A. Gbedemah (Minister of Commerce & Industry)




It seems clear that these were government appointees rather than
nominations of the Assembly. This committee was slightly altered in
the following months by the addition of Dr. E.E. Kurankyi Taylor.
20
But in August 195^ Nkrumah proposed to the Legislative Assembly
that the Gold Coast National Committee now consist of:
E.A. Gbedemah (Minister of Finance)
K. Botsio (Minister of State)






A question was put as to why Dr. J. C. de Graft Johnson and Mr. William
Ofori-Atta should be dropped from the committee but no satisfactory
answer was given and the motion approving the new committee was
passed. This revision of the membership of the Gold Coast National
Committee necessitated a second visit to the Kemano-Kitimat project
which took place in September 1955. This fact was communicated to
the Legislative Assembly in November 1955 and gave rise to the
following question and answer (in pursuit of the information sought
in August 195^) '•
Mr. Kusi: "Can the Hon. Minister give the reasons why the three
prominent members of the first National Committee,
namely Doctors de Graft Johnson and Kurankyi Taylor
and Mr. William Ofori-Atta were removed from the
Committee."
Mr. Inkumsah (Ministerial Secretary to the Minister of State):
"I should like the Hon. Member to understand that the
Go\'ernment does not appoint members to committees for
life."
/ Legislative Assembly Debates,
17 November 1955 7
Despite requests from members of the Legislative Assembly
that the report of the first National Committee on its visit to
Canada and the U.K. be made public, the report continued to be
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kept confidential. The first National Committee had been too critical
of the proposed project for Nkrumah's liking and he had not only
altered the committee to suit his views but he had prevented the
Legislative Assembly and the general public from hearing the first
committee's considered opinions. / Personal interview, J.C. de Graft
Johnson, OctoUr 1175 J
Why did Nkrumah act this way? Why was Nkrumah attacked by a
conservative opposition on the same kind of grounds as a left-wing
opposition might attack a conservative government? Both J.B. Danquah
and K.A, Busia (opposition members) stated that the Gold Coast
government should have a large or majority share in the smelter. A
question was asked: "What plans have the Government to prove to the
people of the Gold Coast that they will eventually own the whole
Volta Project?" And the answer was: "Nationalisation of the scheme
is not contemplated by this Government". /-. . , , ,,
/ Legislative Assembly
Debates, February 1953 7» A statement was made which summarised the
opposition's recommendations:
"The primary purpose of the VHP is the production of cheap
electricity to smelt aluminium. The secondary purpose is
the development of this country. The same benefits could
be achieved without the Aluminium Project by
a) building a small hydroelectric power project which could
be sold to many towns and areas at a commercial rate,
b) a small scale irrigation project at various points on the
Volta,
c) the construction of Tema Harbour. "
/ Legislative Assembly Debates, February 1953 7
J.B. Danquah stated "the Volta River is not for sale". Dr. A. Koi
said: "The Volta Scheme itself is liked, but the project as stated
is imperialist and capitalist arising out of colonialist days."
K.A. Busia told the assembly:
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"It is against our interest as a nation to mortgage our
entire economic future between the benevolence of the
British and the restraint of the Aluminium Company."
and
"The Volta Scheme in its present form may be a return...
of the old imperialism. Because, if successful, it
would provide raw materials for British industry...and...
the control of the plan as it stands would be in private
hands."
W. Ofori-Atta laid the blame on the U.K. colonial government:
"consciously or unconsciously those who rule a dependent
people would generally pay more attention to their own
interest and advantages than to those of the people they
rule."
/ Legislative Assembly Debates, February 1953 7
Why was Nkrumah, the author of "Neo-colonialism, the Last Stage of
Imperialism", prepared to deny these arguments? Because of his
belief in the necessity of foreign investment to build up capital-
intensive technologies
"Right from the early 1950's, mainly as a result of the
influence of Sir Arthur Lewis and Sir Robert Jackson,
Nkrumah had become convinced that Ghana could be developed
industrially only with the help of foreign capital, and in
the first two years of independence these two men were Nkrumah's
principal economic advisers. To Nkrumah, the key to Ghana's
industrialisation was the VRP, a project which could never be
implemented \*-ithout massive foreign capital. Since 1953
therefore and especially after independence, Nkrumah's
main concern was to avoid taking any measures in the
economic field that would scare away foreign capital and
foreign investors. It was mainly for this reason that he
resisted the pressures of his followers to restrict foreign
companies, to introduce exchange controls, to restrict
transfer of profits or to tax profits, or to nationalise
the banks or the mining companies. On the contrary, he
went out of his way to introduce some incentives between
1957 and I960. These included the reduction of company
tax rate from 45^> to 40/o in 1958, the granting of tax
reliefs to new industries, exemption of customs duties on
raw and semi-processed materials for manufacturing, the
provision of an infrastructure of roads and railways and
finally the appointment of an English I'rofessor of Law,
Professor Gower, to draw up a new Companies Code."
/"Boahen, 1975, 198-200 7
e
23
J.D. Esseks tells us what kind of policies Nkrumah was willing
to follow to acquire an oil refinery. An oil agreement was
negotiated with ENI (the Italian State oil company) which allowed
the mixed (60$ private, 40$ state) company to monopolise crude oil
buying and distribution of refinery products. There were other
j
privileges, tax holiday plus reductions, repatriation guarantees.
Other provisions in addition meant that "in effect the Ghana state
would receive (after 22 years) a refinery at no direct cost to
itself except in the form of inflated fuel prices, in return for
permitting EN1 to charge a captive market prices high enough to
assure that within 22 years it would amortize its investment and
realise a level of profits .justifying complete withdrawal".
/Esseks, 1967, 147 7 This deal was negotiated by Nkrumah, E. Ayeh-
Kumi and K.A. Gbedemah. When the agreement was announced it was
criticised by rival oil firms and this led to guarantees being made
to them and also to a few concessions from ENI. However, the actual
details of Ghana's acquisition of an oil refinery do not concern us
here. What does interest us is Nkrumah's willingness to accept a
harsh deal over the short term while looking for the long-term
benefit. And the long-term benefit is seen to be the ownership of
an expensive piece of capital equipment.
With the 1993 Legislative Assembly debate over, the Preparatory
Commission set to work and eventually produced its three volume
report in 1956. The Commission was in no sense a committee, it
consisted essentially of a Special Commissioner who received reports
and advice from specialists and directed his own team on various
studies. It was he who produced the final report.
According to the Special Commissioner, Lobert Jackson, the
Commission was necessary in order to check the feasibility of such
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an enormous project / Jackson, 1964, 146 J. However the Preparatory
Commission's work was not expected to last for any length of time
or to incur any great expense:
"The Preparatory Commission will be appointed as soon as
possible and will be instructed to proceed with its work
with all practicable speed...it is not expected to cost
more than £400,000...."
/ U.K. Government, 1952, 7_7
"He / the Special Commissioner 1 would be required to
submit his final report and recommendations with all
reasonable despatch".
/ U.K. Government, 1952, 21_7
In fact, although the Preparatory Commission started its work
in May 1953, its report (dated 1956) was presented on 31st December,
1955 / Preparatory Commission, vol. 1, 1956 ]. And the Commission
cost altogether £1.3 million (but it must be noted that this included
£265,000 to Hbuy out' WAPAL, by reimbursing them for their preliminary
investigations) / Preparatory Commission, Vol. 2, 1956, 428 J. The
proposed scheme studied by the Preparatory Commission envisaged a
partnership between the Ghana government, U.K. government, ALCAN
and BAC0 / U.K. Government, 1952, 6 J, The main works involved were
the development and operation of new bauxite mines in the Aya/Yenahin
area; the building of approximately 130 Ion of railways to transport
the bauxite and ingot etc; the construction of a large dam and
power station (which would create a lake covering approximately
9100 sq. km.); the development and operation of an alumina plant,
and a smelter with an ultimate annual capacity of 210,000 tonnes
of aluminium which would require 90$ of the dam's electric power
output; a new port to handle the flow of imports and exports
associated with the scheme (the contract for Tema Harbour was
awarded in 1954 to Parkinson Howard Limited) and new townships at
the site of the bauxite mines, the dam and the smelter.
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The Preparatory Commission report considered a broad range
of subjects including not only technical engineering questions but
also economic and social questions. On the technical side it
investigated, for instance, the probable future world demand for
aluminium and the probable costs of energy generated by nuclear
power, as well as more immediate problems such as the expected loss
of reservoir water through evaporation. On the human side, it
considered whether sufficient labour would be available, the
practicalities of resettling those people living in the area to be
flooded by the lake, and the effects on people living downstream
from the dam.
The Preparatory Commission report has been widely regarded as
one of the most exhaustive preliminary investigations for such a
project. For example Gilbert White says "No other reservoir study
approaches the Volta investigation in concept or in detail" / Farvar
and Milton, 1972, 920 J. But the Preparatory Commission was primarily
responsible only for the technical and economic aspects of the
project which did not actually involve aluminium. As the report
states while discussing the matter:
"For reasons which will be appreciated, the Commission
is not in possession of estimates of cost for the internal
operations of the smelter, nor of information that would
enable a comparison to be established with other existing
or potential schemes for aluminium production. The two
governments (U.K. and Ghana) informed the Commission that
in their view the best test of the commercial prospects of
the smelter would be the willingness or otherwise of the
companies to undertake the great capital investment
involved on their part."
/ Preparatory Commission, Vol. 1, 1956, 89 7
The Preparatory Commission's method of analysis was, according
to the report, to split the work into three stages, as follows:
1) to demonstrate that each component part was sound from
a technical point of view,
2) to analyse all the economic and financial aspects of the
project,
3) if the two earlier stages indicated that the scheme was
technically sound and economically acceptable, to consider
certain general factors which could exercise a decisive
influence over the project as a whole / Preparatory Commission
Vol. 1, 1956, 3J.
Throughout its study the Commission had a policy of making "no
optimistic assumptions at any time about any aspect of the project"
/ Preparatory Commission, Vol. 1, 1956, 2 ]. It published the
following table comparing its own cost estimates in 1955 with those
of the U0K. White Paper of 1952 (in £ million)
Aluminium smelter 80,000 tonnes 120,000 tonnes 210,000 tonnes
output; 1952 1955 1952 1955 1952 1955
Power Project 45.5 60.2 49.5 64 o0 54o0 67.6
Smelter & Mines 29.0 43.1 39.0 57.9 64.0 91.2
Ghana Government
Public Works
26.0 59.3 26.0 63.0 26.0 72.5
Total 100.5 162.6 114.5 184.9 144.0 231.3
It then stated that in order to allow for annual rises in world prices
and in local wages, an additional 45Jfc should be added to the cost of
the project, thus making the cost of the final stage £309 million.
lieaction to the Commission's report was not totally favourable.
Thomas Bnlogh / lialogh, 1956 7 criticised the Preparatory Commission
for failing to appreciate Ghana's point of view;
"These luxurious and luxuriant reports show little
consciousness of these basic duties / to the Ghana
and U.K. governments / and what is far more disturbing,
of the fact that these duties might well conflict with
the interests of the aluminium companies'.'
"They / the Preparatory Commission 7 were certainly not
... discreet when discussing quite freely the far-reaching
changes the Gold Coast Government needs to make in its own
development plans to enable the aluminium scheme to
remain profitable."
"The Preparatory Commission....adopts an extraordinary
point of view. It has chosen a method of construction
/ minimising the labour force ~] which minimises the
beneficial impact on the Gold Coast. Their effort is
concentrated on making aluminium production as profitable
as possible instead of contributing to the maximum
development of the Gold Coast."
Thus be also criticised the Preparatory Commission for not
broadening its enquiry to consider such questions as whether so
much electricity out of the total available should be allocated to
aluminium production, and whether the aluminium companies should
be allowed permission to use Jamaican bauxite.
"From the point of view of the Gold Goast, the failure of
the Preparatory Commjission to take these possibilities
into account not merely reduces the value of its work
considerably hut creates a situation of artificial
strength for the companies in their bargaining."
/ Ualogh, 1956 7
Balogh's criticism of the Preparatory Commission report
contains a lot of truth, but omits to mention that the inflated
cost estimates for the VHP would tend to make all potential
participants in the project lose interest.
During 1956 the participants in the proposed scheme considered
the implications of the Preparatory 6ommiSsion report and it became
clear that by this time the U.K. Government and the aluminium
companies had lost their initial interest. Por whereas in 1952
there had been a shortage of aluminium production capacity, by
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1956 there was a surplus / Birmingham et al, 1966, 392 7• Having
lost a lot of their interest these parties were now prepared to
get involved only on very favourable terms. Thus the U.K. government
wanted financial support for the scheme to come from the World Bank,
as well as themselves / Moxon, 1969» 85 7» ALCAN wanted a very low
price for electricity, 2.5 mills/ kvh initially, to be lowered in
subsequent years / Moxon, 1969, 86 7• And neither aluminium
company was very keen to see an integrated aluminium industry set
up in what was soon to become an independent African nation. They did
not like the idea of approximately 7/ of the world's aluminium
production capacity being sited in a black socialist country
/ Birmingham, personal interview J B For these reasons, as well as
the high cost estimates contained in the Preparatory Commission
Report, the project began to look moribund.
But Nkrumah was not prepared to let it rest there; through his
Minister of Finance, K.A. Gbedemah, he made contact in October 1957
with the U.S. government and President Eisenhower / Moxon, 1969t 88 7*
An agreement was reached between Kkrumah and Eisenhower that the
Henry J. Kaiser Company of California should do a reassessment of
the engineering aspects of the Preparatory Commission Report with a
view to cutting down the time required for the building of the dam,
and cutting down the total cost estimates / Moxon, 1969, 91 7-
"The scope of the reassessment report as outlined in the
original agreement entered into between the Ghana
Development Commission and Henry J. Kaiser Company on
August 22, 1958 was generally to make an up-to-date
reassessment of certain basic factors examined in the
1956 Preparatory Commission report on the VliP. This
review was to include the main dam and power plant
near Ajena, an open jjit bauxite mine in the Aya-Yenahin
area, an aluminium smelter at Kpong, necessary connecting
rail road facilities, general power transmission, and was
to suggest other possible power consuming industries.....
f\ *<5 c-k*. - ej- cy Ik S
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No review was to be made of other related works which
were comprehensively covered in the Preparatory Commission
lieport such as new town sites, lake resettlement, health
and sanitation programs, new ports, roads and other public
WOrks"" /"Kaiser, 1959, II-1_7
Later the scope of the Reassessment lieport was enlarged to
include a study of the Bui darn. However, when the lieport was
published (February 1959), it stated:
"....this development / Bui 7, due to smaller river flow
and the remote location, would be relatively economical
only for the general public supply of electricity. The
very large block of low cost power economic for electro¬
chemical production is not available here."
/"Kaiser, 1959, VII-1J7
The Report recommended a dam at Akosombo, and an alumina plant
and smelter at Tema, utilising bauxite from the Kibi deposits
initially. The cost estimates for the project (see Table Four)
were not radically different from those of the Preparatory Commission
Report except that they omitted the latter's heavy expenditure on
public works. The report stated:
"There are ample reserves of acceptable quality bauxite
to support a substantial aluminium industry in Ghana."
/ Kaiser, 1959, I-'i 7
and
"Because of the massive reserves of bauxite in Ghana,
in relation to the proposed aluminum plant capacity
and estimated electric power availability, it is
suggested that the aluminum producer should examine
the feasibility of building additional alumina
capacity for sale and export."
/"Kaiser, 1959, XI-10_7
Despite these very definite statements about the acceptability
of Ghanaian bauxite, in subsequent discussions, both with Kaiser and
with ALCAN, it was agreed that the smelter should, initially, use
imported alumina. This agreement was made in order to cut down the
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capital cost of the project by avoiding expenditure on bauxite
mines and alumina plant. The details of this modified project were
never published.
After publication of the Kaiser Reassessment Report in February
1959r Nkrumah made a statement to the Legislative Assembly:
"Honourable Members will be aware that after my
official visit to the U.S.A. last year, President
Eisenhower and his government kindly agreed to share
with us the cost of a reassessment of the engineering
aspects of the VRP and the power potential at Bui. That
work was undertaken by a firm of proven ability and
international renown - the Kaiser Corporation — which
sent a team of engineers here in the latter part of
1958. I am happy to announce that I received the
report of the Kaiser Corporation yesterday. Their
reassessment will receive the most careful consideration
by the government. I have every hope that I shall be
in a position in the reasonably near future to make a
detailed statement to this House on the possibilities
of hydroelectric development in our country, but I
wish to make this simple and basic statement forthwith,
that is, that my Government is determined to develop
hydroelectric potential of Ghana to its maximum."
/ Legislative Assembly Reports, March 1959 7
Negotiations concerning the VHP were carried out without any
debate in the House over their acceptability. While bargaining
over its details was in progress, Nkrumah's Government let contracts
for the completion of a highway from Tema to Akosorabo, for the
provision of access roads to the dam site, and for the construction
of a considerable amount of housing for supervisory staff and workers.
In that same year, in November 1959» the Volta Aluminium Co. Ltd.
(VALCO) was formed. It consisted of five major aluminium companies -
Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation, ALCAN, ALCOA (Aluminum
Company of America), Olin Mathieson and Reynolds Metals - convened
by Edgar Kaiser to explore their joint interests in the project.
Three of these companies withdrew - ALCAN in I960, ALCOA in early
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1961 and Olin Mathieson later in 1961 / Moxon, 1969, 202 ~]. This
left Kaiser with a 90$S interest in VALCO and Reynolds with lOJfc.
By November I960 an agreement had been reached between VALCO
and the Ghana Government (represented by K.A. Gbedemah and E. Ayeh-
Kumi) on the price VALCO would pay for electricity / Esseks, 1967
l
and Moxon, 1969> 107 7« Subject to the conclusion of satisfactory
financing arrangements for the project, the price was to be 2.625
mills per kwk.
In December I960 the Legislative Assembly was informed by
Mr. W.A. Wiafe (Ministerial Secretary - Volta River Project
Secretariat) after a question about the financing of the VRP, that
half of the necessary money would come from abroad:
"Pending formal agreements with financial agencies, the
following loan negotiations are in progress
£G
i) U.S.$ 20 million @ - 50 years Development
Loan Fund 7.14 million
ii) U.S.$ 10 million @ 5"f$ - 25 years Export Import
Bank 3»56 million
iii) £G 5 million @ 6fo approximately - 25 years
U.K. Government 5«00 million
iv) U.S.$ 40 million @ 5^^ - 25 years IBRD 14.30 million
£G 30.00 million
/ Legislative Assembly Debates, December I960 ~]
On the 20th February 1961 the Ghana Government published a
statement about the VRP. This went so far as to state:
"The Government undertakes for a period ending 30 years
after the; Permanent Delivery Date, not to expropriate,
nationalise or intervene in.....VALCO".
/ Ghana Government, 1961, 55 7
And in a statement to the Legislative Assembly on the following day,
Nkrumab said:
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"It is desirable to mention briefly why it is necessary
for an aluminium smelter to be encouraged to establish
itself and to purchase power from the Volta Project.
The project involves damming a very large river; the flow
of the Volta Itiver varies in the ratio of as much as 300
to 1 between flood and low water, and therefore, to obtain
the maximum power from the Volta means creating a large
lake which will provide a reserve of water for the low
water season and will without danger absorb the large
quantities of water which flow during the floods. To
build a small dam and power house would be very
uneconomic and would lead to considerable waste of water,
because the lake area would be too small to absorb all the
flood."
/ Legislative Assembly Debates, 21 February 1961 7
He went on to say that Akosombo dam would produce more than
twenty times as much electricity as the electricity department
in I960, and since to leave so much capacity idle would he very
expensive, a customer requiring large quantities of electricity was
needed. In the same speech Nkrumah announced that houses, a power
station, water supplies and an access road had already been
provided at Akosombo ready for the contractor. This was in advance
of the award of the contract for the dam to Impregilo (an Italian
consortium which had previously built the Kariba Dam) which took
place in the same month / Moxon, 1969> 101 7*
The general tone of the debate which followed Nkrumah's
speech was one of uncritical praise for both Nkrumah himself and
for tie project . One CPP member suggested that the VliP would turn
Ghana into a Utopia and Mrs. Grace Ayensu (CPP) said:
"The implementation of this project envisaged by
Osagyefo the President will bring relief to all of
us. D0th men and women in all walks of life will he
required to give their services to the huge project.
It will be a feather in Ghana's cap as an independent
country to have such a gigantic project. With this
hydroelectric power in our country many factories will
he established, and we shall he in a position to
manufacture most of our commodities. The project will
help to solve so many problems, such as unemployment,
for men and women will get enough work to do".
/ Legislative Assembly Debates, 22 February 1961 7
It is clear that these comments are ill-informed since both
the Preparatory Commission and the Kaiser Reassessment Report
sought to minimise the labour force requirements of the project.
Another CPP member from the Northern Region expressed the hope
that the lake would be used to irrigate the Northern and Upper
Regions - in ignorance that the lake would not extend to the Upper
Region and would only just penetrate the Northern Region.
On being questioned about possible nationalisation of the VHP,
Kofi Baako, Minister of State, replied:
"....the Government's view on nationalisation is
that it is a means to an end, but if we can achieve
an end by another method then we can use that other
method / Interruption J Perhaps the Honourable
Member does not understand what socialism is. Briefly,
it seeks to ensure that the means of production and
distribution is in the hands of the state. That is
what it is, and there is nothing to fear about it.
/ Interruption^ ..."
/ Legislative Assembly Debates, 22 February 196l_7
Leaving aside the question of the validity of Baako's
definition of socialism, this statement still leaves a lot to be
desired. Having already stated that the Government is socialist,
it should automatically follow that the Government would nationalise
the VHP. Yet it is not being clearly explained as to why this was
not government policy.
However, eventually the motion was put "this House approves
the (outlined) terms of the Master Agreement for the Volta River
Project" and it was passed unanimously.
The House was almost completely CPP dominated and nobody had
been willing to criticise the VHP itself.
On the 19th April 1961, the V0lta River Development Bill,
which set up the VRA with Osagyefo as Chairman, was debated under
Mb
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a Certificate of Urgency. J.E. Appiah of the United Party (the
opposition party) announced:
"I just want to protest vehemently against this attitude
of the Government, telling us to come here and debate a
Bill brought in under a Certificate of Urgency, and then keeping
the Bill away from us until five minutes to debating time.
Yesterday when Ave closed, Mr. Speaker informed the House for
the first time that this Bill .vas coming up to be debated
under a Certificate of Urgency. Ao the best of my
recollection, we shouted that we had not seen this and
we were told that copies were in our pigeon holes. They
were not there yesterday".
/ Legislative Assembly Debates, 19 April 1961 7
The Bill was rushed through at such a speed that there was no time
for debate. The Bm vas given its first and second reading, its
consideration stage and its third reading, all in less than one
hour.
Impregilo started work on the building of ^kosombo dam in
August 1961 although as yet the U.S. loans (apart from the World
Bank loan) for the VRP had not been confirmed. President Kennedy
took some time to agree to support the VRP. When Nkrumah visited
E. Europe, Kennedy wavered / Esseks, 1967 7» In an article entitled
'JFK opens purse to Volta Dam' the Engineering News-Iiecord described
what eventually happened in December 1961:
"Approval for loans to the small African nation totalling
^133 million has been given. The loans have been withheld
since July, because of U.S. doubts about Ghana President
Kwame Nkrumah's left-leaning neutralism and the stability
of his regime. President Kennedy held back approval of the
' loans until a few hours before the deadline when the Ghana
Government could no longer back out on a contract with the
Italian consortium, Impregilo, which will build Akosombo Dam.
"Under the terms of the loans, the money will he made available
in stages, so that the U.S. can still hack out if the project
takes a turn for the worse. The President hopes the loans
will be viewed throughout Africa as proof that Washington
does not attach political strings on foreign aid. It is
thought that other African countries that have been holding
back requests for American assistance for fear of being
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called "American stooges" will now apply for aid."
/ Engineering News-Kecord, 1961, 43 J
The debate in the Ghana Legislative Assembly on the subject was of
as low a standard as the debate of February 1961. The debate about
the terms of the Master Agreement took place on 20th January 1962 and
Mr. E.Y. Attigah (CPP) made the following obsequious statement:
"In associating myself with the compliments paid to
Osagyefo in bringing this great scheme to reality, I
should like to say that this great man, our Messiah
and prophet, has proved himself beyond all doubt to
be a wonderful man. He will continue to be great and
his wonders will never end".
/ Legislative Assembly Debates, 20 January, 1962 ~j
A note of dissension was raised however and this came from a member
of the government. Mr. J. Kodzo (Deputy Minister of Health) said:
"Up till now there is no substantial evidence to show
that the area that is going to be inundated or flooded
is being surveyed for the purpose of resettlement, and
I want 1,o bring this to the notice of the Minister".
Mr. K. Baako (Minister of Defence) replied:
"I should like to bring to the notice of the Deputy Minister
of Health that in fact he is making suggestions to himself.
He is part and parcel of the Government, therefore he has
no right to make these suggestions here. If there is
anything, he can meet the Minister in his office. It is
rather odd for this thing to be brought up here."
/ Legislative Assembly Debates, 20 January 1962 7
Obviously Baako was not prepared to countenance anything like an
open debate. So the House approved the terms of the Master Agreement,
with hardly a mention of the terms themselves.
By February 1962, the legal and financial side of the VHP
had been settled / Moxon, 1969, 115 J. Diagram Two describes the
arrangements. Afterwards Edgar Kaiser was able to say:
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"Nkrumah and I achieved a good rapport, hut it wasn't
so much the cut of my hair he liked. He liked our
money."
/ Forbes Magazine, 1968 ~]
By July 1963 the scheme to resettle those people living in
the area affected hy the lake had commenced.
In June 196^, construction of the smelter at Tema began.
In September 1965 the first commercial power became available from
the dam and the formal inauguration of the VHP took place in
January 1966. The component parts of the dam and power station came
from many countries. The turbines were supplied by Hitachi Limited
of Japan. The generators came from the Canadian subsidiary of the
International General Electric Company, U.S.A. The penstocks (the
tubes down which the water flows to the turbines) were made by
Chicago Bridge Limited, U.K. The gantry cranes (for maintenance
work on the power station) were made in Austria. The substation
equipment was supplied by an Italian firm.
The smelter came into operation in April 1967.
In 1969, negotiations for the sale of electricity from the
Volta Dam to Togo and Dahomey were formally concluded / VliA Annual
Report, 1969 7. A 181 mile transmission line carrying power to
Lome and Cotonou at a cost of £3.3 million was scheduled to start
running by the end of 1971. The agreement provided for Togo and
Dahomey to take up to 50 MW of power. This transmission line was
officially opened by Colonel Acheampong in December 1972, who at the
same time officially commissioned the Akosombo Expansion Project,
which involved the operation of two more generating units at the
Volta Dam, bringing the number up to six. A Canadian loan of
#7,580,000 provided most of the financing for both the transmission
I.B.R.D.
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Executed Feb. 8th 1962
Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., Voting Trustee if Valco fails to build smelter, voting
trustee replaces management until construction completed.
First National City Bank of New York, Trustee Handles all payments by Kaiser
and Reynolds to Valco, payment of Valco expenses and taxes, and retains balance in
New York.
Diagram Two
/ From R.G.A. Jackson, Progress No. 4, 1964 J
line and the expansion of Akosombo hydroelectric power station.
Later, in July 1975, preliminary agreements were signed in Abidjan
for a link up of power between the Bandama Iliver Project in the
Ivory Coast, and Akosombo. Meanwhile, in May 1972, the smelter had
been expanded by the addition of a fourth potline costing
$26 mill ion. A further expansion (adding a fifth potline) in
June 1976 brought the total cost of the smelter to $220 million.
CHAPTER THREE
AIMS AND EXPECTATIONS
This chapter is devoted to a study of the aims of the
participants in the VRP. Taking individuals and interest groups
involved or affected by the project, it is possible to show that
their aims and expectations differed substantially. Comparing
these expectations with the subsequent realities, gives one
method by which to gauge how successfully the project was implemented.
That is, to what extent some aims were satisfied and others
dissatisfied. The chapter is substantially based on quotes to
allow, as far as possible, the participants to outline their own
aims. Those passages chosen for quotation are those which express
most clearly and succinctly the values and motives of the individuals
and groups involved.
C. St. John Bird was the first of the pioneers to prepare
substantial proposals and a detailed report. Therefore his outlook
on the project is the first to be considered.
The size of the lake formed by the proposed dam was expected
to be about 2000 sq. miles and was therefore the largestenvisaged
artificial lake in the world. Writing on the subject of "Submersion
Rights", St. John Bird states:
"It will be necessary, before proceeding with the scheme,
for the Company / WAFAL / to obtain the equivalent of a
Private Parliamentary Bill, or what 1 believe is known in
the Gold Coast as an "Order in Council". This is a legal
matter, and the rights and powers of the Company will be
safeguarded thereby. It will not only consolidate all the
Company's existing rights, but will give powers to
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expropriate land etc., to enable it to carry on its
activities.
"Fortunately, the areas concerned are sparsely inhabited
and of very small valne. Moreover there are no permanent
works such as railways, bridges, towns, etc., which would
be costly to replace.
"I understand from the Chairman of the Company that the
submersion rights on certain relatively valuable land in
the Afram Valley were obtained for about Is. per acre
over an area of about 25 sq. miles. Land in the submersion
area is not valuable, but in order to make some provision
for expenditure on these accounts I propose to allow a
provisional sum of £1,000,000 to cover legal costs and
compensation.
"If the negotiations are skilfully carried out and
tactfully handled, with support from the COVernment,
I consider this provisional sum to be more than ample."
/"St. John Bird, 1949, 3_7
St. John Lird next goes on to deal with the housing of the
labour force and technical staff at the site of the dam and
aluminium works:
"Within about four miles south from the works site
the ridge rises to an elevation of about 1200 feet.
The prevailing breeze is from the south west and it
would be possible to site the housing for the
Europeans at about that elevation on this ridge to
face the breeze."
/"St. John Bird, 1949, 15_7
From the nature of the report, it is clear that this site is
intended exclusively for Europeans, because St. John Bird goes
on to deal with the settlement of African labour:
"There is a suitable site within a mile of the works
where the natives can be housed on the Volta Iliver
hank.
"There is a further site suitable for a township at
Achiasi, where the shopping centre, post office,
police station, churches, school, bioscope / cinema 7
etc., could bo concentrated."
/ St. John Bird, 1949, 16 7
For the European settlement, St. John Bird recommends the following
amenities:
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"It is considered that in the interest of the workers
a club house with sports, such as tennis courts, squash
courts, swimming bath, dance hall etc. sbould be
provided, also single quarters."
/"St. John Bird, 1949, l6_7
St. John Bird then goes on to consider what he terms "Native
Requirements" as follows:
1
"The compound system for housing natives is almost
universally adopted here, but there are signs that
there will be a gradual breaking away from it by
the providing of married quarters for selected
employees."
/ St. John Bird, 1949 > 16J
"Where large numbers of natives are employed, the
mines find it advantageous to feed their employees,
to ensure that they get a properly balanced diet".
/ St. John Bird, 1949, 16 7
"It would he as well, at this stage, to realise
that it is essential to examine every native
medically on applying for work, whether on
construction or for employment on the production
of aluminium."
/"St. John Bird, 1949, 11J
On the subject of temporary housing for those Africans
constructing the dam, St. John Bird suggests that aluminium houses
Originally designed for 'natives' in South America by ALCAN could
be imported. These, he states, would prove "palatial in comparison
with the local product". / St. John Bird, 1949» 18 ]
The St. John Bird Report makes no provision for the employment
of Africans on skilled work. Where skilled workers are indicated
he makes a definite point of inserting the word 'whites'. Only
white people are to be employed on supervisory duties and skilled
work. Africans are to be labourers and a few are to become semi¬
skilled workers. Basing his calculations on 1948-9 rates of wages
in the Gold 0onst, he indicates that African labourers are to be
paid £4 a month, African semi-skilled workers are to he paid £7 10s
a month, while a European is to receive £100 a month /St. John
Bird, 1949, 18_7.
That St. John Bird's proposals are basically 'apartheid' in
nature is only partly due to his South African background. Such
proposals fit into typical colonial policy very easily and have not
been completely jettisoned even in the years of independence. The
Preparatory Commission report was later to advocate a more refined
system of apartheid, not based on colour but on technical expertise
and culture. (This will be dealt with later in this chapter.) And,
as we shall see, this form of apartheid has been implemented at
ikkosombo, even under an African 'socialist' government.
The St, John Bird report proposed the use of river transport
up the Lower Volta to the dam site and attendant works / St, John
Bird, 1949, 8 /, It also considered railway transportation as an
alternative but rejected this on the grounds that "The rapids at
Senchi and Kpong would remain and the resources of the river would
not therefore he fully developed, thus taking much away from the
benefits which the scheme would bring to the Colony." / St. John
Bird, 1949, 9J.
It seenEprobable then that St. John Bird sincerely believed
that his proposals were definitely going to he beneficial to Ghana.
However it is not too difficult to find instances when St. John Bird'
proposals are more closely aligned to the practical requirements of
his project than to the needs of other people. For example, he
considered clearing the lake area of trees before flooding in order
to protect the turbines from the resultant debris. He rejected this
on the ground that the small number of trees which would float to
the dam could he trapped and hauled out / St. John Bird, 19^9, 6 7»
He failed to consider other reasons for clearing the lake, for
instance that it would allow fishermen to use mobile nets rather
than hanging or floating nets and that it would allow easier use of
the lake for transportation.
St. John Bird's aim, then, was to set up a commercial venture
which, partly due to its technical sophistication and partly due to
St. John Bird's own prejudices required the implementation of a
modified system of apartheid.
Why did the U.K. government become involved in the VHP? This
becomes very clear on reading the White Paper Cmd 8702 of November
1952. Even the title of this document - The Volta ILiver Aluminium
Scheme - gives one a strong clue. The paper commences with an
account of the U.K.'s requirements of aluminium and forecasts that
these requirements would increase at about 5% a year. The U.K.'s
consumption in 1991 was about 203,000 tonnes of virgin aluminium.
Of this, 27,000 tonnes were produced in the U.K. and 176,000 tonnes
were imported. Canada supplied 172,000 tonnes of these imports at a
cost in dollars of over £18 million. The White Paper therefore
stated: "it is important that additional supplies should come as
far as possible from the Sterling Area".
The White Paper then went on to explain:
"There is no danger that the expansion of aluminium
production will be restricted because of shortage of bauxite.
Known reserves of bauxite of good qualitjr in countries of
the free xvorld are estimated to be of the order of 1,500
million tons (350 million tons metal content) and they are
widely distributed. Nor is there any reason to think that
shortages of other raw materials will be a handicap to
expansion.
"The chief difficulty is the heavy demand on electric
power which the extraction processes make. Unless cheap
power is already available in large quantities, any
major new development of aluminium producing capacity
involves at the same time the large scale development of
power - normally, as things are, hydroelectric power.
This means in practice that large-scale expansion of
aluminium production under present processes can only
take place in connection with major power developments."
/ U.K. Government, 1952, H_7
Thus the reason for the U.K.'s interest- in the VHP was not so much
Ghana's bauxite, as her hydroelectric potential. The scheme
envisaged by the U.K. involved the production of 564 MW of
electric power from the dam, of which 514 MW would go to the
smelter and only 50 Mw to other users in Ghana.
As for the production from the aluminium smelter:
"The U.K. would he the natural market for most of the Gold
Coast metal, but the smelter company would he under an
obligation for 30 years from initial production to offer
buyers in the U.K. not less than 75J° of the metal produced.
The option would be in terms of ensuring that in normal
circumstances the price would not compare unfavourably with
North American prices. As a result of the scheme U.K.
consumers should he able to count on at least 60,000 tons
a year of additional Sterling Area aluminium in the early
days of the smeltei* and on a minimum of 157,500 tons a year
when the full capacity of 210,000 tons is being worked."
/ U.K. Government, 1952, 6 7
So, the White Paper concluded:
"Her Majesty's Government in the U.K. are favourable in
principle to participation in the scheme, which would
further their policy of encouraging the development of
the resources of the Commonwealth as well as contributing
to the raw material needs of the U.K. They believe, on
the basis of the information so far available, that it
is soundly conceived and that its successful completion
would bring substantial benefits to the two countries."
/ U.K. Government, 1952, 6J
However, the White Paper failed to mention what benefits Ghana
would receive. And it really is unclear from the White Paper
whether Ghana actually could benefit from the scheme as proposed.
The White Paper discussed an outline of a Power Contract to
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be agreed between the Volta Electricity Board (which would administrate
the power undertaking) and the companies running the aluminium
smelter.
"The supply of power for the smelter would be governed by a
contract to make power available to the smelter up to an
amount necessary for the production of aluminium at the
rate of 210,000 tons a year for 60 years from the date at
which power was first available. The contract would
recognise that other users in the Gold Coast would require
up to 50 MW of the power which would be available. The
Gold Coast Government, ALCAN and BACO would share, in the
ratio of their respective holdings in the equity of the
smelter company, an obligation to secure that the Volta
Electricity Board would receive payments amounting each
year to its out of pocket or operating costs (including
interest) in respect of the power contracted for by, and
made available to, the smelter company, plus the calculated
amount needed in the year to cover a) the appropriate
contributions to a renewal fund and b) amortisation of the
capital expenditure over 80 years. In the initial stages
these payments would he abated by the amount of sales to
consumer's other than the smelter company".
/ U.K. Government, 1952, 16 ~J
So the aluminium smelter was to he supplied with electricity at cost
price, and, moreover, a cost price that would involve the deduction
of any profits made by supplying electricity to other consumers.
Kith this arrangement in force the Ghana Government could not hope
to derive any revenue from its expenditure on the power project
for 60 years.
And what of the aluminium side of the venture? To quote the
White Paper again:
"The Gold Coast Government, as trustees of the people
of the Gold Coast, would have the right to provide 10^
of the equity capital as it was issued from time to time.
After the smelter company had been in production 25 years
and upon the request of the Gold Coast Government, the
smelter company would in addition undertake to offer for
sale at a reasonable price to pi'ivate Gold Coast investors
equity stock in an amount equal to the amount of equity
stock previously transferred to private Gold Coast
investors from the Gold Coast Government's original holdings."
/ U.K. Government, 1952, 15 7
Ghana was therefore to be limited to holding 10/b of the
equity capital for the first 25 years, and 20$ thereafter, despite
the fact that she was expected to provide 27 to 31J° of the final
capital cost of the whole project, and 36j& of the capital cost
of the first stage.
It is clear from this White Paper that the U.K. was only
interested in acquiring supplies of aluminium from a non-dollar
i
source. No concern is expressed for developing Ghana's bauxite
or hydroelectric potential as such. No mention is made of the
possible deleterious side effects of the scheme. The proposed
arrangements are rather one-sided, yet the White Paper is able
to claim:
"The Gold Coast Government have stated that they would
be ready, whenever the occasion arose, to defer or
repliase other parts of their development programme which
seemed likely to conflict with the scheme in the demands
on the resources available of men, transport and materials,"
/ U.K. Government, 1952, 6J
It is instructive to compare the U.K. Government White Paper
with the contemporaneous Ghana Government publication of May 1952 -
'Development of the Volta Kiver Basin'. / Government of the Gold
Coast, 1952 7. Although the latter is not as lengthy a statement
as the former, and is not very detailed, it is nevertheless much
more comprehensive. The Ghana publication deals with the
substantial public works needed to service the scheme, such as a
new port, railways and roads. It considers the possibility of using
the new lake for irrigation and transportation, and the possibility
of supplying Ghana's major towns and mines with electricity through
a grid. It also notes that there would be health problems associated
with the scheme and problems of land acquisition, compensation and
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resettlement associated with the lake.
'Development of the Volta River Basin' in contrast to 'The
Volta River Aluminium Scheme' expresses the hope that the project
"would he a great source of wealth to the country / the Gold Coast 7
and assist generally in the raising of the standard of living of the
inhabitants." / Government of Gold Coast, 1952, 2 J
But to understand more clearly the Nkrumah Government's interest
in the VHP, a more extended account must be given of the statements
of Nkrumah and the CPP. The VHP was a key item in the CPP election
manifesto of 1951. This manifesto^ entitled 'Towards the Goal',





The Coussey Committee let the Country
down by prolonging white imperialism.
The CPP will fight for self-government NOW.
An upper house of the Legislature, known
as the Senate, shall be created for the
Chiefs. Universal suffrage at the age of
21. Direct elections with no property or
residential qualifications for candidates...
A five year Economic Plan...
i) Immediate materialisation of the Volta
hydro-electric scheme
ii) Railway lines to be doubled and extended
iii) Roads to be modernised and extended
iv) Canals to join rivers
v) Progressive mechanisation of agriculture
vi) Special attention will be given to the
swollen shoot disease; farmers will be
given control of the Cocoa Industry Board
funds
ix) Industrialisation will be carried out with
all energy.
Education:
i) A unified system of free compulsory
elementary secondary and technical
education up to 16 years of age.
ii) The University College to be brought up
to University status,
iii) A planned campaign to abolish illiteracy.
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Family Assistance:
A free national health service
A high standard housing programme....
A piped-water supply in all parts of
the country....
A national insurance scheme. "
/ Austin, 1964, 130 7
Of the economic and social aims only the VHP and the raising
of the University College of the Gold Coast to University status
can he said to have been fully implemented as at 1976. Because the
VHP came so high up on the CPP's list of aims and because it was
implemented (in contrast to the other stated aims) it would appear
that it was a high priority to Nkrumah's Government. Nkrumah himself
said:
"Greatest of all our development projects was the Volta dam....
/It7 permitted not only a large aluminium plant at Tenia,
processing the country's rich bauxite deposits, but a broad
range of other industrial projects."
/ Kkrumah, 19b8, 82-3 7
The accuracy of the second sentence will be questioned later but the
first sentence makes Nkrumah's sentiments clear. Why was the VRP so
important? Nkrumah stated that the VHP was "designed to provide the
electrical power for our great social agricultural and industrialisation
programme" / Nkrumah, 1968, 77 7« Tbe importance Nkrumah attached to
the role of electric power in a developing country may be gauged from
the following quotes:
"1 have always been convinced that an abundance of cheap
electric power is the soundest base for the expansion of
industry in a country such as ours."
/ Legislative Assembly Reports, March 1959 7
"My Government is determined to develop the hydroelectric
potential of Ghana to its maximum".
/ Legislative Assembly Reports, March 1959_7
"All industries of any major economic significance require, as a
basic facility, a large and reliable source of power. In fact,
the industrialisation of Europe, of America, of Canada, of
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Russia and of other countries, emerged as a result of the
invention of sources of power of hitherto undreamt of size.
Newer nations such as ours, which are determined by every
possible means to catch up in industrial strength, must have
electricity in abundance before they can expect any large-
scale industrial advance. Electricity is the basis for
industrialisation. That, basically, is the justification
for the Volta River Project".
/ Legislative Assembly Reports, 21st February 1961 7
I
Thus the rationale behind the VHP was that it would provide
abundant supplies of electricity. This electricity was seen as a
necessary requisite for industrialisation. The Nkrumah Government
did not see the aluminium side of the venture as the primary aspect
of the project, it was the uses to which the electricity could be
put that attracted them.
But in order to get the project going, Ghana needed foreign
money and foreign expertise. It is paradoxical that Nkrumah, the
author of 'Neocolonialism', should have been so keen on welcoming
foreign money and foreign expertise into Ghana. For instance, during -
the heated debate on the VRP in the Legislative Assembly in February
1953» Nkrumah intervened to state:
"....since most of the participants are British companies
the arguments should be so carefully worded that we would
not in any way prejudice those who are going to be
participants; but the whole of the speech / by William
Ofori-Atta 7 was a diatribe against the British government.
As far as I am concerned when the national movement started
in this country, I was one of the principal soldiers
against imperialism....Go through the whole history of
the UGCC and you will see that my government has always
been against imperialism. Yet you say here that Kwame
Nkrumah is selling out to imperialists.....We are not boys J
Bo you think I am a fool to enter into a project like that
blindly? If I were a fool do you think I could have been
able to organise the country to this stage? I am not so
damned silly as to put my nose into something that is
detrimental to the interests of this country."
/ Gold Coast Legislative Assembly Debates,
February 1993 7
Much later he described the Kaiser Company as "enlightened foreign
private enterprise" / Ghana Government, 1962 7» and as "a firm of
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proven ability and international renown" / Legislative Assembly
Reports, March 1959 7• And at the VHP inauguration ceremony -which
occurred shortly after the publication of 'Neocolonialism' he stated
"like Britain in the heyday of her imperial power, the U.S. is, and
rightly so, adopting a conception of a dual mandate in its relations
with the developing world". This could, he said, "enable the U.S.
to increase its own prosperity and at the same time assist in the
increasing prosperity of the developing world" / West Africa, Vol.50,
1966, 118/9 7. Obviously, Nkrumah and the CPP thought that they
could handle such outside influences successfully and arrange that
the aims of all the participants in the project would be fulfilled.
This will be called into doubt later.
Having dealt with the differing expectations of the U.K. and
Ghana Governments, we now turn to an analysis of those aspects of
the VRP on which there was substantial agreement between the
participants. The Preparatory Commission report will form the
basis for this analysis, since this report is nearest to being a
consensus of opinion between the U.K. and Ghana Governments and
ALCAN and BACO. This is not to say that the Preparatory Commission
Report is unbiassed, merely that it is the official publication which
arose out of the closest collaboration yet of the four participants.
It is reasonable to take the Preparatory Commission report as
indicating some areas of consensus because:
l) R.G.A. Jackson, the Special Commissioner, was an
Australian who was advised by independent experts
from all over the world (sxicb as Arthur Morgan of the
Tennessee Valley Authority and Professor W.A. Lewis,
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the Vest Indian economist). These people hod no affiliations
with any of the participants, so their conclusions were not
obviously biassed toward one or other of the participants.
2) Nevertheless, all the participants had a substantial
amount of access to the Preparatory Commission. The cost of
1
the Commission was borne equally by the U.K. and Ghana
Governments. All the work of the Commission was done in
Ghana and in close touch with Prime Minister Nkrumah and
the two Government ministers with special responsibilities
for the project. Yet the final report was published by HMSO,
London / Preparatory Commission, 1956 7• The Special Commissioner
had meetings with representatives of BACO (in London) and
ALCAN (in Montreal) in February and March 1953 to discuss
the procedures the Preparatory Commission should follow when
it began work in April / Preparatory Commission, Vol. 2, 1956,
24 7. Throughout the life of the Commission ALCAN and the
U.K. Government received monthly reports giving a full
account of the Commission's activities, and BACO received
regular reports of a similar nature. And, as the Preparatory
Commission states,
"The appointment of Dr. 11. Grimes-Graeme in July 1953
as resident representative in the Gold Coast of ALCAN,
provided a further opportunity for ensuring that the
aluminium companies were kept fully informed of the work
of the Preparatory Commission, and also enabled the
Commission itself to obtain information from ALCAN quickly
and conveniently. Throughout the work of the Commission
an effective and harmonious relationship was preserved
with the representative of ALCAN and the Commission wishes
to record its appreciation for all his assistance."
' Preparatory Commission, Vol0 2,
1916, 20-7J
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So, what were the points on which these four participants
agreed? The Preparatory Commission report says: "The VHP would
accelerate the trend from rural towards industrial communities"
/ Preparatory Commission, Vol. 1, 1956, 29 7« It also states:
"The sociological objective of the permanent community at
Ajena / the dam site 7 would he the establishment of a small
and contented group of reliable and efficient men whose
primary responsibility would be the operation and maintenance
of the dam and power installation, the regulation of the
water and the administration of certain health measures.
This settlement would thus be entirely different in
character from the rural communities in the neighbourhood
and in view of the special responsibilities of the workers
who would live there, it is desirable that it should
remain so. It should not be merged with a village
settlement of normal character".
/ Preparatory Commission, Vol. 1, 1956, 41 7
The emphasis is therefore on industrial development as opposed to
rural development, to the extent of creating a 'civilised' enclave
amidst 'primitive' society. The results of thinking along these
lines were as follows: a) The Preparatory Commission stressed the
necessity of keeping the labour forces to a minimum: "The two
Governments, the aluminium companies and the consulting engineers
have all supported the Commission's policy of keeping the labour
forces to a minimum" / Preparatory Commission, Vol. 1, 1956, 27_7:
b) There was to be a much greater outlay on the development of the
industrial community than on the resettlement of the rural communities
which had to be moved. The labour force on the dam would reach
an estimated peak of 5,000 by the fourth year of construction. The
cost of temporary housing for this work force, inclusive of hospitals,
schools, community centres and other amenities, of roads and other
services and of the supply of water and electric power would he
about V4-§ million. Allowing for contingencies, however, the cost of
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servicing this community was put at £7 million, i.e. £1,400 per
capita / Preparatory Commission, Vol. 1, 1956, 13 7« In contrast
the Preparatory Commission estimated that there were almost
62,500 people living in the area to be submerged by the new lake
and put the cost of their compensation and resettlement at
£4 million or £64 per capita / Preparatory Commission, Vol. 1, 1956, kbj
c) Over 65/b of the capital investment in the project would have to
be external in character, representing imported equipment and
materials.
Thus the immediate benefits of the project were to be restricted
to a small sector of the Ghanaian population which received housing
and employment, and to the overseas suppliers of capital equipment.
The project was not to involve the people of Ghana as participants
in any significant way; there was a deliberate policy of minimising
their involvement.
Why did the U.S. Government decide to involve itself in the
VHP? R.G.il. Jackson stated that political factors were paramount
/ Jackson, 1964 J. Ghana represented the first of the new independent
African states and the U.S. was anxious to gain influence in Africa.
Here was the ideal opportunity. The desire to achieve greater
standing in Africa was heightened by memories of recent events in the
United Arab Republic where the Suez crisis had led to withdrawal of
British and American funds from the proposed Aswan High dam. As a
result, Ihissian financial backing had been used for that project.
In a statement before the U.S. Committee on foreign Affairs,
G. Mennen Williams (U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs) explained, in response to a question as to why,the U.S. gave




"...it is our estimate that in the long run there are
favorable factors that....will prevail. This is an
area where the British developed a very soundly based civil
service, a well trained military.... The middle class is a
sizable one, and the amount of free enterprise is considerable.
Their most important crop is cocoa. These are all middle
class, independent farmers. I think when you put the thing
in balance that over the long run we could hope for a
government which would at least he non-aligned."
/ Allen & -Johnson, 1970, 2-CBy7
But the Cold War and questions of political alignment were not
the only factors to be taken into account. There were economic
reasons for involvement too. Eugene li. Black occupied the posts of
executive director, president and chairman of the World Bank between
19^7 and 1962, i.e. over the whole of the period of negotiations over
the VHP. Black stated that
"our foreign aid programs constitute a distinct benefit to
American business. The three major benefits are:
1) Foreign aid provides a substantial and immediate
market for U.S. goods and services
2) Foreign aid stimulates the development of new
overseas markets for U.S. companies
3) Foreign aid orients national economics toward a free
enterprise system in which U.S. firms can prosper"
/"Magdoff, 1969, 176J
The extent to which the U.S. government agencies were prepared
to back Kaiser and Reynolds' involvement in the Tema aluminium smelter
indicates how highly they regarded the potential political and economic
benefits. The U.S. Export-Import Bank provided a $96 million loan
and the remainder of the necessary investment ($32 million) was
provided by Kaiser and keynolds but was fully guaranteed by the U.S.
government. Thus there was very little investment exposure on the
part of the Kaiser Corporation. The U.S. government was prepared to
provide 75$ of the necessary loans for the smelter hut only 43$
(including the IBRD loan) of the funds for the dam and power system.
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That the VALCO investment paid off is indicated by the fact
that the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) gave VALCO
the first annual OPIC Development Award. (OPIC is a U.S. government
agency which insures and helps to finance American private investment
in about 80 developing countries; it insures companies against risk
of expropriation, currency inconvertibility and war and revolution.)
The award was presented by Daniel Parker in a ceremony in the U.S.
Capitol building. Parker is not only Chairman of OPIC's board of
directors but also Administrator of the Agency for International
Development. In OPIC's own terms VALCO had been a model of private
investment in a developing country and had also been a useful instrument
of U.S. government policy / Burks, 1975 1 •
However, the VHP was not a complete push-over for the Americans;
at one point they had to resort to using a threat. E.G.A. Jackson
indiscreetly states:
"Recently, Mr. Averell Harriman, the U.S. Under-Secretary
of State, made the profound observation to President Nkrumah
that success or failure in this joint enterprise could
probably do more than anything else to determine the support,
or otherwise, of future U.S. administrations towards the
development of that cooperation between African states in
which President Nkrumah so fervently believes."
/ Jackson, 1964 ~j
The impression given up to now of the Kaiser Corporation has
been partial. The Kaiser Corporation is not just an aluminium
company and its subsidiary, Kaiser Engineers, is not just involved
in the design of hydroelectric schemes. The Kaiser Corporation was
founded 60 years ago by llenry J. Kaiser./ Sources used in this
description of Kaiser Corporation are Forbes Magazine, 1968,
Fortune Magazine, May 1969, December 1969, June 197D, December 1975,
May/June 1975 and Kaiser Corporation reports.7 He died in 1967
aged 85, having handed over the business to his son Edgar F. Kaiser,
who is the present chairman of the board. It is expected that Edgar
F. Kaiser will be succeeded by one of bis sons, Edgar F. Kaiser Jr.,
as head of the company. / Loving, 1975 7 The Kaiser Corporation,
like Reynolds Metals and Harvey Aluminum (also amongst the big four
aluminium companies in the U.S.), is'a family concern. Edgar F.
Kaiser is chairman of all the major Kaiser companies and his family
still controls more than hOfi of Kaiser Industries' common shares.
But although the Kaiser Corporation is patriarchal and patrilineal
it is not parochial. The Kaiser Corporation has a major interest in
steel, it mines iron ore and coking coal (as well as coal for use in
power stations) and it produces and fabricates steel. Other basic
resources which Kaiser produces are cement, gypsum, sand, gravel, zinc,
lead, glass fibre, refractories, agricultural chemicals (including
fertilizers), and industrial chemicals. Using these basic resources
the Kaiser Corporation is able to construct stich items as offshore
oil production platforms and exploratory drilling rigs, ships,
nuclear power stations, canals and ports. The aerospace and electronics
division produces sophisticated mechanical and electronic devices for
military aircraft and missiles. The Kaiser broadcasting company owns
and operates television stations covering Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia,
Boston and San Francisco. Kaiser also owns a real estate company and
a dredging operation. It also owns and operates its own shipping
fleet consisting of five vessels engaged in bulk transportation. It
has several Gulfstream executive jets. And the Kaiser Trading Company
deals in worldwide marketing of all Kaiser's products as well as such
extras as fuel oil and forest products. In the past the Kaiser
Corporation also manufactured cars and jeeps, but it sold its Jeep
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Corporation to American Motors in 1970. And during the Second World
War it mass produced the famous Liberty ships at the rate of one a day.
Due to a combination of vertical integration (i.e. depth of
interest in a particular product from basic resources to marketing),
and diversification (i.e. breadth of interest in a wide range of
f
products), Kaiser possesses a great deal of security, and control over
its affairs. Since the steel it uses to construct power stations is
produced from the iron ore which Kaiser mines, the price and quality - *
of this input to the engineering operation can be rigorously controlled.
In fact the extent to which the Kaiser Corporation could make its
operations totally self-reliant is truly astounding. For instance,
the iron ore which Kaiser mines can be made into steel using the
coking coal (which Kaiser mines) and the refractories which Kaiser
produces. This steel might then be used to build the ships which Kaiser
uses to transport such things as iron ore, coal, etc. In its aluminium
ventures as well as steel, the Kaiser Corporation has control over the
operation from first to last. It mines its own bauxite and produces
its own alumina and aluminium using chemical catalysts it has
itself manufactured. It then fabricates the aluminium into
products (such as aluminium foil, sheet and cable) which it markets
through its own trading company.
Kaiser not only has a broad range of interests in commodities,
but also a worldwide area of operations. Outside the U.S., some of
its facilities include:- " •
Canada : Iron ore, coal, asbestos and gypsum mines
copper, steel and ferro-alloy plants,
Aluminium fabricating plant.
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Australia : Bauxite and iron ore mines








Aluminium smelter and aluminium fabricating
plant
Aluminium fabricating plant
Printing and packaging plant
Aluminium fabricating plant
Alumina plant
Gypsum quarry and steel plant
Bauxite nines and alumina plant
Real estate
Phosphate mines
Aluminium fabricating plant and refractories
plant
: Aluminium fabricating plant
: Aluminium fabricating plant
: Bauxite mines, alumina plant, aluminium
smelter, aluminium fabricating plant, and
pig iron facilities
Thailand : Cement plant and aluminium fabricating plant





















Guam Real estate, cement plant
Bahrain Aluminium smelter
Indonesia Aluminium fabricating plant
New Zealand Aluminium smelter, aluminium fabricating plant.
Kaiser has been involved as well in canal engineering in Panama,
and in many hydroelectric schemes such as the Guri dam in Venezuela,
the Salto Santiago and Salto Osorio projects in Brazil, the Bandama
River project in the Ivory Coast (Kosscu and Taabo dams), the Snowy
Mountains Project in Australia, and the Hoover, Bonneville and
Grand Coulee Dams in the U.S.A.
hith total assets of about $3,500 million, the Kaiser Empire
ranks as number thirty in the list of largest U.S. manufacturing
industries. This is not a well-known fact since the various parts
of the Kaiser linpire are usually treated separately. For instance,
Fortune Magazine publishes an annual list of the United States'
largest industries in which Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation
appear separately from Kaiser Industries and Kaiser Cement and Gypsum
/- ~r *
/ Fortune Magazine, 1975 /. However, since the whole of the Kaiser
linpire is answerable ultimately to one man, Edgar F. Kaiser, this
separation is unwarranted and misleading.
In 1973, the total revenues from Kaiser's operations amounted
to about $2,500 million, a figure which it is interesting to compare
to Ghana's GNP. In 1972, this latter amounted to N$ 2,62't million,
i.e. about $ 2,570 million, so it seems that the Kaiser Corporation
and Ghana may, in terms of economic power, be roughly equal.
Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation is the biggest division
of the Kaiser Gorp0ration in terms of sales, assets, and employees.
(
i -r
pf\ 0^. J u
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It is the fourth biggest producer of aluminium in the world after
ALCOA, ALCAN and Reynolds Metals, all North American firms. Kaiser
Aluminum and Chemical Corporation presently produces ab^ut 8% of
the worldte total production of aluminium. The Kaiser Aluminum and
^bemical Corporation was formed as late as 19;i6, and, as Forbes
Magazine put it:-
"Kaiser was not long in the aluminum business...before it
was realised that it needed to control large supplies of
bauxite, the raw material from which alumina and in turn
aluminum, are made. Where could the company find bauxite?
Overseas. So in 19'*7, Henry Kaiser accepted the inevitable
and purchased bauxite properties in Jamaica. His resolution
never to go overseas was doomed the moment he decided to
enter the aluminum business".
/"Forbes, 1968_7
ALCOA's control of bauxite deposits and hydroelectric resources
in the U.S. forced Kaiser to take its operations overseas / Girvan, 1970
In fact there has been a steady trend for all the big four aluminium
companies to move abroad in search of new supplies of bauxite. ALCOA
and ALCAN got supplies from Guyana and Surinam between the 1920's
and the 19'tO's. Reynolds and Kaiser moved into the Dominican Republic
and Jamaica after the Second World War. Interest is increasingly
shifting to Australia and Africa during the 1960's and 1970's, not
only to find supplies of bauxite, however, but also sources of
hydroelectric power.
Henry Kaiser once said:
"There is an overriding secret to our success. That
secret is to fill human needs. LVery undertaking we've
ever tackled was entered upon because wc saw unfulfilled
needs of people. There is an almost irresistible force
in giving ourselves for the needs of others."
/ Moxon, 1969> 93 7
This is a piece of humbug. The Kaiser Corporation bad specific
aims to fulfil when it got involved in the VHP and it did not sacrifice
6o
those aims, or itself, for the benefit of the people of Ghana. The
Kaiser Corporation was called in initially for advice on the VHP.
It was not long before it became involved in actual operation of
the scheme. Kaisers were contracted to design the dam and supervise
its building, and to build and operate the aluminium smelter. They
i
were paid a substantial sum for the former task, they did not do it
for nothing. And in operating the aluminium smelter this concern was
not a broad one of filling human needs but a narrow one of producing
cheap aluminium. By involving itself in the VHP, the Kaiser Corporation
was able to gain access to cheap hydroelectricity, and was able to
place itself in a strategic position to obtain some of Ghana's large
supplies of bauxite.
That Kaiser was not particularly interested in Ghana's desire
for development is indicated by the way in which they rejected the
proposed Bui scheme as an alternative to the VHP. The Kaiser
Reassessment Report stated:
"....this development / Bui_/, due to smaller river flow
and the remote location, would be relatively economical
only for the general public supply of electricity. The
very large block of low cost power economic for electro¬
chemical production is not available here."
/"Kaiser, 1959, VII-I_7
The emphasis here is on Kaiser's interest in aluminium production
rather than Ghana's desire for electricity. However, this is not
to say that the multinational corporation is totally unamenable to
bargaining and compromise:
"Edgar Kaiser has always held that it is better to create
an atmosphere of mutual trust than it is to try to clean
all the chips off the table. This way the partners are
willing to come back ami deal again".
/ Loving, 1975J
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The main participants in the project have heen dealt with.
But what of the others, those affected by the scheme? The VHP did not
arise out of Ghanaian initiative so that most Ghanaians did not have
any aims to fulfil through implementation of the project. Instead
they had received from others or acquired for themselves a set of
expectations as to what the project would mean to them and to
Ghana. Some expected the project to be beneficial, some thought
overwise. A Ghanaian Professor of Economics stated that the scheme
was "fraught with many socio-economic problems, such as the displacement
of people from the land, the diversion of labour from agriculture and
other fields of economic activity including the mining of other
minerals, the possible increase in the incidence of river blindness,
and the further disintegration of existing social units". / de Graft
Johnson, 1955, 30 7
Another West African economist stated:
"Some persons tend to regard the scheme as one of the
first fruits of the country's recent successful political
tournament. Nothing could be further from the truth.
The scheme cannot be expected to make any substantial
contribution to the secondary industrialisation of the
country in the sense of a shift of resources away from
agricultural and mining activity to manufacturing industry.
In essence it is just another of those enterprises which
have characterised and continue to characterise the economy
of West Africa as a raw materials economy. It is a plan
for winning aluminium, in most part by private enterprise,
and exporting it to other countries which will use it in
the manufacture of useful articles."
/ Carney, 1952, 4-5_7
And George Padmore (author and ardent Pan-Africanist) wrote:
"..All in all, while it is clear that the scheme will
provide the U.KC with a source of aluminium outside the
hard currency area and the smelting company with profits
from an assured market, the benefits which would accrue
to the Gold Coast are not discernible, beyond the
incidental ones of an artifical lake and possible
provision of some electric power for the development
62
of other industries once the smelting company's needs have
been met...It may come as a shock to the Gold Coast people
to find that they have perhaps given away rights to work
yet another rich natural resource of their country for little
or nothing,
/ Padmore, 1953» 238-9 7
And even the U.K.'s Watson Commission, after the riots of 19^8, felt
obliged to make the following warning:
"We are very much concerned to see that in the exploitation of
the natural resources of the Gold Coast the indigenous
population shares to the fullest extent the advantages. We
realise that in so far as the execution of the VHP depends
on the manufacture of aluminium, it is a commercial venture
the success of which may well depend on world prices being
maintained. If the view held by those in the trade and
maintained in high places in Britain immediately after the
late war is any criterion, any prediction of this nature is
no sure guide. It would not be right therefore in our view,
unless the scheme held prospects of paying its way independently
of aluminium manufacture, for the Government of the Gold Coast
to embark upon it as a national venture. On the other hand,
while capital is entitled to a fair return measured by risk
it may be proper to observe that views may differ on what
is a fair return. It would be equally improper in our
view to permit without adequate safeguards the investment
of foreign capital. These should include a share of profits
and provision for the national use of surplus water and
surplus electrical energy, together with the adoption of
ultimate national ownership. Accordingly we recommend that,
assuming the Government upon consideration, for the reasons
given or other good and sufficient reason, decides not to
embark on the scheme as a national enterprise, then in
permitting private enterprise to carry out the scheme, such
permission should be conditional upon agreement on the
following broad lines:
1) The nominal share capital of the company formed to
carry out the scheme should be small and the Government
entitled to subscribe up to 49$ thereof,
2) The bulk of the working capital should be provided
by way of loan capital at a fixed rate of interest including
a rate for amortisation in 50-75 years, the interest to be
a first charge on the company's revenues but not otherwise
secured.
3) Upon redemption of the loan capital the Government
to have an option to acquire the balance of the 51$ share
capital at a price to be fixed, failing agreement, by
arbitration.
"We appreciate that this recommendation in this form may be
qxiite unacceptable to foreign capital. Our intention is not
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to tie the hands of the Government to any fixed formulae
hut to indicate the kind of arrangement which in our view
should he aimed at and which we think the people of the
Gold Coast are entitled to expect from the exploitation of
their natural heritage."
/ Watson Commission, 19^8, paragraphs 310-320 "J
What of those who, even more than most Ghanaians, were decidedly
affected hy the VRP, those people living in the area to be flooded
hy the new lake? We are told that:
"...residents well up-river from the dam site were
incredulous that their own villages would actually be
flooded. Indeed, some suspicions were voiced that
the move was merely a Government device to get them
out of the way so that their land could he utilised
in a different way."
/ Lowe-McConnell, 1966, 102 7
In other words, they thought their land was being stolen. And, as




EFFECTS OF THE PROJECT UPON INDUSTRY AND THE MACROECONOMY
By 1974, the fixed assets held by the VRA had entailed a total - *
expenditure of N$ 199.5 million. The foreign component of this
expenditure had amounted to 144.8 million, i.e. about 75$
/- -7 *
/ Personal interview, Chief Accountant, VRA /, The bulk of this
foreign expenditure had been incurred during the construction period
1962-66 and amounted to N$ 93 million or N0 18.6 million per annum
/ VRA Annual Reports 1962-66 7« Comparing this annual expenditure
to Ghana's balance of payments situation (see Table Five), it can
be seen that it is not an insignificant factor, though it is by no
means the only cause of an adverse balance of payments. (it must
be remembered that the price of cocoa on international markets is
the overriding factor, this being the explanation for the particularly
large deficit in 1965. However it is possible to state that the
VHP, and similar projects requiring foreign expenditure, aggravated
the existing balance of payments problem.)
The loans originally agreed for the project in February 1962
amounted to (in terms of dollars):
IBRD $47 million for a period of 25 years @
5-4$ p.a. interest
AID $27 million for a period of 30 years @
3|-$ p.a. interest
Export-Import
Bank $10 million for a period of 25 years @ 5^$
interest
U.K. Export Credits
Guarantee Dept; $14 million for a period of 25 years
6$ interest
* kU-~^^ )1~7 £


















































/ Sources: Birmingham et al, 1966; Bank of Ghana, Annual
Reports, 1960-74; Central Bureau of Statistics,
Statistical Yearbooks (passim) J
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The Government of Ghana provided the rest of the cost of the project
through an investment valued at £98 million, most of this actually
being in Ghanaian cedis.
The VRA Annual Report for the year 1962 states:
"A number of procedural matters had to be negotiated
and settled vith the four lending agencies before funds
could be withdrawn from their loans for financing
expenditures. The first step was to allocate the proceeds
of the loans as between various Contracts in a Master List
of Goods and to secure rhe approval of this list by the
four lending agencies. While the loan agreements were
signed and executed on February 8, 1962, the scrutiny and
approval of the Master List of Goods took several months
and were finalised in January 1963. In general, the loan
proceeds of AID and Export-Import Bank are available to
finance the procurement of necessary goods and services
in the United States and those of the UK loan in the
United Kingdom. The proceeds of the World Bank loan are
available to finance expenditures in other currencies".
/ VILA, Annual Report, 1962, 19 7
In other words, the loans were tied to the purchase of goods either
from the donor country or from acceptable member countries of the
World Bank. It was due to the advice of the World Bank that the
loans agreed on were not entirely tied to the purchase of goods,
for the World Bank proposed that some contracts be put out to
international tender / Moxon, 1969, 104_7 Under the original loan
arrangements all the debts except that to AID were due to be paid
off by 1987. The AID loan was to have been repaid by 1995. Most
of the U.K. Loan was not taken up (it had the highest interest rate)
and other loans were obtained. The IBRD has lent a further £t> million,
the Canadian Government has lent just over £9 million and the
Ghanaian Government has lent nearly N0 2 million / VRA Annual
Report, 1974 J. As a result the total drawings on the loan facilities
available amounted to £98 million, about the same as anticipated in
1962. Rut by 1974, instead of the expected total borrowings
remaining to "be paid of $60 to $65 million, the VRA had still to
repay $82 million / VILA Annual Report, 1974 7« instead of having
paid about $33 million in interest charges, they had paid $51 million
/ VRA Annual Reports 1962-74 7» This was due to a lower profitability
than expected on the part of the VRA, and thus a reduced ability to pay
off the loans. Since the interest rate on the loans is applied to that
amount still outstanding, the interest charges were therefore also
higher than expected. In fact year by year the VRA is merely managing
to pay the interest charges on loans received but is not managing to
repay significant amounts of the loans themselves. In 1974, the VRA
paid back only $1.2 million of loan facility because $4 million had to
be paid in interest charges.
The total interest charges to be paid on the original loans
would have amounted to $56 million. As has been noted the VRA has
already paid out $51 million in interest yet there is still interest
to pay on the outstanding part of the loan, currently $82 million,
until this is totally repaid. It is anticipated that repayment at the
present rate will take more than 50 years so that the grand total
of interest paid will amount to more than $150 million. That is,
the VRA's original borrowing of $98 million may necessitate a total
repayment of about $250 million.
Examining Ghana's trade with her present-day major trading
partners, the U.S. and the U.K. (see Table Six), it can be seen that:
(a) there has been a tendency for both import and export
trade with the U.K. to decline,
(b) exports to the U.S. have remained steady,
(c) imports from the U.S. have increased considerably.
Thus the U.S., previously a minor trading partner, has become
of major importance to Ghana. This is not, of course, solely due
TABLE SIX : Ghana's Trade with U.S. and U.K. as percentage
of World T()~fccii ("y l"V l-ww\ TrW*.
Year Imports
U.K./ U.S./
(Sterling Area) (Dollar Area)
Exports
U.K./ U.S./




1958 n.a.(46.3) n.a.(7.9) n.a.(41.4) n.a.(19.8)
1959 n.a.(45.8) n.a.(8.9) n.a.(34.8) n.a.(19.8)
I960 n.a.(41.6) n.a.(8.3) n.a.(36.7) n.a.(15.9)
1961 n.a.(40.6) n.a.(ll.O) n.a.(32.8) n.a. (24.6)
1962 n.a.(38.5) n.a.(ll.l) 31,5(n.a.) 18.2(19.6)
1963 32.8(37.6) 6.4(8.8) 28.2(31.9) 15.6(16.9)
1964 27.4(35.4) 8.9(11.6) 23.0(26.4) 21.0(22.9)
1965 n.a.(28.9) n.a.(n.a.) n.a.(23.8) n.a.(n.a.)
1966 28.8(32.7) 16.8(17.9) 25.0(29.7) 14.5(17.2)
1967 30.3(35.5) 16.8(19.6) 27.7(31.8) 18.6(23.0)
1968 27.6(32.4) 19.1(21.6) 27.1(32.1) 17.7(21.4)
1969 26.8(33.2) 18.4(20.4) 28.5(33.5) 19.0(20.6)
1970 23.6(28.7) 18.1(21.3) 23.4(29.3) 18.0(19.2)
1971 25.0(30.9) 15.1(16.6) 24.2(28.7) 22.6(24.0)
1972 15.6(24.2) 17.5(20.5) 18.5(23.4) 13.2(15.4)
1973 16.8(28.4) 15.5(17.2) 17.0(21.7) 13.2(14.8)
r\. a . — {Win/4.
/ Source: Bank of Ghana Annual Reports, dates as specified f
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to the implementation of the VHP, but it does indicate that the
VHP was part of a general tendency toward involvement with the U.S.
Has the VHP helped Ghana to broaden her range of export
earnings? Only in a limited way. Aluminium was first exported in
1967 ana, soon after, was making a substantial contribution to the
total value of exports. But, apart from this, there does not appear
to have been any change in the structure of Ghana's export earnings,
as can be seen from the adjusted figures omitting aluminium from
the list of exports (see Table Seven). This indicates that the
VRP's provision of electricity has, up to now, made no difference
to the nature of Ghana's export economy.
Moreover, to consider the value of exported aluminium as a
simple addition to the credit side of the national accounts would
be false. The average value of annual aluminium exports in the
period 1968-73 was Nj£ 46 million. But the average annual cost of
imported alumina was N0 23 million, and the cost of imported cryolite,
pitch, coke and other chemical supplies necessary for aluminium production
was about N0 9 million per year. So the maximum possible credit to
Ghana's accounts would be N0 14 million per year; however, this
figure fails to allow for the cost of imported'machinery and other
items. The Preparatory Commission Iteport was of the opinion that:
"In broad terms the amount of exports at full scale
production of the smelter (over 200,000 tonnes) would be
very close to the quantity of imports needed for production."
/ Preparatory Commission, Vol. 1, 1956, 20 /
This statement was based on the assumption that alumina for the
smelter would be produced in Ghana. Production from the smelter
has been nnning at 130,000 tonnes per year and imported chemical
supplies (apart from alumina) at about 100,000 tonnes per year.
TABLE SEVEN : Diversification of Ghana's Exports
Percentage contribution of cocoa, timber, gold, diamonds and
manganese:—
to the total value to the total value


















/ Bank of Ghana, Annual Reports/
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If the statement of the Preparatory Commission is correct about
50,000 tonnes of imports remains unaccounted for.
The percentage of the total labour force which was officially
unemployed in Ghana in 1970 remained the same as in i960 (i.e. 6%)
/ Population Censuses, I960 and 1970 7* must be remembered that
this unemployment rate is not easily comparable to the rates
measured in developed countries. But since the rate remained the
same it would appear unlikely that the VHP had any appreciable
beneficial effect upon the unemployment rate in Ghana.
The labour force at the VALCO smelter numbers about 2000, while
the combined labour forces of the VRA and the Electricity Corporation
of Ghana (ECG) amount to 7200 / VALCO information, VRA Annual Report
197^, ECG. Annual Report 1973_7. By early 1975, the fixed capital
assets of VALCO were worth about $150 million so that the cost of
each work-place was of the order of $75,000. The combined capital
assets of the VRA and ECG were worth about $270 million so that the
cost per work-place was about $37,000. These figures merit
comparison with the situation in the U.S. where an average of about
$18,000 of capital is required for each worker in industry. Only
in the more highly mechanised and automated industries does the
investment per worker reach $80,000 / E. Paul De Garmo & John It. Canada
'Engineering Economy' 5th Edition, 1973, Kacmillan, N.Y. J. The VHP's
cost per work-place was, therefore, not only high for a developing
country b\it also for a developed country.
The effects of the project upon Ghana's regional structure hove
merely been to accentuate it. Electricity has only been supplied to
the Eastern, Western, Central and Asbanti regions, which were already
the richest areas of Ghana. The smelter is situated in the richest
region of all, tbe Eastern Region. The project thus cannot possibly
have any beneficial effect upon Ghana's maldistribution of income
amongst its regions.
The decision to locate the smelter at Tema was one of doubtful
wisdom. Positioning the smelter close to Tema port was clearly of
advantage to the Kaiser Corporation once it was decided that all the
smelter's inputs would be imported and all its outputs wotild be
exported. But, conversely, this location was inconvenient to the
Ghana Government for it meant that both electricity and water supplies
had to be transmitted a much greater distance (about 65 kilometres).
It also meant that, contrary to earlier plans, Tema was to become a
dual-purpose settlement (i.e. both a port and an aluminium town) thus
leading to a serious lousing problem. This problem has not yet been
solved, for Tema has spawned a shanty town, Ashiaman, which is still
without proper supplies of piped water and electricity.
The project has also created a shanty town at Akosombo where
the workers' 'temporary' township, built for the labourers on tbe
dam, is still in existence. This houses about 5000 people living
in dilapidated dwellings made mostly of corrugated sheeting. The
supervisors' township (housing about 3000 people in substantial, air-
conditioned buildings) is officially part of the same town - Akosombo -
and yet is entirely separate. Each township has its own school,
store, market and other facilities. The official reason for
separating the two townships is lack of flat land for building space,
but is it then entirely coincidental that the two townships were laid
out according to St. John Bird's original recommendations? The
supervisors' township was built on the slope of a hill to catch the
breeze and the workers' camp was placed in a valley bottom. Tbe
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supervisors' township has been provided with tennis courts and a
swimming pool but leisure facilities are not a feature of the workers'
camp.
The Aluminium Side of the Venture
As a result of the VHP, Ghana t is now tied into the world
aluminium industry in a most unsatisfactory manner, Ghana exports
bauxite, imports alumina, exports primary aluminium, and imports
rolled aluminium to be fabricated into aluminium products. This
situation is economically and politically expedient for the aluminium
companies but is technically inefficient in terms of energy usage
(due to the needless transportation of heavy materials over long
distances) and is certainly not in the economic interests of Ghana.
Over the last 20 years the British Aluminium Company has taken
more than five million tonnes of bauxite from their mine at Awaso
(see Table Eight). About 80^ of this has gone to the U.K. to be
processed into alumina. The implementation of the VHP has in no
way affected this trade in one of Ghana's most useful resources.
Exports of bauxite have remained at a high level since 19(>7.
In order to feed the VALCO smelter between 250,000 and 300,000
tonnes of alumina has to be imported each year / VALCO Information /.
This alumina originates from bauxite mined by Kaisers in Jamaica which.,
has then been shipped to Kaiser plants in Louisiana for processing
into alumina before being shipped across the Atlantic Ocean to Ghana.
The primary aluminium produced by the VALCO smelter is all
exported. It leaves the factory in several forms: 'pigs' to be used
for casting, rolling ingots for producing sheet metal, extrusion billets
for extruding aluminium sections, and 'sows' which are large ingots of











































































/ Sources: Bank of Ghana Annual heports, Central Bureau of
Statistics Economic Surveys, Metallgesellschaft
Aktiongesellschaft. ~]
raw aluminium on which further processing or alloying is to be
done.
A large proportion of the production of the Tema smelter
goes to the U.S. For instance, in 197^, 51,000 tonnes out of a total
production of 157*000 tonnes went to that destination / Metollgesell-
schaft Aktiengesellschaft, 1975 7« Other major markets for the
aluminium are Japan, the U.K., test Germany and Sweden.
Ghana's own requirements for aluminium products are met by
importing rolled aluminium sheet which can then be fabricated in
Ghanaian factories. The largest of these is run by Ghana Aluminium
Products Limited (GIIANAL) which makes aluminium roofing sheets, grain
storage bins, chicken coops, fish freezing trays, and van bodies.
G1IANAL is a joint venture between the Ghana Government and ALCAN. It
began operations in 1959 solely to produce roofing sheets, and became
one of the world's largest producers of roofing sheets with a peak
output of more than 7000 tonnes per year / Ghana Economic Review,
1972-3, 131_7.
Due to the natureof ha- involvement in aluminium, Ghana lacks
control over all aspects of her aluminium industry. There are ample
world supplies of bauxite to meet present demand so that the price
obtained per tonne of bauxite exported is fairly low. If Ghana were
to process aluminium from her own bauxite the value added would be
significant. Nevertheless, primary aluminium is still no more than
a basic resource; the production of aluminium in Ghana could not,
by any stretch of the imagination, be regarded as a move away from a
raw materials economy. However, if Ghana were to stop exporting
bauxite and process it instead into aluminium for export, she would
at least avoid this fragmentary use of her resources, and would have
greater opportunity of control over a single venture rather than
her present weak position in respect to the multiple ventures in the
aluminium industry. As it is, Ghana merely serves the world aluminium
industry as a source of cheap bauxite on the one hand and as a source
of cheap electricity for aluminium production on the other. If Ghana,
through negotiation, achieves better prices for either resource, then
the aluminium companies concerned will find their ventures less profitabl
But the options open to the aluminium companies are much greater, since
they can, if necessary, phase out their operations and move to another
part of the world.
It is not merely the mode of external linkage into the world
aluminium industry which must be criticised, however, because the
way in which the VHP has been structured has been detrimental to
Ghana's internal affairs. The aluminium sector of the project almost
seems to have been designed to minimise the internal linkage effects
which might have benefited Ghana. As it is, the decision to import
alumina and all necessary raw materials for the smelter meant that
the scheme would have no encouraging effect upon industries that could
supply inputs: that is, the scheme would have no backward linkage
effects into the general Ghanaian economy. Similarly, the fact that
all the primary aluminium produced by the smelter is exported means
that the aluminium scheme has no forward linkage effects for it
supplies no inputs to other industries.
Not only must the general arrangements of the aluminium sector
of the VHP be criticised but also the particular terms of agreement.
The Master Agreement, signed by Kwame Nkruxnah on behalf of the
Government of Ghana and Edgar Kaiser on behalf of VALCO, makes the
following concessions
(a) VALCO to pay no import duty on alumina, or other materials
to be used in the construction or operation of tbe smelter, until
25 April 1980.
(b) No restriction or taxation of VALCO's aluminium exports
(c) VALCO to pay no company tax until 25 October 1978. From
that date until 1997, tax will be levied at the rate in force on
2nd January 1961. »
(d) VALCO's dividends to be free of tax until 25 April 1980
/ Personal communication, director of Finance, VRA /
These are very generous terms and they would appear to ensure
that VALCO recoups its investment in a fairly short space of time.
As well as these arrangements for tax concessions and exemption from
import and export duties, two further points about the agreement have
been criticised in the past. The first is the low price obtained for
the electricity sold to the smelter and the second is the failure to
insist on a commitment from VALCO to build at some time in the future
an alumina plant in Ghana.
The original price for electricity sold to tbe smelter as agreed
in the Power Contract was 2.625 mills per kwh (a mill is one-tenth of
a U.S. cent). Ve may compare this price with the average cost of industrial
power used for primary metal production in the U.S. which is 7 mills
uer kwh / Guyol, 1969, 62 J, This price of 2.625 mills was to have
remained in force for 50 years but since the financial performance of
the VISA did not come up to expectations a firm of consulting engineers
(Preece(Cardew and Rider, based in Brighton, England) was appointed in
1970 to review the electricity rates charged by the VRA. The Preece,
Cardew & Rider report recommended that a 5-6/fc increase in the VALCO
rate be sought / Preece, Cardew & Rider, 1970 J. As a result, the
rate charged to VALCO was altered by agreement to 2.75 mills per kwh,
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effective from 25th October 1972 / VRA Annual Report, 1972 J. But
this was merely an interim rate to be used until a final rate was
established, and following discussions in February 1973> a further
interim rate was negotiated of 3.125 mills per kwh / VRA Annual
Eeport, 1973 /. Discussion has continued since then, the VRA's case
for a further rise being put by Preece,Cardew & Itider, VALCO's case for
a continuation of the present rate being put by Haskins & Sells (a
firm of accountants based in New York). Since agreement was difficult
to reach, a fifth party, Messrs. Shawmont Limited (business consultants
based in Montreal) was appointed jointly by the VILA and VALCO to review
the power rate. Their report is being used in the negotiations to
determine a new tariff level / Personal Interview, Chief Accountant,
vra_7.
That the rate charged for electricity supplied to VALCO is very
low may be indicated by a brief calculation. By 1974 the total value
of the VRA's fixed assets was N0 200 million. Assuming the project
to have a life of 50 years (the figure used in the Kaiser Reassessment
Report) the distribiited annual capital cost of the project is
N0 4 million p.a. The interest charges for 1974 amounted to
N0 4.5 million and the running costs for the year amounted to
NI 5.4 million. Thus the total cost of electricity supply for the
year 1974 (omitting extraneous items such as resettlement and
compensation) was N0 13.9 million.
Now it is possible to apportion the costs of supplying
electricity to the various consumers on the basis of their maximum
demand for power (in Mb) and their total energy use (in kwh). The
cost of generating supply is usually taken as 50'jo demand—related
and 50$) energy use related. The cost of transmission is usually
taken as 100$ demand related but we may ignore this factor since its
costs are small compared to the rest of the scheme.
In 1974 VALCO accounted for 59$ of the maximum demand on the
VRA's system and 69$ of the energy used. Since these must be taken
equally into consideration we may average these figures and state
that the cost of supplying electricity to VALCO is 64$ of the total
cost of supplying electricity. So that the cost of supplying VALCO
equals 64$ of N0 13.9 million, which equals N0 8.9 million.
Yet the revenue obtained from sales to VALCO was only
N0 8.6 million, so that on these terms the electricity is not even
being sold at cost price, be must note that the electricity revenue
for 1974 does not include the extra payment due to VRA on the basis
of the further interim price of 3.125 mills per kwh (a sum of
N0 1.2 million) since this was placed under deposit account until
'1
finalisation of the tariff negotiations. But it is still clear that,
even including payment for the further interim rate, the returns to the
VRA remain very low. Calculations for previous years bear out this
finding, indicating that revenues from sale of electricity to VALCO
do not meet the cost of supply.
The Electricity Side of the Venture
The VRA's Akosombo Dam produces by far the largest proportion
of electricity generated in Ghana. The Electricity Corporation
of Ghana (ECG) produces the rest of the public supply from diesel
generating sets. However, the VRA sells a substantial amount of
electricity to the ECG each year which the ECG then distributes.
The VILA also sells electricity directly to the larger consumers;
VALCO, the Communaute Llectrique du Benin, some of the mining
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corporations and also Akosombo township and Akosombo Textiles Limited.
It will he clear to the reader that in practice the aluminium
and electricity sides of the VHP are inextricably linked. But since
the two aspects of the project were of differing importance to the
various participants (i.e. to the Ghanaian Government the electricity
derived from the project was of more importance than the aluminium
produced) it will he of interest to knew which, if any, of the two
aspects has proved the more successful. To this end, the two sides
of the project must be examined as distinct ventures, as far as possible.
Having said that, one must nevertheless contrast the rate that
VALCO pays for electricity with the rate applied to other consumers.
As has been noted VALCO has paid 2.75 mills/kwh since 1972 as the
further interim rate of 3.125 mills/kwh has not yet been ratified.
The average rate paid by customers of the ECG in 1973 was 22 mills/
kwh / ECG Annual Report 1973 7. Of the electricity sold by the ECG,
25$ goes to commercial enterprises (for lighting and power), and to
street lighting, 25$ goes to private residences and 50$ goes to
Special Load industrial consumers who buy their power at a cheaper
rate than other Ghanaian customers / ECG Annual Report 1973 7« Thus
the Special Load consumers paid 13 mills/kwh while the rate for
commercial lighting was 83 mills/kwh, and for domestic supply the
rate was 22 mills/kwh. None of these rates are favourable when
compared to the VALCO rate.
It is instructive also to compare these electricity rates to
those used in the U.K. where the average rate for industrial consumers
in 1973 was 0.74 pence/kwh (18 mills/kwh) (at the then current
exchange rate of $2.4 to £l), the rate for commercial supplies was
1.1 pence/kwh (26 mills/kwh) and tbe rate for domestic supply was
0.97 pence/kwh (23 mills/kwh) / Electricity Council, 1975, 67 7*
The average revenue from power sales in the U.K. was 0.90 pence/kwh
or 22 mills/kwh, that is, exactly the same as the ECG's revenue/kwh.
What can he learnt from these figures? Given that the aims of
the Ghana Government hove been to encourage industrialisation, one
can say that the ECG's tariff structure is a sensible one. The growth
in deraan^ (from all of VBA's customers except VALCO) over the last ten
years has averaged out at 17/ per year / VPA Annual Report, 1974 / so
it seems that the electricity is not over-priced. The rate for VALCO
however is very much lower than that for the other consumers. One
would expect it to he lower since VALCO, as a base-load consumer, takes
a uniform quantity of power 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. But should
it he so much lower? As was calciilated previously, VALCO is paying
less than cost price for electricity. Since VALCO takes such a large
proportion of the VliA's electricity and pays such a low price, the
average revenue the VUA receives is very low, as can he seen from the -
IBRD's International Electric Power Data for 1969 (see Table Nine)
/"IBRD, 1972_7.
Despite the very large amount of electricity made available by
the VKP, electricity is still a minor factor in Ghana's energy
supply. In 1969 (the latest year for which comprehensive figures on
energy supplies are available), the total generation of electricity
from private and public sources in Ghana amounted to some 2,700 million
kwh / VRA Annual Report, 1969 /• ln the same year, coal consumption
in Ghana amounted to about 35>000 tonnes (all imported), and about
615,000 cubic metres of petroleum products were also imported for
use as fuel / Quarterly Digest of Statistics, March 1972 J. Thus
Ghana's non-traditional energy supplies were made up approximately
TABLE NINE : International Electric Power Data (1969)
Country Population Installed MWs Consuxaers
(000s)
Argentina 23,983 3,965 4,000,000




Ceylon 12,240 247 n.a.
Colombia 20,463 1,870 n.a.
Costa Ilica - 1,695 213 150,400
El Salvador 3,390 166 9,200
Ethiopia 24,769 180 94,100
France 50,330 25,696 15,300,000
Ghana 8,600 675 94,500
India 536,983 14,503 n.a.
Indonesia 116,000 651 n.a.
Italy 53,170 21,702 n.a.
Kenya 10,506 157 100,900
Malaysia 10,583 664 398,600
Mexico 48,933 4,904 4,170,000
New Zealand 2,901 3,023 n.a.
Nigeria 63,870 n.a. n.a.
Pakistan 126,353 1,873 • 728,000
Singapore 2,017 524 245,000
Sweden 7,978 13,731 n.a.
Switzerland 6,230 9,500 n.a.
Taiwan 13,800 2,245 2,100,000
Tanzania 12,92b 102 4b,100
Uganda 8,340 170 59,700
U.K. 55,534 55,681 19,964,000






























^"Source: IBRD, 1972 7
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as follows:
Oil - - 65$
Hydro electricity - 32$
Coal - 3$
(we neglect sucli items as firewood and charcoal only because tbey
are extremely difficult to assess)
Since 1969 the amount of electricity generated has risen by
about 50$ so it may be that oil and hydroelectricity are more nearly
comparable in importance (although oil demand has probably risen also).
However, it must be remembered that a large proportion of the electricity
generated is taken up by VALCO so that the amount of energy available
to Ghanaian consumers is much smaller than indicated. VALCO absorbed ^
2,000 million kwh of electricity in 1969. He might therefore say that
the true measure of energy supplies available to Ghanaian consumers in
I969 was:
Oil - - 85$
Hydro electricity - 11$
Coal - - - 4$
Obviously then, Ghana is quite highly dependent on oil, more so
than the U.K. where the primary fuel input was made up as follows
Oil - - 42$
Coal 37$
Natural gas - 17$
Nuclear electricity 3.'*$
Hydro electricity - 0.6$
Where does the electricity from the Akosombo dam go to? In 1973 it




Accra/Tema area 552 14.7
Mines 243 6.4




Textile Factory 34 0.9
Others 58 1.5
/ VIIA and ECG Annual 1reports, 1973 7
The greatest quantity of electricity was therefore used in
the Accra/Tema area either by VALCO or by domestic, commercial, or
industrial customers of the ECG. The next largest amount was consumed
by the mining companies in their gold, diamond and manganese operations
which are spread over the central and southern part of the country.
After the mines the Communaute Electrique du Benin (i.e. Togo and
Dahomey) was the next largest consumer, followed by the Ghanaian
cities of Kumasi and Takoradi.
One of the effects of the availability of electricity has been
to discourage the mines from generating their own electricity from
diesel generating sets. They have become major customers of the
VTiA. But, important though a change from one source of power to
another can he, it would be much more interesting to know what novel
effects the availability of electricity has created.
On this question one nay usefully cite Bans Amann's study of
development and electricity in East Africa / Amann, 1969 7. Amann's
study of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania sought to ask what effects the
East African power supply industry had on the development of these
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three countries. Their situation is similar to Ghana's; all three
being without indigenous sources of mineral fuel and therefore
dependent on petroleum imports or the development of hydro electricity.
Amann state s:-
"As a rule the percentage of electricity costs in the
total industrial costs is very low, 1 fo would be a
useful approximation for industries in East Africa.
Therefore, little scope exists for the public utilities
and the state to stimulate industrialisation through
forward linkage effects by particularly low electricity
prices".
/ Amann, 1969, 142 7
This is not due to electricity prices in East Africa being very
low in comparison with other countries, for they are about average,,
It is, rather, due to the fact that electricity costs are, in
general, a minor factor in the total costs of any industry.
Amann notes that Uganda is the most electrified East African
country,, 98/° of its electricity is generated at the 190 Mlvr hydro¬
electric power station at Owen Falls, built in 1954. Hydro-
electricity accounts for about 6^ of total energy consumption in
Tanzania, 6^ in Kenya and 17^ in Uganda. Nevertheless, Amann
says of Uganda
"A relatively high per capita consumption (of electricity),
an impressive length of transmission lines etc. must be
balanced against an almost disastrous state of financial
affairs".
/ Amann, 1969, 29_7
"During these post-war years, electricity enjoyed magical
esteem as an agent in industrialisation. The assumption
underlying the Owen Falls project was that cheap electricity
would almost automatically cause various industries to start
operation."
/ Amann, 1969, 154 ]
But,
"The advent of cheap electricity from the Owen Falls hydro-
power station did not entail rapid industrialisation as had
been anticipated. However, outlets for electricity were
badly needed to obtain minimum revenue in order to at
least cover running costs and provide a contribution to
the very heavy financial commitments. Thus, pressures
from an infrastructural overhead situation committed
Uganda to a programme of 'rural electrification' that is
quite outstanding by African standards. Furthermore,
with the bulk supply to Kenya, another stop-gap of the
overhead situation was achieved as well as a step towards
international integration within the East African Community.
Finally, efforts towards industrialisation were emphasised
(cheap electricity did not cause industrialisation but
industries had to bo created which, by their increased
consumption, made electricity cheaperl)."
/"Amann, 1969, 32 7
Amann also found no evidence that electrification had "ignited
industrialisation in Tanzania and Kenya / Amann, 1969, 90_7« But
we may note, while on the subject of Amann's study, that although
he dismisses the idea that electricity has a development stimulating
effect through forward linkages, he does suggest that hydro projects
could have important developmental effects through backward linkages
Fhe extensive civil works entailed may require large inputs of
construction materials and unskilled labour giving hydro projects an
advantage over thermal power stations for which the equipment has
to be imported. Whether this will be true or not will depend on
the extent to which the particular hydroproject relies on indigenous
or imported resources. For the Akosombo Dam the latter was the case
Amann's study then, must make us doubt the possibility that
the building of the Akosombo Dam and the resulting electrification
has caused, or will cause, any radical changes in the Ghanaian
economy. A note of caution must be added, however, for in studying
this question, we are hampered by a serious lack of statistics.
Since the advent of the military regime in 1973, the Central bureau
of statistics and other sources of statistical information, have
82
ceased publication of their statistical handbooks. This means that
the latest available information was published in 1972 or 1973 and
relates only up to the years 1969 or 1970. Having only a set of
statistics for the first five years of the project puts a severe
limit on the kind of assessment that can be carried out. nowever,
«
from our statistical review of the effects of the project as a whole
upon the macroeconomy, it is clear that no great changes had occurred
by the early 1970's.
This preliminary assessment therefore indicates a zero or
negligible influence from the VHP on Ghana's industrialisation.
Undoubtedly the production and distribution of electricity is
efficiently carried out by the VliA and the EGG. But we have had
to look beyond the provision of electricity to ask what was to be
achieved through it. The Ghana Government's aim in setting up the
project was to achieve a significant measure of industrialisation;
this does not seem to have occurred.
To lend further support to this critical view of the scheme,
it is instructive to perform a simple cost-benefit analysis on the
electricity side of the scheme for its projected lifespan of 50 years.
(See Tables at end of chapter) Using the data for electricity
revenues from 1965 to 197^, we may 'project' the returns to the
scheme into the future. To allow for the economic effect of interest
rates, we'discount' these future benefits by a discount factor. To
obtain a discounted future benefit, we multiply byQTJ~yn where r
is the interest rate and n is the number of years from the base date
1965. These annual benefits are then added to give the total benefits
to the scheme. A similar procedure is followed for costs, both
capital and running costs and interest charges.
In projecting the benefits into the future we shall assume
that the fifth VALCO pot-line is fully operational by 1977. The
maximum power demand from all consumers other than the VALCO smelter
had grown at an average of 12/fc p.a, over the period 1966-74. This
growth rate seems to have fallen steadily over the years, however,
so it seems reasonable to assume an'8^ growth in maximum demand
thereafter, (The growth rate for 1973-4 was more than 8$). Anyway,
the exact figure chosen for the growth rate is not too important
since the system very soon reaches its maximum capacity. At an 8*fc
growth rate this occurs in 1977, so thereafter we assume a constant
revenue from all electricity sold. Between 197'* and 1977 we assume
that the total electricity revenues from consumers other than VALCO
will grow at 6';c. (Over the 1966-74 period they had grown at 12/c p„a.
and for 1973-74 at nearly 10^.) Again the model is not very sensitive
to changes in the value of this growth rate since the limits of the
system's capacity are reached so early.
Having totalled the benefits over the period 1965-2014, we
find they amount to $281,5 million and the costs in the same
period amount to $306.5 million (at constant prices referred to
1974), thus giving a benefit to cost ratio of 0.92. This ratio is
not very sensitive to changes in the growth rate of electricity
demand, so we may he confident in asserting that the cost-benefit
ratio of the project is very low.
The calculations have been performed on the basis of the first
interim power rate to VALCO, i.e. 2.75 mills/kwh. If the cost
benefit ratio is to equal one, then the total benefits must add up
to $306o5 million, that is, there must be additional discounted
revenues of $25 million. This could be achieved by raising the
actual revenue for the years 1975 to 2014 by $2.25 million p.a.
This represents a 30$ increase on present rates (while the further
interim rate represents an increase of 13»6$). It can be seen
therefore that the VliA ought to ask for a price increase for
electricity sold to VALCO of substantially more than 30$ otherwise
the project will do no more than pay its way.
Epilogue ; The U.K. Experience
What did the U.K. do about its supplies of aluminium, having
failed to establish a Sterling Area source in Ghana? Eventually,
in 1967, the Board of Trade invited proposals from aluminium
companies for the establishment of aluminium smelters in "development
areas" of the U.K. In that year the U.K.'s supplies of primary
aluminium were made up as follows:






The Government's proposals concerning electricity supplies and
financial arrangements favourable to the aluminium companies
were set out in a White Paper, "Industrial Investment. The
Production of Primary Aluminium" / U.K. Government, 11)68 7
After negotiations, three projects were agreed (for more
details on the negotiations, see Warren, 1973, chapter 9):
(a) An ALCAN plant of 120,000 tonnes ultimate capacity
at Lvneraouth, Northumberland, with electricity to be provided by
a new coal-fired station owned by ALCAN and powered by coal
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supplied by the National Coal Board under a long-term contract.
(b) A BACO plant of 100,000 tonnes initial capacity at
Invergordon, Boss & Cromarty, supplied with hydro-electricity by the
North of Scotland Hydroelectric Board.
(c) A plant of 100,000 tonnes initial capacity at Holyhead
operated by Anglesey Aluminium Limited (jointly owned by Bio Tinto
Zinc (43$), Kaiser Aluminum (30$) and British Insulated Callender
Cables (27$)) and supplied with electricity by the Central Electricity
Generating Board from Wylfa nuclear power station. / Electricity
Council, 1973_7
All three projects have now been in productive operation for
more than five years, making the U.K. virtually self-sufficient in
primary aluminium. It was estimated that the projects approved would
save £55 million of foreign exchange annually / barren, 1973, 205 7»
The cost of the whole scheme was about £200 million, including the
capital cost of the smelters, which was £150 million. The U.K.
government loaned £62 million and gave investment grants of about
£60 million toward the scheme making a very large total government
commitment. In return, BACO and Anglesey Aluminium Limited invested
money in two new nuclear power stations, Dungeness 'B1 and Ilunterston
'B', which only nominally supplied the smelters with power but which
was part of a 'deal' by which the smelters got their electricity at
a low price. This "development scheme" has not been without its
problems. An article in the Daily Telegraph explained:
"A fresh approach is to be made by the electricity industry
to the Government for compensation to cover heavy and still
rising losses on a "cheap" power deal. The Elcctricity
Council yesterday agreed to back the claim from the Central
Electricity Generating Board to recover some of the estimated
£200 million deficit on the deal to supply power to the
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Anglesey aluminium smelter of Kaiser Aluminum and Rio Tinto
Zinc. It wants parity of treatment with the North of Scotland
Hydroelectric Hoard which will receive compensation under a
Bill now going through Parliament for its £200 million losses
on a similar contract to provide low-priced power to RACO's
smelter at Invergordon."
/ Daily Telegraph, 10 June 1976 7
It is evident that not only Third V.'orld countries get their
t
fingers burnt in such deals, since the U.K. developed similar
financial problems to Ghana. The power of the aluminium companies,
and especially the multinational companies, is sufficiently great to
present a challenge to both developed and less developed nations.
However, as yet it is unclear whether the U.K.'s scheme has been
quite so disastrous as the VHP in cost-benefit terms. It may in
fact be of overwhelming benefit due to import savings.
COST - BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Costs ($ million, converted at the going exchange rate) ( f - 5°/o
Four generators at Akosombo plus the transmission system:











1966 - 3.0 9.9 14.2
1967 - 1.9 4.0 5.4
1968 - 1.9 4.0 5.1
1969 - 2.0 3.9 4.8
1970 - 2.7 3.8 5.1
1971 - 2.4 3.1 4.1
Tvo more generators at Akosombo plus the transmission line to Togo:
1972 33 23 3.0 3.4 4.5
1973 - 3.7 4.1 5.3
1974 - 4.7 4.0 5.7
1975 - 4.0 3.9 4.8
1976 - 4.0 3.8 4.5
1977 - 4.0 3.7 4.3
1978 _ 4.0 3.6 4.0
1979 - 4.0 3.5 3.8
1980 - 4.0 3.4 3.6
1981 - 4.0 3.3 3.4
1982 - 4.0 3.2 3.2









































































































Benefits ($ million) , r = 5"°/„






















1966 5 14 0.1 0.1 86 431 4.2 4.0
1967 220 923 1.7 1.6 102 531 4.3 3.9
1968 220 1866 4.9 4.2 106 608 4.4 3.8
1969 245 1972 5.2 4.3 130 701 5.3 4.4
1970 250 2012 5.3 4.1 145 794 6.1 4.8
1971 244 1919 4.1 3.1 160 916 5.6 4.2
1972 295 2264 6.0 4.3 171 973 6.0 4.3
1973 300 2626 7.3 5.0 199 1145 8.1 5.5
1974 310 2735 7.5 4.9 216 1255 8.9 5.8
1975 320 2800 7.7 4.7 to 01 ^1 1380 9.4 5.7
1976 320 2800 7.7 4.5 252 1519 10.0 5.8
1977 400 3300 9.0 5.0 272 1670 10.6 5.9
1978 400 3300 9.0 4.8 272 1670 10.6 5.6
1979 II II 11 4.6 ♦I 11 II 5.4
1980 11 II 11 4.3 It 11 II 5.1
1981 11 II II 4.1 II II
II 4.9
1982 11 II II 4.0 II II II 4.7
1983 11 II II 3.8 II II 11 4.5
1984 II II II 3.6 II 11 II 4.2
1985 II 11 ll 3.4 II II
II 4.0
1986 II II 11 3.2 II II II 3.8
1987 It 11 II 3.1 It II 11 3.6
1988 II II tt 3.0
(etc.)
II II ll 3.5
(etc.
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (continued)
Sum of discounted benefits from smelter





Sum of discounted operating costs








This benefit-cost ratio is calculated on the basis of the first
interim rate, that is 2.75 mills/kwh. If the benefit-cost ratio
is to equal one, then the total benefit must equal 0 306.5 million,
that is 0 25 million must be added to the revenue.
Let x = the increase in revenue for each of the years 1975 to 2014,
then
x(0.6l + 0.58 + + O.l) = $ 25 million
x 0 2.25 million p.a.
This represents a 30$ increase on present rates.
CHAPTER FIVE
"SIDE-EFFECTS"
Having covered the main aspects of the VRP, the aluminium
production and hydroelectricity generation, we turn now to what
may he called the "side-effects" of the scheme. That is, they
are side-effects only if one's main aim is to produce aluminium
or electricity. For those who are not involved in the primary
functions of the VHP, the side-effects may he, overwhelmingly,
the major aspects of the scheme, whether they are beneficial or
deleterious. Obviously, a person's perception of the importance
of these side-effects depends upon how deeply that person is
involved with them.
E.A.K. Kalitsi (formerly Chief Resettlement Officer and now
Director of Finance for the VRA) has said:
"The Volta Project is the most adventurous event in the
life of Ghana. Its construction was the boldest step
taken by Ghana to diversify her economy and underpin the
newly independent country's industrial development. It
was conceived to develop the total resources of a river
which runs into the heart of a small country for the
benefit not only of its riverine dwellers hut the entire
population.
"Nevertheless, implementation concentrated on power as
the direct economic objective and important work to
achieve socio-economic objectives and ensure desirable
biological conditions were left in abeyance resulting




Akosombo Dam created a huge lake covering about 8,500 sq.
kilometres; the largestman-made lake in the world in area. In
more commonplace terms the Volta Lake could cover the area of the
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counties of Kent, Surrey and Sussex, or, if superimposed on a map
of England, x/ould stretch from London to Exeter, The area now
covered by the lake was formerly inhabited by 80,000 people living
in 739 villages and comprising more than 1% of Ghana's population.
These people were mostly subsistence farmers although some of them
grew cocoa (about 2,400 hectares of cocoa were lost under the lake)
and some were river fishermen. In general their standard of living
was low. The typical farmer bad 2.9 to 4 hectares of land under his
control in' three or four plots which he would use in turn in
successive years / Lawson, 1968fl7. Only about 6'fc of the land area
now covered by the lake was used productively. The rest of the land
was either unsuitable for agriculture or unoccupied / Preparatory
Commission Report V01. 1, 1956, 87J.
The Preparatory Commission Report recommended that the people
to be moved be compensated in cash and expected to resettle themselves.
It argued that expecting the inhabitants to resettle themselves would
have the advantage of retaining communal initiative and encouraging
people to help themselves, instead of looking to government for
assistance in all matters. Thus, if these people were to be
resettled, the report expected that no matter what plans for
resettlement might be made in the initial stages, constant pressure
would inevitably be directed towards increasing the scope of
operations, with consequent increased spending / Preparatory
Commission, Vol. 1, 1996, 92 7.
however, this recommendation was rejected, partly, it seems,
after the experience of the baroodar Valley Project in India where
91/0 of the people to be resettled chose cash compensation in
preference to accepting land for land and house for house. The
result was a mass migration to the Indian cities and later efforts
to recolonise the people from the streets of the cities on to
farmlands had little success / Jopp, 1965, 43_7»
Further reasons for the rejection of a self-help scheme were
the large numbers of people involved and the lack of time to
mobilise them. It was found much easier to bring in building
workers to erect resettlement houses and to use machinery for land
clearing / Chambers, 1970, 40-2 /. So, instead of imposing some
kind of self-help scheme upon the victims of the lake, the villagers
were encouraged to participate in the government's resettlement
scheme, although those who did not wish to participate were given
cash compensation and were allowed to resettle themselves. The latter
became known as the "Gone Elsewhere" villagers. The original estimate
was that 69,249 people in 12,799 households chose to be resettled,
while 9,036 people in 1,858 households chose to resettle themselves.
/ Chambers, 1970, 48 J. In fact, about 67,500 people were actually
placed in 52 resettlement villages by the VIIA.
The organisation of resettlement first got under way in 1961
when an Administrative Officer and an Agricultural Officer were
assigned to work full-time on resettlement. No definite plans had
been made by May 1962, when dam building had been in progress for
nine months, so a working party was established to plan and coordinate
the resettlement scheme. This working party consisted of representatives
from several government departments: the Ministry of Agriculture,
Ministry of Works, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, the
Lands Department, the Survey Department, the Department of Social
Welfare and Community Development and the Department of Town and
Country l'lanning, as well as from the \1A, the University of Science
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and Technology at Kumasi and the Soil and Land Use Survey Division
of the Ghana Academy of Sciences. The rationale for the involvement
of so many bodies was not only that they had the expertise and physical
resources which the VRA lacked, hut also that the VlLA's spending on
resettlement was limited to £3.9 million. Any expenditure above
that figure was to be borne by the Ghana Government and the VILA felt
therefore, according to E.A.K. Kalitsi, "that as many agencies of
government as possible should be associated with the resettlement
programme, since the size of the government contribution would depend
on the extent to which these agencies could be persuaded to spend
on the programme." / Chambers, 1970, 38 7
At its first meeting in May 1962, the working party was faced
with a two-year period in which to arrange the resettlement scheme,
for the lake was due to start filling in May 1964. The planning and
execution of the resettlement scheme %vere therefore carried out in
something of a hurry. Evacuation of the people living in the lake
basin was started on 20th November 1963. Kalitsi informs us that
the working party adopted three guiding principles:
"First that resettlement should be used as an opportunity
to enhance the social, economic and physical conditions
of the people.
"Second, that the agricultural system should be improved **
to enable the people to move from a subsistence to a cash
economy.
"Third, that the resettlements shoiild be planned and located
in a rational manner, so that the flood victims as well as
others in the area of impact could derive maximum benefits
from the changes involved."
/ Chambers, 1970, 39 7
Let us examine each of these three principles in turn. The
first guiding principle may be related mainly to two aspects of
resettlement, namely housing provision and monetary compensation.
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Housing and Compensation
The type of bouse built for the people resettled was called
a "core" or "nuclear" house. It consisted of a concrete floor,
landcrete block walls and a corrugated aluminium roof. (Landcrete
is concrete made with soil as the principal constituent.) It was
called a 'core house' because although sufficient floor space was
provided for two rooms and two porches, only one room was to be
actually constructed before the settlers moved in. The rest of the
house was to be completed by the settlers themselves.
According to Kalitsi, 11,199 core houses had been built by
the end of 1964 / Chambers, 1970, 52J and according to the latest
reliable estimate available there were 11,98-5 core houses built by
1970 / VISA Annual Report 1970 J. Some 800 households that had
chosen to be resettled did not obtain a core house; we are not told
what happened to them, but presumably they went elsewhere. Of these
11,985 houses, 6,282 had been completed by 1970; of the rest, 2,877
houses were reckoned to be 75% complete, and 2,826 remained at the
"nuclear" stage.
h'hy did so many houses remain uncompleted? Firstly, because
they were quite difficult to complete. Planning restrictions were
enforced quite vigorously compared to the normal Ghanaian attitude of
"laissez-faire", so that houses had to be completed in approved
materials which were difficult to obtain. (in theory the settlers
were to have been given the materials necessary for house extension
but in practice this did not occxir.) The cost of obtaining items
like cement and bitumen was prohibitive in terms of attainable
family incomes.
Secondly, and probably more importantly, large numbers of
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settlers found their position in the resettlement villages
i
untenable. Even the completed "nuclear" house was a small dwelling
and was difficult to extend further because of the expense of building
extra concrete flooring. The smaliness of the resettlement dwellings
was also compounded by the fact that many of the families were
polygamous, the wives traditionally living in separate rooms or
houses / Chambers, 1970, 89 /. There was definitely a problem of
overcrowding in the resettlement villages for the average number of
persons per room in 1968 was 2.2 compared \\dth 1.4 in the flooded
villages. And this despite the fact that the total population of the
villages was down to 43,500 due to migration / FAO/UNDP 1971 7
Although outwardly the resettlement houses appear to be far
superior to the traditional mud and thatch dwelling, in some respects
they have been found to be inferior. A comparison of the thermal
characteristics of the two types of hoxise indicated that the
traditional house possessed a greater thermal inertia; that is, the
mud and thatch house tended to be cooler than the ambient temperature
during the day and warmer than ambient at night. / Chambers, 1970
174 7. Complaints were often expressed to the investigating tea as
of physical discomfort due to cold at night in the resettlement houses.
/"Chambers, 1970, 174 7. The provision of a properly design'J ceiling
under the roof would provide the necessary insulation.
It was not only dissatisfaction with their housing t at led to
large numbers of settlers moving out of their new villages, but also
serious problems connected with the viability of farmin around the
settlements. This topic will be dealt with later. Aryway, for many
reasons there was a steady drift of settlers out of toe resettlement
villages. The FA0 survey of 1968 indicated that of the 67,500 people
who were installed in the resettlement villages only 25,900 remained.
The rest of the 43,500 people actually living in settlement houses
were either children of settlers horn since 1964 or people who had
moved in from outside. Thus something like 40,000 of the original
settlers, or well over half the initial numbers, moved within a period
of four years. This is too high a figure to he accounted for hy the
normal social movements observed in Ghana.
Having dealt with the housing provided for the settlers, we turn
now to the question of compensation. A very clear and definite policy
on this issue does not seem to have been formulated. The Government's
Deputy Chief Lands Officer, K. Amanfo Sagoe, outlined the clearest
statement / Chambers, 1970, 58-77 7« According to this, those who
resettled themselves were to be compensated in full in cash for their
buildings and for their crops. Compensation for crops destroyed was
to be paid out on annual crops which could not be harvested before
evacuation, and on the future value of perennial crops. Those who
were resettled by the VKA were to receive compensation for their
crops and buildings only if their value should exceed the stated
value of a resettlement house which was £330. Since the value put on
traditional houses •was very low, this happened but rarely. D.A.P.
Butcher, a sociologist who was closely connected with the resettlement
scheme, gave a different version of compensation policy when be stated
(in 1967 or later):
"A deduction of N0 780 was made from the compensation
for flooded crops of each settler to pay for his house.
This was not in keeping with declared policy of compensating
for crops in f11 and replacing flooded houses in kind."
/ Butcher, undated J
During the one period of civilian rule in Ghana after the deposing
of Nkrumah, questions were asked in the House about compensation
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payments in connection with the resettlement scheme. The questioners
were told as little as possible:
"Mr. E.I1.T. Madjitey (written question) asked when the
compensation in respect of
a) crops destroyed
b) lands submerged
c) lands acquired for resettlement
as a result of the creation of the Volta Dam and Lake will he
paid to those affected.
Mr. B.K. Adama (Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs):
a) Payment of compensation for crops destroyed started in
1965 and is still in progress. To date, Nj£ 1,111,404.22
has been paid to 13,460 claimants.
b) Compensation for land submerged has not yet been paid.
A provisional description of the 3,400 sq. miles of lakefill
area or roughly two million acres of submerged land
/ 800,000 hectares /, has been completed and is awaiting
publication of the necessary executive instrument to
enable interested parties to submit their claims.
c) It is estimated that a total of 430,000 acres of land
/ 172,000 hectares 7 will be required for resettlement
townships and agriculture. Executive instruments in
respect of 140,050 acres of land / 56,020 hectares J
affecting 23 settlement sites have been published and
claims have started coming in for processing.
It is expected that payment for land in b) and c) above
will commence after negotiations with the land owners have
been completed, most probably during the next financial
year. / This turned out to be a wildly optimistic estimate,
see Chapter Five. 7
Mr. Madjitey: In view of the fact that considerable hardship
is being caused to those affected by this exercise, will the
Prime Minister assure the House that everything possible will
be done to ensure the expeditious completion of the exercise?
Mr. Adama: The Prime Minister is anxious to see that everything
possible is dene to bring amicable settlement to all persons
concerned„
Mr. I.E. Osei-Bonsu: The Douse has learnt today that some
two million acres of land have been submerged under the Volta
Lake. We would like to know from the Prime Minister how much
compensation is the Government going to pay for an acre of land.
Mr. Adama: I need notice of this question.
Mr. I.E. Osei-Ilonsu: How many acres of land have so far been
acquired for resettlement townships?
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Mr, Adama: Since the Honourable Member is asking for a
specific number, I need notice of this question.
Mr. Osei-Eonsu: be want to know from the Prime Minister how
much compensation has so far been paid to the owners of land
on which these resettlement townships have been built.
Mr. Adama: I have already given the answer, and that is
NJ8 1,111,404.20 /"This is of course totally incorrect, see
Adama1s first statement./
t
Mr. Osei-Eonsu: May I know from the Prime Minister how much
one resettlement house costs?
Mr. Adama: 1 need notice of that.
/ Parliamentary Debates, 12 March 1970 7
The total amount of compensation for crops and buildings paid
out by the end of 1974 was N/ 2,250,673 /"VliA Annual Report, 1974_7.
Since most of this was paid to those who resettled themselves, who
numbered in excess of 10,000, the average amount paid per individual
was something over K/ 200. E.K. Afriyie, who was intimately connected
with the VRA's resettlement scheme, said of the "Gone Elsewhere"
villagers: "These people either received no compensation or a
derisory amount for crops and buildings destroyed, thus making it
difficult for them to establish themselves" / Afriyie, 1969 7* Some
of them were paid as little as N/ 2 for their old houses. Most of
the compensation payments were heavily delayed; only N/ 1 million
had been paid out by the end of 1969 / VliA Annual Report 1969 7 and
payment is still continuing 12 years after these peoples' displacement.
That the great hulk of compensation was only paid out more than five
years after the move, and therefore too late to assist the "Gone
Elsewhere" villagers to resettle themselves, is something of a scandal.
If compensation payments for crops and buildings have been
unsatisfactory, compensation for land flooded by the Volta Lake and
for land acquired for resettlement villages and farms has been atrocious.
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The VEA's policy on land compensation has been unclear. Sagoe tends
to avoid the issue while also stating that "The actual value of the
land, in any event, is not very considerable" / Chambers, 1970,69 7»
It is true that the land is of much lower value than land elsewhere
in Ghana; however the massive area involved (3-2% of Ghana's total
t
land area) and the importance of compensation payments to those
dispossessed, make the issue a vital one. The V11A policy as outlined
by Sagoe seemed to be that those being resettled would be compensated
in kind by receiving land for land. Sagoe's statement on this point
is apologetic however: "Lands under perennial crops, it is submitted,
are being compensated for in kind in the sites being provided in the
new agricultural settlements. The reduced acreages being made
available in the settlements need not result in a falling-off of the
level of incomes." / Chambers, 1970, 69 J. The land area to be
acquired for resettlement agriculture was put at 104,000 acres or
41,600 hectares / Chambers, 1970, 60 7 compared to approximately
128,000 acres / 51,200 hectares 7 which had been used productively
in the flooded lake basin / Preparatory Commission, Vol. 1, 1956, 87 7
Sagoe also states however, "'v'ith perennial crops....the valuation
of the crops can be taken to include the value of the land." / Chambers,
1970, 70 7» which seems to imply that "Gone elsewhere" villagers
would be compensated only by payment for their crops, if they had
grown predominantly perennial crops.
Anyway, whatever policy the VHP had it does not seem to have
been carried out. It was only on the 28th August 1974 that the
Government by Executive Instrument No. E.I.98 acquired the l.and area
inundated hy the Volta Lake / VPA Annual Peport, 1974 7, so that
even by the end of 1975 no compensation had been paid at all to
any of those whose land had been flooded. Since the resettlement
scheme has been so disastrous, it now seems possible (though not certain)
that the Government will compensate both the "Gone Elsewhere" villagers
and those resettled, for the land they loste
The matter of compensation for the land acquired for the
resettlement villages and associated' farm land must also be mentioned.
Payments to the previous owners properly began only in 1973» and the
total paid out by the end of 1974 amounted to N0 510>000 / VliA Annual
Report 1974 7» Since under the revised agricultural scheme for the
resettlement areas 438,000 acres / 175,000 hectares ~] are to be
acquired (see next section on agriculture) there remains a lot of
compensation to pay.
Just how long it will take to pay all compensation monies due
is a matter of speculation. The VJ1A (who handled the problem initially)
took about 7 years to pay out N0 1.6 million. The Lands Department
which has handled compensation payments since 1973, has paid out
about N0 1.4 million. It appears that compensation payments for crops
and buildings destroyed by the lake are almost complete. Estimates
of the amount of compensation necessary for the loss of flooded land
range from £1.5 million or N0 4.3 million / V.ilbrandt, 1967 7
to a figure approaching E0 10 million / Chief Lands Officer, personal
interview J. Compensation for land acquired for houses and farms
for the resettlement villages should, logically, come to almost the
same figure. It therefore appears reasonable to estimate that between
N0 8 million and Nj£ 18 million remains to be paid. It seems unlikely
that this task will be completed in less than 10 years, in fact it
seems possible that the task will never be finished. The Lands
Department, whose task this is, was the subject of a paragraph by
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Wendy Asiama in the Ghanaian newspaper, the Daily Graphic, of
25 November 1979. Under the headline "Improve Department's Image"
was the following short article:
"Lt.-Col. T.T. Kutin, Commissi oner for Lands and Mineral
Resources has expressed dissatisfaction with the performance
of the Lands Department and called for an immediate
improvement of its tarnished reputation. He said he would
like the department to he classified as one of the efficient
government organisations staffed with competent people.
Lt.-Col. Rutin made these remarks when he visited the Lands
Department yesterday on a familiarisation tour of organisations
under his Ministry. The Commissioner asked the Chief Lands
Officer to ensure proper supervision of the staff and prevent
the image of the department from being associated with all
kinds of vices."
Since the housing provision and compensation payment associated
with the resettlement scheme have proved so unsatisfactory, it seems
one must conclude that the resettlement scheme has not been "used
as an opportunity to enhance the social, economic and physical
conditions of the people" ,/ Chambers, 1970, 39 7»
Agriculture
What of the second of the working party's guiding principles?
This stated that "the agricultural system should be improved to
enable the people to move from a subsistence to a cash economy".
Wras the agricultural system "improved"?
At the planning stage it was envisaged that the amount of land
needed for agricultural purposes for the resettlement villages was
41,600 hectares / Chambers, 1970, 60 J. Th is was to be allocated in
several small plots (totalling about 5 hectares) to individual farmers
but mechanised cultivation was to be used across several plots; thus,
it was said, giving the small farmer the advantages of modern farming
methods while allowing him personal control and ownership of his own
land. This system was described as cooperative farming, but that title
is somewhat misleading since the extent of 'cooperation' or mutual
support between farmers was to be very limited. A more appropriate
description would have been 'group farming', the farmers merely
being responsible for weeding and harvesting their strips of the
field with the costs of the use of mechanised equipment being shared
on an acreage basis / Laws on, March 1968 J. The VRA was to own the
tractors, distribute and sell fertilisers and buy a significant
quantity of the agricultural, produce. In fact, it is easier to see
the resettled farmers as agricultural labourers for the VEA than as
individual farmers acting in mutual cooperation. In fact their
position was probably worse than that of an agricultural labourer
for the latter is not responsible for the success of the crop. The
subordinate position of the resettled farmers is further confirmed
when we realise that farmers were to be 'assigned' to certain types
of agriculture by the VHA. About AOJfc were to be arable farmers, k0%
tree crop farmers, 15% livestock farmers and 5% pastoral farmers
/ Chambers, 1970, 210_/.
Some of the livestock farmers were allocated a broiler house or
a pig sty, with the appropriate stock, to a total value of about
£2,000. The output of the livestock enterprise was all sold by the
VRA through its central office in Accra, the Authority's costs were
deducted and the surplus paid to the farmer a month or so after
delivery of the product. Poultry farmers obtained about 8% of the
selling price of chickens, representing payment for their labour.
It was hoped that the farmer would have paid back the debt on the
original capital after two to three years / Wetham, 1968 "J.
By 1967 it was becoming obvious that the agricultural scheme
had failed. The VliA had cleared only 3,0'i0 hectares of land for
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farming purposes, only 2,400 of these hectares were cropped, and only
1000 of these 2,400 hectares were cultivated mechanically. The VRA's
financial inputs totalled about N0 800,000 dxiring 1967 but the value
of the harvest was only N0 294,000 for all 52 settlements /Afriyie &
Butcher, 1969 7» Of the 9>600 adult male farmers in the settlements,
only 52$ were actually able to farm 'at all in 1968 / FAO/UNBP, 1971 7•
Since 1964 the settlers had had to be given free food relief in the
form of maize, wheat flour, milk, butter, canned fish and meat,
vegetable oil, egg powder and sugar under the UN/FAO World Food „
Programme (WFP) Project 70. Most of this food originated from America
/ West Africa 50, 1966, 140_7.
It was therefore decided that a new scheme shoiild be implemented:
the VRA stopped clearing land, and sold most of its mechanical clearing
equipment to a private firm in Ghana. The new approach was to offer
payment to the settlers in the form of food (under WFP Project 356)
for manual clearing work, the aim being to clear about two hectares of
land for each farmer for xtse as a subsistence holding up to a grand
total of about 42,000 hectares. It was hoped that it would then be
possible to clear an extra 132,000 hectares of land, by both manual
and mechanical methods, to be used for commercial farming / Wilbrandt,
1967J.
However, by the end of August 1972 the amo\mt of land cleared
for agriculture was still only 6680 hectares / Sub-Committee of the
Low—Cost Housing Committee, 1972 /. At most of the resettlement sites
sufficient land could only be found for a maximum allocation per
farmer of just over one hectare / FAO/UNDP, 1971 7 which is insufficient
for the settlers' subsistence using either traditional or modern
techniques.
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Between 1964 and 1970 the V.'FP, under Project 70 and Project 356,
had supplied the resettlement programme with $ 7 million worth of
foodstuffs / Johnson, 1970 /• And yet even now the agricultural
scheme cannot claim to have made any progress. It can hardly he termed
a success.
Planning and Development
What of the third of the resettlement working party's guiding
principles? That is, that the settlements should he planned so that
the flood victims and tbeir'hosts' (i.e. those living permanently in
the area now occupied by settlement villages) could derive maximum
benefits from the changes involved. Unfortunately, this principle
too seems to have remained unfulfilled. Since the Government has not
properly compensated the 'host' farmers for their lost land they
consider that they have not yet sold, and so the resettlement sites
have been the venue for constant wrangles over who owns what area of
land.
The Preparatory Commission report estimated the cost of
compensation and resettlement would be about £4 million and recommended
that a further £500,000 be accepted as a prospective liability for
deleterious effects on communities downstream of the dam (i.e. for
destruction of clam and creek fishing and agricultural production
downstream). / Preparatory Commission Vol. 1, 1956, 46 J.
The portion of the Volta dam construction funds earmarked for
resettlement (i.e. VT£A funds) was limited to £3.5 million, expenditure
above that amount was to be borne by the Government of Ghana / Chambers,
1970, 37-87. In fact, the total expenditure on the resettlement
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programme up to June 1968 amounted to N0 26.2 million. Subsequent
payment of compensation up to the end of 197'i amounted to N0 2.75
million, -with an estimated N0 8 million to N0 18 million remaining
to be paid. Contributions to WFP 356 were estimated to be of the
order of N0 4 million / Wilbrandt, 1967 7 nnc^ continuing costs (both
capital and running costs) of resettlement came to N0 7 million
/ VRA Annual Reports,1968 to 197^_7«
Thus by the end of 1974 the total costs of the resettlement
programme (including compensation both paid and outstanding) could be
estimated as 40 million to N0 58 million. Respite the actual
expenditure of N0 40 million then, the resettlement programme does
not seem to have been a success. In the words of E.A.K. Kolitsi,
"The spectre of a ghost town hangs over every settlement we have
built" / Chambers, 1970, 225_7«
It appears unlikely that this situation will be fundamentally
altered in the near future since the VRA has been in the process of
shedding its responsibilities onto various other bodies, which makes
it unlikely that a coordinated rehabilitation scheme will be carried
out. The VRA no longer has any responsibility for resettlement
agriculture, this being entirely under the Ministry of Agriculture
since July 1972. The maintenance of settlement townships has been
the duty of local authorities since January 1966. In respect of
maintenance of water supplies the VRA Resettlement Department had
until February 1972 maintained a mobile water maintenance team which
repaired pumps, storage vessels, etc. but this has now been abandoned
and as a result the resettlement villagers are again carrying water
from nearby streams or from the Volta Lake. As for the general
welfare of the settlers, the Department of Social Welfare and Community
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Development has responsibility, but its field workers have no
special mandate for the resettlement villages, the villages are
merely included in their areas of jurisdiction.
ihis shedding of responsibilities has occurred despite the
recommendation of a Government committee's report, which, incidentally,
contains a veiled criticism of the VHA:
"It is our opinion that to derive full benefits from an
integrated development programme, the administration and
execution of the entire programme should be centralised
and entrusted to a new and autonomous agency. In this
respect, we would like to state that if such centralised
function were entrusted to an existing government institution
which is, obviously, already saddled with its own goals and
priorities, there would be the tendency for such an
institution to relegate the Resettlement Programme to
the background, and no appreciable positive results would
be achieved."
/ Sub-Committee of the Low Cost Housing
Committee, 1972 7
Why was the resettlement scheme so lacking in success? Chambers
raises the question of the settlers attitudes and whether these were
conducive to success or not / Chambers, 1970, 25k-5 7* But there are
at least two reasons for believing that the situation in which the
settlers found themselves was more a determinant of success or failure
than any sxipposed apathy of the settlers.
(a) The first reason is that there are marked regional
differences amongst the resettlement villages. A survey of the
agricultural production from the villages / Joughin, 1976 7 indicates
that the further north the village lies, the better off it is. That
this might be correlated with the attitude of the villagers seems
unlikely. A more plausible explanation .is that land is, in general,
easier to obtain in the north of Ghana. The same survey indicates
that the number of absentees from the villages (those who have left
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permanently) is higher toward the south.
(h) The second reason is that there appears to have been no
essential difference between the experiences of Nkwakubew (a
resettlement site selected by its prospective tenants and subsequently
accepted by the VRA as being viable) and Apeguso (a site selected by
the VTtA and imposed upon reluctant settlers). / Iliverson, 1973 7«
Both villages lie in the southern area of resettlement villages, within
a few miles of each other. Since Nkwakubew was the first settlement
site to be built / Chambers, 1970, 52 7 and since it was decided to
make it a "show town" for mechanisation schemes and livestock breeding
/ Iliverson, 1973 7 one might have expected Apeguso to have fared much
worse due to apathy on the part of its tenants. However, Iliverson
points out that the Nkwakubew experiment failed and that there was
no real difference in economic or social situation between the two
villages. In both cases the settlers were heavily dependent on the
VEA, having too little land to sustain themselves, and in both cases
there was a serious problem of overcrowding.
In the opinion of the writer, the resettlement scheme was a
failure because it was not sufficiently well catered for. The necessary
inputs of time, money and effort were just not available in sufficient
quantities. This situation arose, in part, from the statement of
Nkrumah that the settlers should be "no worse off than before"
/ Preparatory Commission, Vol. 1, 1956* 45 7 which was far too passive
a recommendation.
Fisheries
In contrast to the resettlement scheme, the development of a
fishing industry on the Volta Lake has been quite a success story.
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This has developed as a result of essentially individual initiative.
It was only in 1971 that the Ghana Government began a scheme at
Kpandu to provide facilities (a concrete landing area, storage and
processing facilities, a supply house etc.) for the fishermen.
It seems that expectations of the potential of the Volta Lake for
fishing were fairly low; a figure of' IS,000 tonnes catch per year
vas quoted / Preparatory Commission, Vol, 1, 1956, 66J. In fact
production from the lake reached a peak of 60j000 tonnes in 1969
before settling down to a level of 38,000 tonnes in subsequent years
when the lake had become ecologically more stable. This annual catch
(of 38,000 tonnes) may be compared to an estimated figure of 10,000
tonnes for the annual take from the Volta Basin before the Akosombo
Bam was built / Denyob, 1971 7. Previously there had been about
2000 fishermen operating in the Volta Basin, but now there are estimated
to be about 12,000 fishermen working on the lake. / Kumi, 1973 7-
They and their families make up fishing communities, numbering about
60,000, living in approximately 1000 villages scattered around the lake.
Fish caiight from the lake sell for an average price of about
15 pesewas/kilogram (this is the price the fisherman receives) so
that the val\ie of a year's catch is about N0 5.7 million. U'e may
infer then, that this is quite a significant 'side-effect', since the
value of fish caught compares with a figure of N0 19 million total
revenue obtained from Akosombo-produced electricity / VI(A Annual
Report 1974 7.
The Volta Lake's production of fish is also quite significant
when compared to Ghana's other sources. Ghana's total marine catch
(by the State Fishing Corporation and all other fishing organisations
and fishermen) was estimated as 119,000 tonnes in 1969. And the
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country imported 18,700 tonnes of fish valued at / 5»8 million in
the some year / Kalitsi, 1971_Z« Thus in 1969 Ghana's total fish
consumption was 197,700 tonnes. -
The catch from the Volta Lake therefore satisfies approximately
20c/i of the country's demand for fish. Most of the fishermen working
the Volta Lake operated as fishermen'elsewhere in Ghana before the
Lake was created. A large proportion of them were engaged in clam
and creek fishing / See Lowe-McConnell, 1966, 29 7 on the lower Volta.
As a result of the dam being built the creek fisheries were destroyed
and the clam fishery severely truncated. The Preparatory Commission
Report estimated that the creek fisheries were worth about £67,000
a year and the clam fishing as worth no less than £25,000 a year.
/ Preparatory Commission, Vol. 1, 1956, 56 ~J. At 19*55 prices the
loss would therefore have been about 0 160,000 or at 1974 prices about
N0 640,000 / Birmingham et al., 1966, 29; Bank of Ghana Annual Report,
1974_7.
Health
A serious problem associated with the Volta Lake has been that
of health hazards. Two diseases of major incidence must be mentioned,
those of schistosomiasis (or bilharzia) and onchocerciasis (or river
blindness).
Schistosomiasis
Schistosomiasis / Cowper, 1971; IvIIO, 1059; Ansari, 1973 7 is a
world—wide disease which can be classified into three different types
caused by three similar carriers. Schistosoma mansona and schistosoma
Japonicura have as a focal point of infection the intestines; schistosoma
haematobium (which is the variety of schistosomiasis being spread by
the Volta Lake) particularly affects the urinary system. Man is
infected with schistosoma haematobium from water in which swTim larval
forms (called cercariae) of the parasitic schistosome worm. The
cercariae penetrate the skin and get into the blood circulation where
i
they feed. They can then make their way to the liver, lungs, heart
or main lymphatics where they mature and pair. The schistosome worms
then proceed to the network of veins around the bladder, where the
females lay their eggs. Some of the eggs are discharged in the urine
(as little as two months after the initial exposure to cercariae)
and hatch on contact with water, producing miracidia, which enter
certain species of water snail (in the V0lta Lake these are Bulinus
truncatus rohlfsi and Bulinus (Physopsis) globosus). Having entered
the snail the miracidia pass through further life-stages and emerge
and enter the Lake waters as cercariae to complete the life cycle.
Since the miracidia and the cercariae have limited life-spans (the
cercariae live for up to 48 hours) they must soon find their
respective hosts, or die. Thus the transmission of s.haematobium
depends on fairly frequent contact of human beings with water in
which Bulinus snails are living..
The first symptoms of s.haematobium are usually skin complaints,
fever, inflammation and coughing; in the later aciite stages there is
blood in the tirine. The disease usually only makes itself evident
through hacmaturia after five years or more. Schistosomiasis is a
cumulative and debilitating illness. Although the schistosome worm
may live and produce eggs for up to 20 years, it is not common to
fall prey to the illness after only one infection. Weakness and
death usually only follow repeated infections, after which the
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existence of dead worms and'eggs in the body cause many different
kinds of complication. Eventual death may occur through cardiac
failure, fibrosis of the lungs, an enlarged spleen, secondary bacterial
infection of the urinary tract and other complications.
Before formation of the Volta Lake, infection rates in the area
had been 1 jo to 5$> that is, a maximum of five out of 100 people had
shown symptoms of the disease / Paperna, 1970 J. Elsewhere, however,
infection rates were higher. On the lower Volta, around the delta,
infection rates had been 80-90$, and upstream from the present Lake
infection rates were 40-50$ / Paperna, 1970 7• The formation of
the lake created excellent living conditions for the Bulinus snail
which likes still or slor.—moving water. This, coupled with the
fact that many infected fishermen from the lower Volta settled
close by the shores of the lake, led to a massive increase in the
disease.
The usual method of studying the progress of the disease is to
survey schoolchildren since at their age the symptoms of the disease
become more pronounced and it is usually easier to estimate their
length of exposure to the disease than it is for older people. A
survey of 1584 schoolchildren aged between four years and 16 years,
living in six villages around the lake (four of them resettlement
villages) showed that the average infection rate was 80$ in February
1968. In particular villages this rate rose as high as 100$.
/ Paperna, 1970_7.
A later survey carried out by the Volta Lake Kcsearch and
Development Project (which is the UNDP—financed section of the VliA
that studies the lake's fishing prospects and health hazards) indicated
that by January 1970, these rates had fallen slightly (see map 2).
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However, this comprehensive survey of 140 villages was never
published by the VRA. In fact no systematic surveys have been
published of the extent of schistosomiasis.around the Volta Lake.
There are several possible approaches to the control of
schistosomiasis. One can kill the water snail directly with
chemical molluscicides or one can remove the water snails' habitat,
waterweeds, with herbicides or mechanical clearing. One can also
use biological control; the puffer fish is a predator of snails,
so are waterfowl; manatees (which are present in Volta Lake in small
numbers) consume water weeds in large quantities; even crocodiles
could be useful in keeping people out of the waterl Much research
has yet to be done into the natural enemies of snails, cercariae
and miracidia / Smithsonian Institution, no date ~].
Other approaches concentrate on the human reservoir of infection.
Treatment with drugs is long and dangerous, and even if the adult
worms are killed, the patient is still liable to be reinfected.
Another method is to encourage people to stay away from the water;
this can be done most effectively b3r providing a clean, piped-water
supply and latrines, so that people have no need to collect water for
drinking and washing and no need to use the lake as a toilet.
The VRA is concentrating upon the human reservoir of infection
in its approach to the disease. Previously the VRA. tried weed control
by manual raking and did decrease the snail population, but decided
to discontinue the programme after six months. Molluscicides were
also used over small areas but these, unfortunately, kill off all
snails so that as soon as application is stopped, the Pulinus snails
have an equal opportunity with all other snails to renew their numbers.
The World Health Organisation have nevertheless been spraying the
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northern areas of the lake in the hope that this will have some
beneficial effect.
Onchocerciasis
Onchocerciasis / baddy, 1969 7 is caused by the filarial worm Onchocerca
volvulus which is transmitted from man to man by the bites of a small
black-fly, simulium damnosum. The adult hairlike worms (the female
grows up to TO cm. long) live in human subcutaneous connective tissue.
The females produce microfilariae which are ingested by the black-fly
when it bites an infected person. These microfilariae develop through
two stages while living in the insect and eventually move to the fly's
mouthparts. From there they enter the body of a human host when the
fly takes a blood meal.
Infection usually does not become evident until several months
have elapsed, that is, until the microfilariae have reached adult form .
and reproduced. The symptoms of onchocerciasis are chronic dermatitis,
skin tumours or nodules, and eventually ocular changes that lead to
blindness after exposure for 20 years or so, though sometimes much
shorter exposures may be sufficient.
Treatment involves chemotherapeutic drugs, and also surgical
removal of nodules which relieves the symptoms and acts as a control
measure, since the nodule is infested with the adult filarial worms.
Chemotherapeutic treatment, however, does not prevent reinfection.
The disease could be prevented if it were possible to deplete the
siraulium damnosum population. S. damnosum generally lays its eggs in
turbulent fast-moving water and one method of control is to dose
fast-moving streams with a chemical to kill the larvae.
Ill
Since the disease normally takes such a long time to develop
it is usual to survey the population over the age of 15 years in order
to discover its prevalence. The VllA survey carried out in January
1970 (see map 3) indicated that there were areas where the disease
was particularly serious along the east side of the Volta Lake where
the tributaries feed into the lake. .The prevalence rate around
Asukawkav for instance was 90% / Kalitsi, 1971J. The FAO give the
same prevalence figure and note that infection has been found in
children as young as two-and-a-half years and nodules in children
as young as four years / FAG/UNDP, 1971 7. Now that the Akosombo
dam has created a fairly constant river flow down the Lower Volta,
the rapids at Senchi and Kpong (previously established as breeding
centres) have become intensive siraulium breeding grounds. The FAO's
epidemiological survey indicated the prevalence rate around the
Senchi-Kpong area to be about 75/® / FAO/UNDP, 1971J.
The VIIA has tried to control the worsening situation around
Akosombo, Senchi and Kpong by dosing with DDT, releasing surplus
water from the dam to fluctuate the river level (but this cannot be
done very often), and lately by dosing with Abate 200 E. The latter
was used four times at weekly intervals at a dosage rate of 0.1 ppm;
this appeared to kill all the larvae and kept a low fly density in the
immediate area, but the breeding area was rapidly reinfected by flies
from surro*inding areas when dosage was stopped / VLRDP Quarterly
Progress iteport, January-March 1975 7«
It has been difficult to find figures on the spending devoted
to combatting these diseases. However, the health programme has been
a part of the Volta Lake Research and Development Project, initiated
in January I968, which is a joint operation carried out by the UNDP/FAO
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and the VliA/Ghana Government. The main aims of the project were:
1) to help develop fisheries on the lake,
2) to research into the use of the drawdown area for agriculture
(the drawdown area is that area uncovered and covered by the
lake according to the season),
3) to carry out socio-economic surveys of the resettlement
villages,
4) to carry out studies on the public health aspects of the
Volta Lake.
The possibility of involving the UN in funding this Research
Project was first raised in a draft request by the Ghana Government in
1962. A second request was submitted by the Government in 1965 and
a UNDP mission visited Ghana in 1966. Following this mission the
Government submitted a third request in December 1966. This last
request was approved by the Governing Council of the UNDP in June 1967
and the FAQ was designated as the executing agency / FAO/UNDP, 1971 7»
The research project was originally scheduled to last for a
limited period but was extended in 1973. Between January 1968 and
December 1974 the VRA spentN0 1,190,000 ox* $ 928,000 on the project
/ VliA Annual Reports, 1968-74 7° During the same period the UNDP/FAO
spent 0 1,336,000 and the Ghana Government contributed about $ 700,000.
/ Freeman, 1974 7. Thus total spending on the VLRBP amounted to
% 2.9 million / V.'addy, 1975 7° Considering the importance of the
topics covered by the VLlcDP this is a very small amoxuxt of money. As
we have seen the numbei* of people dependent on the fishing industry
is aboxit 60,000. The actual number of people living around the margins
of the lake is somewhat higher than that. Most of the 80,000 people
who were resettled must be included. V,'e may estimate therefore that
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total spending on the VLRDP amounts to substantially less than $ 7 per
person per year. Contrast this with the expenses involved in servicing
Akosombo Township (excluding the cost of Akosombo Hospital). The VRA
spentN0 207 million or 0 2.1 million on Akosombo between January 1968
and December 1974 and the Ghana Government gave subvention in the same
period■amounting toN0 1.2 million or 0 0.9 million / VTiA Annual lleports,
1968-74 7. Thus total spending on Akosombo Township amounted to
0 3 million or 0 54 per person per year. Nevertheless, most of Akosombo
remains in a state of dilapidation; the costs of servicing the 'modern'
community are high.
What has the effect of these diseases been in terms of lost
productivity? Very little literature has been produced on the subject
of onchocerciasis; moreover, few reliable statistics are available on
the prevalence of onchocerciasis in Ghana. We shall therefore have to
assume that the Akosombo dam has caused no overall change in the number
of people affected by onchocerciasis and that it has merely altered
its geographical distribution.
More work has been done on the subject of schistosomiasis, both
in Ghana and internationally. Several attempts have been made to
estimate the costs of schistosomiasis in terms of lost productivity.
A study in the Philippines / Farooq, 1963J divided the infected
population into categories
Category Loss of working Proportion
capacity
1) No manifest symptoms 0% .61.5$
2) Mild symptoms, no absence from work 25$ 22$
3) Moderate symptoms, reduced capacity *•
for work 50$ 15$
4) Severe symptoms, frequent absence
from work 75$ )
5) Very severe symptoms, total absence | ^•V
from work 100$
Wright's analysis of the problem in Egypt / Wright, 1968 7
used a similar approach assuming that 2»l/o of infected persons were
totally disabled, and 30.5/fc had a lowered working capacity of 10/&.
A study of workers on a sugar estate in Tanzania /"Foster, 1967 7
found a statistically significant increase in absence from work
(of 30%) attributable to schistosomiasis. These workers were not
under treatment for such were excluded from the study; they therefore
correspond to Farooq's categories 2 and J. One of the most recent
studies, in St. Lucia, came to the tentative conclusion that
schistosomiasis reduces productive capacity by approximately 30/'
/ Weisbrod et al,, 1973 > 77 /• For this study the sample size was
only ^5 working males; however,along with the other analyses it does
seem to support Farooq's approach.
Taking a low estimate of the number of people living around the
Volta Lake at 100,000, and using the average infection rate of 80/1
we may deduce that 80,000 people are infected. Thus
22% or 17,600 have their working capacity reduced by 25/&
15/fc or 12,000 " " " " " " 50#
1.5^ or 1,200 " " " " " •' 87.5^
Ghana's GNP per capita in 1973 was $ 300 / IBRD Annual Report
1975 7. The value of lost productivity per year was therefore
$ 300 x (0.25 x 17,600 + 0.3 x 12,000 + 0.879 x 1,200) = #3,V55,000
Lake Transportation
In comparison to its immediate neighbours, Ghana has a very
good transportation network. This network is particularly well
developed in the south of the country, less so in the north. There
are 800 miles of railway linking Accra, Kumasi and Takoradi, 9»200
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miles of tarmac road and 11,000 miles of dirt road passable to
vehicles / Kenle, 1968_/.
The formation of the Volta Lake had a disruptive effect on road
communications. Major roads connecting Kumasi with Tamale and with
Yendi were severed. As a result the supply of basic agricultural
produce in Kumasi, such as yams and groundnuts, from the areas around
Yendi, Salaga, Kete Krachi and Kimbila has virtually dried up. Farmers
do not find it worthwhile to send their foodstuffs by the new
circuitous routes around the east and west banks of the lake to
Kumasi and Accra. Only a small amount can he carried across the
lake by the ferry at Yeji / Gould, 1967 J.
The two detour roads which have been built roiind either side of
the lake are recognised to be only partial substitutes for the former
road system since they increase the road distance between major centres
considerably and have not yet been sealed with tarmac over their full
length. The Ghana Government has therefore commissioned several
studies of the feasibility of setting up a lake transportation system
for the carriage of north-south traffic. The first of these studies
was undertaken by Kaiser Engineers and was published in 1961 / Kaiser,
1961 /• It addressed itself mainly to the question of whether it was
feasible to ship iron ore from Shieni (near the river Oti, tributary
to the lake) to Tema for export or processing. However it came to
the conclusion that the ore was of too low a grade for this to be
economic. The next report, also produced by Kaiser Engineers, came
out in 196'i and this examined general cargo and passenger transportation.
For cargo, it recommended the use of a "road-train" between Accra and
Akosombo:-
"consisting of a 220 hp tractor hauling 2 trailers. As many
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as SO of these units would travel daily between Accra/Tema
and fort Akosombo. The road train ivould be 56 feet long and
woiild weigh 34 tons, with an 8 ton maximum axle loading.
While this meets U.K. and U.S. vehicle standards, both the ^
total length and the axle loading are in excess of present
Ghana road standards, these standards would restrict payload
to 12 tons and substantially increase vehicle tare weight
and cost by requiring extra axles. It is recommended that
road traffic regulations be changed to permit use of more
economic road hauling units.",
/ Kaiser, 1964 ]
This Kaiser report estimated an annual through-traffic transport
volume of 700,000 tons of goods and 160,000 passengers by 1970. The
total cost of the recommended road/lakf/road system was to be £9.5
million.
The rex>ort illustrates a common failing of these transportation
studies; they fail to take account of Ghana's needs and capabilities.
Estimates of transport requirements and the cost of satisfying them
are consistently too high, and there is an obvious desire to follow
standard American methods rather than techniques which might be more
appropriate to a Third Vvorld country.
The later transportation studies do not differ essentially from
the Kaiser report. The 'Volta Inland Transport Project ileport'
produced in 1965 by C.E.K.O.P., Foreign Trade Enterprise, Warsaw,
proposed a £5 million scheme which covered the actual lake transportation
only. The 'Volta Lake Transport System' report produced in 1969 by
Ostenfeld and Jjtinson/Kampsax of Copenhagen proposed spendingN0 11.4
million, again purely on lake transport. (This study was financed
through a loan from tlie banish Government to the Government of Ghana.)
The views of Peter Gould, transport consultant to USAID, are
enlightening on this matter / Gould, 1967 7« "0 states:
"The initial solution to the transportation problem was
a vast road, rail and lake steamer complex with a price
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tag ranging from £6 to £9 million - depending upon which
lushly-produced report was consulted. In my opinion the
traffic estimates in those reports were so over-sanguine
as to border the absurd. From past work on transportation
in Ghana I am intimately acquainted with the data resources
used in the estimates. In most cases they are completely
inadequate for making investment decisions of this
magnitude. I do not judge the assumptions underlying
the estimations, even when they can be found, to be
plausible. One example, from many, will suffice: to
assume that 70/ of all southward flowing trade will be
siphoned down the Volta "funnel" to the Accra area is
ludicrous in view of the traditional strength of the Kumasi
market and its role as a sorting andtransshipment point to
the south-west and Takoradi. Finally, it is necessary to
point out that Ghana simply does not have such funds
available at the present time for soch a scheme".
/"Gould, 1967, 38-9J
Gould goes on to say that, nevertheless, a cheap and efficient solution
to Ghana's transport problems, costing little in foreign exchange,
was available. He suggests the use of 30 foot boats powered by simple
diesel engines of 33 hp which were already being built and used at
Takoradi. These boats would be used in a similar fashion to the
'tro-tro' or 'mammy-wagons' of the road, i.e. run by individual
operators they would quickly "smell out" the traffic potential. The
total cost of setting up a scheme using five boats and five barges
would be of the order of £30,000 initially and running costs would
be about £20,000 per year. Having set such a scheme in motion, a firm
data base for making decisions about future transport requirements
would become available.
Similar assessments to Gould's were outlined by the IBRD in two
reports / IBRD, 1966, 13-16; IBRD, 1970, 37-9 7• They called the
Kaiser traffic estimates "a completely unrealistic forecast" and
announced "the mission is highly skeptical of the findings and
recommendations of the 1969 Lake Transport Study".
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What have the actual developments in lake transportation
been? In 1967 the VRA started operating a pilot transportation system
on a very small scale. In 1970 this scheme was taken over by the
Volta Lake Transport Company (VLTC), whose share capital was owned
51/fc by the VltA, and the rest was held equally by two private
European firms, Elder Dempster Lines and Scanlake S.A. 13y 1971 very
rudimentary ports at Akosombo and ICete Kracbi had been completed, and
in the same year the VLTC commissioned its first sizeable vessel,
the 250 tonne'Yapei Queen' built by Barman Long (Ghana) Limited and
costing 0 155,000. In the following year the 'Akosombo Queen', a
passenger vessel donated by the Dutch Government was launched, and
these two boats started a regular service between Akosombo and Yapei
(Tamale Port).
Altogether the VLTC was said to have a cargo vessel carrying
capacity of 50,000 tons / VGA Annual Keport, 1973» 26 J; most of this
capacity must have been provided by very small boats. The actual
traffic developed as follows
1970 1971 1972 1973 197k
Passengers 6500 6900 13900 12000 2k 200
Cargo (tonnes) 3100 4900 17950 28250 2k350
/ VltA Annual Deport, 151k, 26 7
The reasons given for the decrease in tonnage carried in 197k were,
not so much lack of cargo, but inadequate craft, lack of spare
parts and equipment to service existing craft and the low water level
in the lake which interrupted some services and restricted carrying
capacities on others / VltA Annual Report, 197k, 26J. This appears
to be in conflict with the story of an apparently entirely adequate
capacity of 50,000 tons mentioned above.
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Despite this rather unclear situation, the VLTC and the VIiA
"believe themselves to be folloAving the outlines of the Ostenfeld &
Jpnson/Kanrpsax Scheme of 1969. This scheme envisaged the carrying
of 150,000 tonnes of merchandise by 1975 > 260,000 tonnes by I960 and
426,000 tonnes by 1985. These figures look very dubious in comparison
with the actual traffic and observed' rates of growth of traffic0
Irrigation
Ghana has long been interested in the potential of the Volta Lake
for irrigation ,/ e.g. Government of Gold Coast, 1952 J. A report on
this topic was requested, again from Kaiser Engineers. This report,
the 'Accra Plains Irrigation Feasibility Study' was published in
May 1965 / Kaiser, 1965a_7. It considered delivering irrigation
water, by gravity from Volta Lake and by pumping from the Volta River,
to 440,000 acres of the Accra Plains south of the dam site. Large-scale
mechanised agricultural methods were to be used on plots which were all
to be above a minimum size. In the case of rice-growing, this size
was set at 2,500 acres and for sugar cane, 10,000 acres. Fertilisers
and pesticides were to be liberally used, costing £7.6 million per
year in foreign exchange. A computer study was carried out to determine
the optimum sequence of development of individual land tracts which
would "yield the highest profitability" / Kaiser, 1965b, 10 /• The
optimum point of initial development was said to be in the extreme
south-west of the Plains, near to Accra itself.
The cost of the scheme was worked out in terms of a maximum
debt. By the tenth year after the start of construction work the
accAimulated debt of capital cost, interest charges and operating costs
were to amount to more than £28 million. But it was estimated that
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this would be paid off after a further seven years.
This method of considering the cost of the scheme is a good one,
but the actual figure involved is extremely large. In fact the scheme
as a whole appears to be even more inappropriate than the resettlement
agricultural scheme. It is entirely unsuited to Ghanaian conditions
being far too large and far too costly to relate to Ghana's internal
economic climate. No moves have been made to implement this scheme
so that the idea of irrigating the Accra Plains remains in abeyance.
Summary
To help give a better perspective on the 'side-effects' of the
VRP here is a summary of the main costs and benefits:
Capital costs
Cost of resettlement scheme $ 35 million
Compensation remaining to be paid 7 to 16 million
Annual costs
VLRDP $ 0.T million
Loss of productivity through
schistosomiasis 0 J.h million
Value of fish lost from Lower Volta $ 0.6 million
Annua1 be nefit s
Value of fish from Volta Lake $ 5.0 million
There appears to be a small overall annual benefit due to the
value of the fish caught from the Volta Lake, but this gain is
nowhere near sufficient to recoup the initial capital cost of the
resettlement scheme within the project's lifespan of 50 years. If
we were to improve and combine this rough cost-benefit analysis of
the side-effects with the cost-benefit analysis on electricity sales




Is the Volta Scheme Unusual?
Is the VRP unique by virtue of-the extent of conflict of interest
over the scheme? The writer's contention is that it is not. To
indicate that this is so, I shall describe three other projects
involving the building of large hydroelectric dams in poor countries;
one from Africa, one from Asia and one from South America. The number
of outline examples of conflict could be extended, but as yet we have
only a shallow understanding of the political nature of such schemes.
The Cabora Bassa Dam built in the Tete province of Mozambique
when it was under Portuguese colonial rule, provides a massive amount
of electricity, more than twice as much as the Volta I'am. Such a
quantity of electricity is of no immediate use to a poor country like
Mozambique; clearly the dam was built to provide for the power needs
of South Africa. The Vorster Government committed £117 million to
the scheme and also four battalions of South African troops to guard
it from the forces of FliELIMO (The Front for the Liberation of
Mozambique) / Adamson, 1971 7• The Portuguese built a "triple defensive
system of fortification and fencing for miles around" / Jones, 1972 7
for the same piirpose. Why was Cabora. Bassa the object of attack? Basil
Davidson explains:
"Cabora Bassa appears as another instalment of colonial-type
development - of the development of colonial-type exploitation -
along the lines of every previous and parallel extension of
the South African-Portuguese—Ithodesian system. If it lias met
with powerful condemnation from the African side, this has not been
merely out of a sense of solidarity with the nationalists of
FIIELIMO in Mozambique. And if these nationalists of Mozambique
hove swrorn to delay and obstruct the building of the dam and its
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ancillary structures - and are now doing so with guerilla
warfare in the Tete District - this is not because they are
opposed to the development of their country. They, like
their neighbours in nearby countries, oppose the project
because the project aims at the development of the system
which victimises and oppresses them. In their view Cabora
Bassa can only mean a reinforcement of the economic power
of their oppressors; it could mean something different only
if this power were to be displaced by African self-rule."
/ Davidson, 1972 7
Turning to Peru and the district of Iluaylas, 3,000 metres up
in the Andes, we find another example of conflict, this time between
the urban-industrial lifestyle and the rural-agricultural lifestyle.
To describe the project we shall quote from Paul L. Doughty's account
/ Doughty, 1972J:
"Peru, like many countries in the Third World, is characterised
by extreme centralisation and a consuming focus upon large
urban centres, particularly Lima, the capital created on the
central coast."
/ Doughty, 1972, 112 7
"This situation tends to thwart modernisation processes in
rural areas particularly. Rurality is associated with the
lower-class peasantry and the Indian under-class, so that
up until now, these people (perhaps 40^ of the national
population) have not been the targets for developmental efforts
on any appreciable scale."
/ Doughty, 1972, 112 7
It was merely the dramatic geography of the Huaylas district
with its spectacular canyon that made it the site for a hydroelectric
dam. The project was:
" designed to provide power for the industrial development
planned for the region near the mouth of the Santa Liver in
the best natural harbour on the Peruvian Coast. Here the
tranquil fishing town of Cbiinbote, with a 1940 population of
less than 5000, was to be converted into an industrial center
featuring that most desired of all developmental "holy of
holies", a steel mill".
/"Doughty, 1972, 115_7
The project was finished in 1957 at a cost of over $ 68 million. The
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dam produces 50 MW of electricity and the mill produces 66,000
tonnes of steel annually.
"After the great men had been praised by their peers and the
technicians and engineers lauded for their ingenuity, few
words were left for the others, the 14,000 who hod actually
performed the work... Fewer voices still drew attention to the
actual and future impact upon these men and their families....
the input and output terminology of the national planners left
a great deal to the imagination, despite implicit assumptions
that jobs and 'development' would occur....Given the nature
■of the Peruvian social structure at the time, particularly
with regard to the high lands, it is understandable that those
in power at the national level were not particularly concerned...
with the impact upon the peasantry."
/ Doughty, 1972, 115-7 7
The third example comes from Bangladesh where the Chakmas, a
Buddhist tribe, were dispossessed by a dam built at Kaptai in 1957.
Nearly 100,000 of them hod to abandon the valleys and take to the less
fertile hills. Adam Curie recounts his experience with the East Pakistan
Planning Commission:
"Clearly the construction of the dam would continue: millions had
already been spent and enormous contracts signed. All we could
do was to stir up concern about the fate of the Chakmas in the
hope that steps would be taken to minimise the effects of the
catastrophe." /-Curle < 19?1> 1Q5j
The Planning Commission recommended that sites be prepared for Cbaltma
settlements accessible by new roads and large enough and sufficiently
close to each other to preserve the social structure. It also recommended
stocking the lakes formed by the dam with fish, cultivating the lakeshore
in the dry season, the growing of cash crops, terrace cultivation of the
hillsides - similar recommendations to those of the VliA.
"Previously, living in a benevolent environment, the people
had been well served by the old ways. Now they would need the
skills of the twentieth century". /-„ 1
/ Curie, 1971, 10u /
But the Chakmas were, apparently, unable to obtain the skills and riches
of modern life:
"There is a general impression (no statistics are available)
that the Chakmas are poorer than they were The Chakma
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social system seems to have suffered just as much as we
feared it would..... The immense lake makes it more difficult
to have rapid, convenient and easy communication between
separate groups. In general there is a lessened sense of
community".
/"Curie, 1971, 107-8J
"It is pertinent to ask for whom the Cbakmas were immolated.
It was not...for the farmers who lived below the dam / for
although the dam was supposed to control downstream flooding,
it has in fact contributed to it 7. Was it for the many
poor Bengalis who lived elsewhere in the area? Possibly:
for although they would not themselves use much electricity,
they might benefit from the industrial development facilitated
by power. There might be more and better jobs available to
them, and they might be helped indirectly by increased
productivity and wealth in their area. On the other hand
the ripple effect is not inevitable; everything depends on
the longer political and economic framework. Would the
already rich industrialists profit from the power produced by
the dam? Undoubtedly. Would the foreign interests associated
with them also profit? Undoubtedly. It depends upon one's
point of view whether one considers the anguish and destruction
of the Chakma people to have been justified."
/"Curie, 1971, 108-9_7
Agreement and Conflict
An account was given in Chapter Three of the differing aims of
the interest groups involved in the VHP. Nkrumah and bis government - »
wanted electricity for industrialisation. The U.K. government wonted
a supply of aluminium from the sterling area but eventually lost
interest and dropped out of the scheme. The Kaiser Corporation wanted
electricity to produce cheap aluminium so as to reap an adequate
financial retiirn. The I .S. government was not particularly interested
in augmenting its aluminium supplies but did wish to expand its
exports to overseas markets and also wanted to gain political influence
in the newly emergent black African nations.
These differing expectations were played off and compromised
within a political framework. Some aims were better satisfied than
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others. Basically, those with more political power, economic might
and technical expertise inevitably did better than those with less.
The Ghana Government, for instance, only achieved its aim of providing
hydroelectricity supplies for Ghana at heavy cost to itself. In fact,
as Geoffrey Bing, Nkrumah's adviser stated:
" in so far as any of Nkrufnah's development projects
were of a neo-colonialist nature, the Volta Hydro-Electric
Scheme best fitted this pattern."
/ Bing, 1968, 592J
The story is not totally one of conflict of interest, however.
If it had been, the Volta dam would never have been built. Let us
further elucidate the conflicts and conjunctions of interest. The
three principal participants in the final project were the U.S.
Government, the Ghana Government and the Kaiser Corporation. The U.S.
Government and the Kaiser Corporation held general economic interests
in common; any moves which brought Ghana into the sphere of economic
influence of the U.S. were to be welcomed. Yet there was a slight
difference in emphasis, in that the U.S. government was wary of the
arguments put forward by purely business interests. For instance the
U.So-dominated IBRD criticised (correctly as it turned out) Kaiser's
■Electric Power Load Growth Report' of i960 for overestimating future
demand, and also criticised Kaiser's initial choice of 165 kV for the
transmission line voltage, on the grounds that the choice of a more
standard operating voltage would offer opportunity for wider competition
in the tendering for high voltage equipment / IBRD, 1960_7. The IBRD
was thus taking a more diplomatic line in order not to alienate the
Ghanaian interests.
The differences between institutions like the IBRD and the
Kaiser Corporation should not be glossed over. However in this
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particular case the conjunction of interest vas paramount. This
may he exemplified by the case of George D. hoods who was a director
of Kaiser Steel Corporation from 1952 to 1963 > was President and
Chairman of Executive Directors of the IBRD and the IDA from 1963
to 1968 and was then Chairman of the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation
after 1968 / Loving, 1975 7» If leading personnel can move quite
freely between the organisations one might guess that the aims and
purposes of the organisations are not too dissimilar.
The Ghana Government and Kaiser Corporation were essentially
economic rivals, since they had to bargain with each other over the
price of electricity for the smelter. However the Ghana Government
needed (or was persuaded to believe that it needed) Kaiser's technical
expertise. As Moxon states, Edgar Kaiser had acted "in two vastly
different capacities - as engineer, adviser and consultant on the
Government's own power project - and both as prime mover and hard-
headed business adversary in the VALCO smelter negotiations."
/"Moxon, 1969, 108-9_7«
As for the relationship between the Ghanaian and U.S. governments,
the Ghana Government was avowedly trying to follow a policy of non-
alignment. It did not want to be swamped by the attentions of either
power bloc, but neither did it want to estrange either of them. As
it turned out, this was a difficult game to play.
The provision of electricity in Ghana has, unfortunately, led
neither to the expected beneficial industrialisation, nor to a "Utopia".
That members of the CUT government could talk of the project as
Utopian indicates the extent of their alienation from the mass of
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the people. It is this kind of alienation that goes toward explaining
the lack of popular resistance to the military coup that ousted
Nkrumah.
We have noted that the VHP did not arise out of the desire of
the people of Ghana, or, initially, of their political representatives.
This is fundamental in explaining its lack of success. The VHP was
conceived originally as a means of fulfilling the aims of non-Ghanaian
interest groups. To many Ghanaians it seems to be almost an irrelevancy;
to the 9»0Q0 Ghanaians employed by the VliA, the EGG and VALCO, it may
appear to be a blessing, but to the 80,000 people displaced by the
Volta Lake the project has been a man-made disaster. These people,
despite their numbers, had little political influence and so were
unable to combat a project that was not in their interests.
We may surmise that Nkrumah's reaction to the project as it now
stands would, if he were alive, have been one of disappointment. His
expectations of industrialisation and diversification in Ghana as a
result of the VHP have not been borne out. On the other hand, the
Kaiser Corporation appears to have had no problems in the running of
its new smelter. In fact the smelter ran at full capacity during the
197^-5 recession in the world aluminium market in contrast to many
smelters elsewhere, including the U.S., where whole pot-lines were
temporarily shut down. The U.S. also appeared to achieve its objectives
of gaining an economic, and to some extent political, foothold in
Africa.
Those people who held bad expectations of the project, the
resettlement villagers and their involuntary "hosts", the progressive
Ghanaian academics, were without political power. In the "debate" over
the VliP they were barely heard and they could do very little to stop
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or alter the project to meet their own desires or convictions.
Broadly speaking, then, most of the expectations of the VHP, both
good and bad, were borne ont. For instance, it was no surprise that
the Volta Lake led to a virtual epidemic of bilharzia. As early as
1950 an entomologist, Dr. Berner, was appointed by the Government of
Ghana to investigate the potential heal th problems in the Volta River
Basin. His report covered malaria, onchocerciasis, trypanosomiasis,
and schistosomiasis / Government of the Gold Coast, 1952 J, Since
the VHP offered few surprises, since there were no 'mistakes', the
failure of the VRP, as far as Ghana was concerned, must be put down
to political causes.
The VRP appears as a Combined political and technological 'steam
roller'. It reflects the political structure in which it was implemented
and effectively embodies that power structure in rock, concrete and
steel. In turn, the existence of the finalised project helps to
confirm a modified power structure for the scheme's technical
sophistication requires an educated elite to run it, so that Ghana
has acquired a body of bureaucratic planners / Tiger, 1967 7«
The introduction of a project of the sheer size of the VHP into
the existing political frameworks lias thus led to severe problems.
It has exacerbated the conflict between centralised, elitist planning
and democratic control by its reliance on the former, and it has
forced Ghana to seek foreign financing for the scheme, making her
more vulnerable to extraneous nolitical pressures. It is for
practical reasons that I am saying that the size of the VHP was
inappropriate to the Ghanaian situation at the time of its construction.
It is not purely or inherently a question of size, but a question of
political relations and organisation.
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Would Ghana have been better off without the VHP? To answer
this question is to enter the realms of speculation, but in view of
the present situation one may feel entitled to suggest alternatives
that might have been less problematic. One such possibility that
might have represented a better compromise between the aims of the
Ghana Government and its people would have been a smaller hydro¬
electric scheme to provide solely for the power needs of Ghanaian
consumers. An aluminium smelter might possibly have been built much
later when Ghana's demand for aluminium warranted it.
But we have already noted in Chapter Three that the possibility
of using a dam at Bui (amongst other places) to provide hydroelectricity
for Ghana's industrialisation was brushed aside by the Kaiser Corporation.
Studies of Bui had been included, at the request of the Ghana Government,
in the Ilalcrow Report of 19:51 and in the Preparatory Commission Report
also. To no avail. The IJui scheme was of no interest to non-Ghanaians;
it was the VHP that whetted their appetites.
Why did Nkrumah desire the TOP so wholeheartedly? We can
identify three reasons:-
1) He believed that the conflicting Ghanaian and non-
Ghanaian interests could be brought to a satisfactory
compromise.
2) He was misled by the technological imperative into
believing that this was the only way to proceed.
3) He thought that as well as providing electricity the
TOP would found the essential basis of an aluminium .
industry and lead to widespread industrialisation in
Ghana - on this point he was disappointed.
Throughout the history of the VHP there has been a failure to
consider seriously any of the various alternatives available. At any
point in time there is a range of technical options open to a society.
The decision to go for one particular option rather than another is
invariably made on political grounds. In the case of the Via' it has
been established that the project as originally conceived was perfectly
(
feasible and that Ghana's bauxite was of a completely acceptable quality,
and yet, in the end, a different version of the project which did not
utilise Ghana's bauxite, was implemented. That this occurred indicate^
that strong political forces were at work, altering the project to
fulfil a different set of aims from those conceived by the originators
of the project. The American aluminium companies that set up the
Tenia smelter did not need bauxite as much as they needed electricity.
This ig not to say that the VHP is purely a matter of intentional
exploitation. There may be an element of conscious self-interest at
work, but generally the participants seemed to be unaware of their
fundamental conflicts of interest. Sometimes a pious desire for
'development' was avowed, but this appears to be more of a protective
ideology than anything else. A genuine concern for the welfare of the
other participants in the project (and the non-participants who were
innocently affected) did not seem to exist.
However, although I have tended to describe the project in terms
of pure conflict, this description must be modified somewhat to fully
portray the reality. No party to the VHP was able to gain complete
power and advantage over all the others. Even the most powerful
participants had to induce cooperation from the others, and in doing
so bod to negotiate with them, thus submitting their ovn policies to
some degree of external pressure. In this way elements of compromise
became evident in the VIU.'. To give two examples of this, firstly,
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Nkrumab's statement on behalf of the Government of Ghana about
resettlement was to the effect that the resettled should be no worse
off than before; a rather passive recommendation. On the other hand
the VILA resettlement division which was in closer contact with the
settlers was more positive about the whole affair, they avowedly
wanted to "offer the people of Ghana a better way of living"
/ Jopp, 1965, 45 7. To gain cooperation from the settlers the VKA
was forced to partially accept their point of view, however in reality
the VKA was unable to put its words into practice for lack of funding
and resources, because it was answerable to the Government and not to
the settlers.
The second example of compromise has been in the matter of
electricity rates to VALCO. Despite the fixed rate set by the Master
Agreement, the VILA has been able to increase the price for electricity.
VALCO cannot afford to take too hard a line on this point or it runs
.the risk of having its expensive smelter expropriated before it has
managed to recoup its investment through profits. Admittedly, this
is a slight risk since Ghana would find it hard to use the smelter
having no alumina plant to supply it or rolling mill to absorb its
output, but it is a risk nevertheless.
It is often said about such hydroelectric projects as the VHP
that a few people may have to suffer for the good of the majority.
But in this case one might say that the already underprivileged have
suffered for the soke of the privileged. That this is not a case of
'development' is clear. Since Ghana was, at the time of the
implementation of the VHP, not a particularly undemocratic country,
it seems justifiable to infer that there are processes of general
importance at work here.
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Geoffrey Bing makes a very perceptive metaphorical statement on
the situation in which Third World countries find themselves:
"The story of Ghana's nine tumultuous years from 1957 to
1966 is interesting, just because it is the case history
of the harriers and antagonisms which prevent / a
reorganisation of resource denloyment_7. It is not the
brood design that provokes hostility. It is the fact - ®
that any particular attempt to implement it runs counter
to some vested interest. Colonialism has never consisted
merely in rule by an alien power. It brings in its train
a series of commercial, financial, military and social
relationships which do not disappear at the end of imperial
rule and have often, from long usage, come to be regarded
as part of the natural order of things. Thus the old
colonial system cannot be set aside by some broad sweep of
policy. The bonds which bind down a poor colonial territory
come to independence, are not of solid weave. They are
composed of a 1000 separate strands often not even intertwined.
Indeed many, at first sight appear to be individual strings
pulling the new state forward rather than holding it back."
/ Bing, 1968, 2k 7
What have we learnt from the Volta Scheme?
In what ways does this particular case study go toward confirming
or contradicting current theories about the dependency of Third World
countries and about their relations with multinational corporations?
Development and Dependency
In Chapter One the extent of Ghana's poor economic position was
outlined. In general this description gave confirmation to Bettelheim's
inverted description of a Third World country:
"The industrial countries today are not countries which
are economically dependent. Their production structure
does not consist of a few hypertrophied sectors narrowly
tied to foreign markets and strongly penetrated by capital
which is also foreign. These economies do not develop or
stagnate according to the movements of the world market
of this or that mineral or agricultural raw material.
They do not support the cost of heavy external obligations.
Their infant industries do not have to face competition with
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powerful industries already well established and dominated
by the same big capital which has already dominated their
own natural resources. These economies do not depend for
their increased productivity on imports of equipment coming
from abroad. Even v'hen they were not highly industrialised
these economies were not distorted and disequilibriated but,
on the contrary, integrated and internally-oriented."
/ Bettelheim, 196T, 28 ~]
1 i
In Chapter Two the history behind the VHP was recounted. It
indicated that the project had arisen out of the interests of the U.K.
but had been taken over by the U.S. Arrighi states that the
"decolonisation" of Africa simply meant that the colonial preserves
of European imperialism were opened up to American capitalism and the
oligopolistic corporation. He describes the emergence of a new
pattern of foreign investment in which financing and merchanting
interests and small-scale capital declined in importance relative
to large-scale ventures in mining, primary products processing for
the export market, and import substitution of consumer goods.
/ Arrighi, 1967 7 This trend appears to be confirmed. Despite the
fact that Nkrumah made the first approach to the U.S0, he soon lost
the initiative and became less a political representative of Ghana
and more an intermediary for international finance.
In this process of American intervention in Africa the World Bank
can, at best, be seen as meekly following the dictates of the U.S. or,
at worst, as being the active medium through which a 'neo-colonialist'
system wras organised / Magdoff, 1969» h\J.
In Chapter Three the differing aims of the groups involved in the
VHP were explained. In particular Ilayter's thesis that aid is intended
to serve the interests of the governments providing it received
plenty of confirmation, /"llayter, 1971, 15_7. The VHP received aid
because it had a large foreign exchange cost which helped to increase
exports from the donor countries which acted through the World Bank,
and because it set up a primary- product processing facility providing
a material valuable to the industrialised world. In giving a detailed
description of the results of the VI(P (Chapters Four and Five), it was
shown that exports arriving from the U.S. have increased since the
inception of the project and that most of the aluminium produced by
the Tema smelter has been used by the rich countries of the world.
We might describe the VKP as an example of an inappropriate
scheme for a Third World country. Cooper asks why such inappropriate
capital-intensive technologies get transferred / Cooper, 1972 /» an<^
gives two reasons:
(a) Distortions in relative factor prices (i.e. a wage rate
which is too high relative to the price of capital given the
relative availabilities of labour and capital) result in the
use of capital-intensive techniques in order to maximise profits.
(b) Technological innovation in the industrialised countries
is generally labour-saving, so the technologies which are
transferred to poor countries are inevitably capital-intensive.
Both reasons, the first economic, the second technological, are
quite correct, but the whole account tends to gloss over the political
reasons for applying the label "inappropriate". In talking about
inappropriate technology, the usual definition of the word "inappropriate"
is a broad social, cultural, economic one. But it is necessary to point
out that in this particular case (the VUP) and probably in many others,
the word inappropriate should-be used because the scheme is, essentially,
inappropriate for political reasons. Chaszar asks whether it is
science and technology which alienate people from the political system,
or whether it is politics that alienates people from science and
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technology / Chaszar, 19^9, 55 7 * In this particular case of the
VRP, we have no reason to think that the production of electricity
and aluminium is inherently "alienating" to the people of Ghana.
Both of these artifacts were used before the advent of the VIIP. The
fact that they were produced in siich quantity was perhaps "inappropriate"
t
hut we have laid that down to political causes.
Multinationals
There have been a number of major studies in recent years on
the subject of multinational corporations. Particular firms hove
been scrutinised / best, 1972; Sampson, 1973; Cronje, 1976 7 and the
general problem area has been described / Kindelberger, 1970; Dunning,
1971; Tugendhat, 1971; Turner,1973; Vernon, 1973; Barnet and Muller,
1975; liadice, 1975_7.
Following Vernon we shall ask three questions about multinational
corporations:
a) Do they undermine a host nation's work for the welfare of
its people?
b) Are they used by the country in which their headquarters lie
(in particular does the U.S. use its multinationals for its
own ends)?
c) Do they have excessive power?
/"Vernon, 1973, 15J
The conflict between nation states and multinationals has been
pointed out by other writers of diverse political views
"Industrial development - especially by the multinational
corporations - far exceeds the scale of operation of
industry a generation ago, and the power of these new
companies, not to mention their rate of growth, now exceeds
that of many nation states. Governments of even quite
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advanced societies con no longer, therefore, claim to be
wholly effective in safeguarding the interests of their
citizens against possibly harmful decisions taken by these
f inns."
/ Benn, 1971 7
"The time has come for governments everywhere to decide what
to do about the great multinational companies that have
grown up in the last 25 years* Their emergence is one of
the most dramatic developments of the period, and of more
than just economic and industrial significance. Their
position profoundly affects the role of governments in the
exercise of their responsibilities...."
/ Tugendhat, 1971, 19 7
There is clearly a loss of national autonomy when a multinational
invests in a foreign country since some of that nation's economic
actors become responsible to stockholders who are citizens of other
countries. Is this loss of autonomy exchanged for a gain, through
transfer of capital and technological know-how? / Evans, 1971 J»
The reply given in Evans's excellently reasoned article is "no".
Capital flow is in the reverse direction and the transfer of technical
skills is useless because it is not allowed to spark off any major
changes - toward industrialisation, for example. The VlfP is an excellent
illustration of Evans's analysis; Ghana fared very badly in its dealings
with the multinationals.
What of the relationship between a multinational and its country
of residence? We are told:
" it is wrong to think of the companies in conventional
national terms. The overriding aim of each one of them is
to pursue its own corporate interest which is separate and
distinct from that of every government, including the
government of its country of origin. There is, of course,
an overlap between a company's interests and those of the
governments of the countries where it is involved, and in
most cases that overlap is greatest with its own home
government".
/ Tugendhat, 1971, 22 J
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The first part of this statement does not conflict with the
experience gained from this study of the VHP, however the last
sentence merits criticism. We have already discovered that there is
very little overlap between the interests of a multinational and its
host country. Itather, the relationship is characterised by conflict.
Further, our study has shown that there is considerable overlap between
the aluminium companies involved in the VHP and the U.S. government.
The aluminium companies and their parent state did not have an
identical set of interests, but there was very little conflict.
Vernon has stated:
" when U.S. - controlled enterprises have felt foreign
governments breathing down their necks, the disposition
has been to find some formula to relieve the pressure
locally without inviting the U.S. government into the fray.
Strategies that involve intergovernmental threat or
collaboration have taken a very low place in the list of
possible responses."
/ Vernon, 1973, 251_7
However, we have noted a counter-example to this, in Averell
Harriman's none too veiled threat to Nkrumah. Vernon goes on to
question whether U.S. -controlled investments should really be
regarded as American, since he says, measured by equity ownership
they are typically 90$ American but by source of funds 25$ American,
by identity of employees less than 1$ American, and by the identity
of the governments that receive their taxes, practically 100$ foreign.
/ Vernon, 1973, 253 7» These percentages are a long way off the mark
in the case of the Tema smelter. Equity ownership is 100$ American,
funds are 100$ American, the employees are 2$ American and the foreign
taxes paid amount to zero.
Since we also know that U.S. companies investing abroad are
generally entitled to write off foreign failures as a tax loss
/ Vernon, 1973, 55 7 we seen entitled to deduce from all this
that the multinational company and its home government have considerable
interests in common.
What of o\ir third question? Is the power of the multinationals
excessive? Evans says that the nation state is the only organisation
with sufficient leverage to bargain with a multinational / Evans, 1971 7-
That may he so, but in Ghana's case that leverage seemed insufficient
to apply much force. It is perhaps the capability of multinationals
to exercise flexibility that is oppressive, combined with a forced
competition among both rich and poor countries for the favours of the
technologically dominant multinational.
How con the nation state cope more adequately with the multi¬
national corporation? More specifically, how can the Third World
country achieve a more equal bargaining position with respect to the
multinational? Should the multinationals, as Tugendhat suggests,
provide more information about themselves to their host governments,
while the governments in turn devote more effort to accumulating
knowledge about the international corporation? This would, no doubt,
ameliorate the situation, but it does not amount to a final solution
since, as we have seen, the host government is easily duped.
The Aluminium Companies
Our attention has been concentrated upon the Kaiser Corporation
as the main participant in the Tema smelter; only brief mention has
been made of Reynolds Metals. How typical is the Kaiser Aluminum
and Chemical Company of the world's aluminium companies?
It has already been noted that Reynolds Metals and Harvey
Aluminum are similar to the Kaiser Corporation in being family concerns.
It is not only the family concerns that are centralised, however, for
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ALCAN too has a single head office (in Montreal) with a president
in total charge of affairs. Nathanael V. Davis, President of ALCAN
carries "ultimate responsibility for all group activities" and "takes
the final decisions involved in selecting that combination of
investments in raw material, smelting and fabricating capacity that
will earn the greatest return on the group's capital and managerial
resources" / Tugendhat, 1971» 130 J. It may be assumed then that
the structure of the Kaiser Corporation is not atypical.
♦
Are the international aluminium companies typical of multinationals?
Perhaps not entirely. Put they are prime examples of the more powerful
multinational. They have achieved this power for two reasons. Firstly,
the world possesses a fairly ample supply of high quality bauxite and
it is distributed quite widely over the world. Therefore the companies
do not find it difficult to obtain supplies. Yet also refining costs
for the processing of bauxite into alumina and aluminium are very high.
The costs of refining aluminium represent about 60'r of production costs
compared to 6 or 75* for oil and 15a for copper / Vernon, 1973* 51 _7»
This makes the aluminium companies aim for large economies of scale
and makes their operations very capital intensive. It is difficult
therefore for new firms (or countries) to enter the industry.
\ve have seen how the Kaiser Corporation sought, and found, cheap
supplies of electricity in Ghana. There appears to be something of a
trend amongst the aluminium companies to enter the Third World countries
for electricity siipplies. In I960 only India, Taiwan and Cameroon
produced any aluminium / Voluntary Committee on Overseas Aid and
Development, 19(>8 / but now Ghana, Jamaica, and Bahrain also have
smelters.
We have seen that in our case the country concerned, Ghana, did
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not appear to benefit from this incursion. Norman Girvan states
that because the facilities set up in agreements between companies
and countries tend to remain in the exclusive use of the former,
the companies succeed in transforming a change which is progressive
in form into one that is retrogressive in content. The Third World
i
country tends to be restricted to some form of terminal activity:
either to primary production and crude processing or, at the other
extreme, to assembly. In either case, elaboration is left to the
rich countries and with that the lion's share of the value added
/ Girvan, 19?1_7^ The aluminium smelter in the Third World
generally remains an enclave.
How can Ghana improve upon the Volta Scheme?
It will be on uphill struggle for Ghana to improve her position
with respect to the VIH'. It will be just as much of an uphill struggle
for Ghanaians to get their government to mitigate the decisive and
deleterious effects of the project. However, as the dam, lake and
smelter now exist, what can be done? First of all the VKA could press
for a better price for the electricity sold to VALCO. Secondly, the
terms of the Master Agreement could be altered so that VALCO would be
subject to the normal company tax. The money obtained from these
altered financial arrangements could be spent on alleviating the
disruption caused by the resettlement scheme, on improved health care
for the people around the shores of the lake, on improving transport
around and across the lake. Whether it is spent in this way will
depend upon Ghana's internal political situation. These moves would
of course be resisted by VALCO but they ought to be carried out, for
at the very most they are reformist measures designed to lighten the
burdens of the VHP.
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As for mere far-reaching policies one such would he to consider
linking Ghana's aluminium industry with that of Guinea, about 1400 1cm
along the coast. There the Konkoure-i'ria Project had been designed
to produce aluminium from Guinea's bauxite, utilising bauxite mines at
Fria and a hydroelectric dam on the River Konkoure / Futa, i960 /• But
only the first stage of the project'was implemented so that now Guinea
exports 700,000 tonnes of alumina per year for processing elsewhere
into aluminium. The scheme was set up in the 1950's and operated by
an international consortium of aluminium companies including American,
French and German firms. In 1975? however, the Government 01 Guinea
took 49$ of the shares in the project and now the building of Konkoure
Ram and an associated aluminium smelter is envisaged for the 19&0's
/ Warren, 1973, 89J•
The Guinea bauxite mines and alumina plant represent a missing
section of the Volta Scheme. In technical terms it would be quite easy
to integrate the two processes notwithstanding their distance apart.
The fundamental obstacles to this arrangement lie in the realm of
political economy and the interests of the aluminium companies. Two *■
problems arise, first, what to do with the surplus capacity of the
Guinea alumina plant since it produces nearly twice as much as the
requirements of the Tema smelter. Second, how to market the resulting
aluminium, since the aluminium companies would no doubt boycott it.
The answer to the first problem might simply be to run the alumina plant
at half capacity since the economic benefits of this joint scheme might
outweigh any economic disadvantage entailed. On the other hand, it
might be feasible to have extra aluminium production capacity at Tema
smelter. The answer to the second problem might be for the new
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) consisting of all
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15 West African nations (i.e. including Ghana and Guinea) to jointly
finance an aluminium rolling rail! so as to supply all aluminium
fabricators within the community. Such a scheme would meet with
opposition from the aluminium companies hut such opposition might not
he so forceful if approval were gained from the International Bauxite
Association, the cartel of bauxite producers set up in 1974. Jamaica
is playing a leading part in this Association and is gaining greater
control of her bauxite/alumina industries by purchasing an interest in
the ALCOA, Reynolds and Kaiser operations / Guardian, 8 October 1976 J.
This bodes well for Ghana since it means Kaiser's control and bargaining
power will be more limited than in the past.
However, at present it appears unlikely that Ghana will attempt
to carry out this kind of ambitious, progressive project. Effort at
the moment is being concentrated on the Kpong scheme (downstream of
Akosombo), where a dam is to be built to produce more hydroelectricity.
The proposed project / Canadian International Development Agency, 19757
consists of a dam 20 metres high with associated dikes six kilometres
in length to hold back a lake of almost 4000 hectares. From this
area 5500 people will have to be resettled. Total cost of the project
is estimated at Kft 149 million, and the power output should be 144 MW
or more. The Kpong scheme is designed to satisfy Ghana's future
demands for electrical power, but whether it will be used to supply
indigenous consumers or further aluminium smelting .capacity in Ghana
is, as yet, unclear.
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